S.G. Ponnambalam and Another vs T.A. Palanivelu

Abdul Hadi, J.—The defendants are the revision petitioners in this civil revision petition, which arises out of I.A. No. 734 of 1992 filed by

the respondent-plaintiff in his suit O.S. No. 479 of 1992. In the suit and I. A., he has claimed that he is a lessee of the suit property and that the

defendants-landlords are interfering with his possession. So, in the suit he sought for permanent injunction and in I.A. No. 734 of 1992, for

temporary injunction. The said I.A. was allowed and the court granted temporary injunction. The said temporary injunction was confirmed in

appeal in C.M.A. No. 21 of 1992 filed by the defendants. Aggrieved by the abovesaid concurrent grant of temporary injunction by the courts

below, the defendants have preferred this civil revision petition.

The main submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that even assuming that the respondent-plaintiff was in possession of the suit

non-residential building after the death, in 1982, of his father Arunachalam Chettiar (who was admittedly the lessee of a part of the suit building

namely Door No. 2, while the suit building consists of Door Nos. 1 and 2) the respondent-plaintiff is not a ""tenant"" within the meaning of Section

2(8)(ii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act even as per the respondent''s own plea in his plaint. Section 2(8) of the said Act

defines the term ""tenant"" and the relevant portion of the definition runs as follows: ""Section 2(8): ""tenant"" means any person by whom or on whose

account rent is payable for a building and includes the surviving spouse, or any son, or daughter, or the legal representative of a deceased tenant

who-

(i) ....

(ii) in the case of a non-residential building, had been in continuous association with the tenant for the purpose of carrying on the business of the

tenant upto the death of the tenant and continues to carry on such business thereafter,.... .

So, according to this definition, in the case of a non-residential building, after the death of the original tenant, if the successor wants to claim as a

tenant of the said non-residential building, he should have been in continuous association with the original tenant, for the purpose of carrying on the

business of the original tenant, upto his death, and should also have continued the said business in the said building after the said death also. But, in

the present case, according to the petitioners'' counsel, the first of the abovesaid two requirements (namely, the abovesaid association upto the

death of the original tenant), stipulated u/s 2(8)(ii) has not even been pleaded in the plaint in the suit. The relevant plea in the plaint is as follows:

The suit property was originally leased out in the year 1962 by one Rukmani Ammal who is the mother of the 1st defendant to the father of the

plaintiff namely T.A. Arunachalam Chettiar and he took the property for lease in the year 1962 and he died in the year 1982, till then the plaintiffs

father was running the old and waste paper business and vessels business. At the beginning, the plaintiffs father was paying Rs. 100 as rent for both

the shops. After the demise, the plaintiff herein started doing the same business in the suit property from the year 1982 and till to-day.

The learned Counsel points out that there is absolutely no plea as to the above requirement of the respondent''s association with the original

tenant''s business prior to his death. If that is so, according to the counsel, the respondent cannot be a tenant at all under the said Act, unless there

is evidence to show that a new landlord and tenant relationship has come into being between the defendants and the plaintiff subsequently after the

death of the original tenant in 1982. In the present case, the learned Counsel points out that there is absolutely no documentary, or other

acceptable evidence showing that such relationship has come into being. Therefore, according to the said counsel, there is no justification at all for

granting temporary injunction in favour of the plaintiff, when the plaintiff has not thus shown that he is in lawful possession of the suit building.

On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the respondent could not advance any acceptable argument contra, with reference to the above

referred to first of the two requirements u/s 2(8)(ii) of the Act. No doubt, he attempted to cite certain authorities, but I find that those authorities

have either no application or they do not lay down any different proposition of law. The learned Counsel for the respondent could not also point

out that the abovesaid tenancy relationship has come into being afresh, at least after the death of the respondent''s father.

Therefore, I have necessarily to hold that at least no prima fade conclusion could be reached at this interlocutory stage that the plaintiff was the

tenant"" of the suit building, in view of the above referred to absence of plea regarding the abovesaid first requirement u/s 2(8)(ii) of the Act.

No doubt, there was also an argument by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that even the plaintiff''s father was not lessee with reference to

door No. 1 of the suit building. But, there is no; necessity to go into that question, in view of the abovesaid legal position u/s 2(8)(ii) of the Act, I

have necessarily to conclude that there is no prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff for granting temporary injunction. Accordingly, the orders of

both the courts below are set aside and the civil revision petition is allowed. No costs. However, at the request of the learned Counsel for the

respondent, I direct the court below to dispose of the trial of the suit O.S. No. 479 of 1992 as expeditiously as possible preferably within six

months from the date of receipt of this order.