Sh. Chaman Lal vs Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board & Others

Ajay Mohan Goel, J

By way of this writ petition, the petitioner is assailing the Award dated 30.06.2008, passed by the learned Labour Court in Reference no. 10 of 1996, titled as Shri Chaman Lal Vs. Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board & others (Annexure P-10), in terms whereof, the Reference made by the appropriate Government to the learned Labour Court was answered by the learned Labour Court by rejecting the case.

Brief facts necessary for the adjudication of this petition are that the following Reference was made by the appropriate Government to the learned Labour Court:-

“Whether the termination/retrenchment of services Shri Chaman Lal worker by the Secretary, Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board, Shimla w.e.f. October, 1990, without notice, inquiry, charge sheet and compliance of section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified. If not to what relief and amount of compensation, Shri Chaman Lal is entitled to?”

The claim put-forth by the workman before the learned Labour Court was that he was appointed as a Beldar on 12.06.1989 with Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board (HPSEB), but was assigned duties with Nathpa Jhakri Construction Division No.7. He worked as such till the month of October, 1990, when his services were terminated by informing him that he would be assigned duties later on.

Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that termination of services of the petitioner in the month of October, 1990 was in fragrant violation of provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, as no notice etc., as is envisaged under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was served upon him.

The claim of the petitioner was resisted by the respondents, who besides raising the issues of delays and latches took the stand that the petitioner was not engaged as alleged and his name indeed was not reflected in the list of the workers who were actually engaged by HPSEB and were called upon to perform their duties with NJPC.

On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, learned Labour Court framed the following issues:-

“1. Whether the termination of the services of the petitioner is in violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as alleged? OPP.

Whether the application in its present form is not maintainable? OPR.

Whether the petitioners have no cause of action to maintain this petition? OPR.

Whether the petitioners have no locus standi to file the present application? OPR.

Whether the reference is barred by delay and laches on the grounds as alleged?

A Whether the respondent No.3 is not necessary party as alleged? OPR-3.

Relief.”

On the strength of the evidence led by the parties, the issues so framed were answered as under:-

“Issue No.1 No.

Issue No.2 No.

Issue No.3 No.

Issue No.4 No.

Issue No.5 No.

Relief: Reference dismissed per operative part of the award.”

Learned Labour Court while deciding issue No.1, held that the claim of the workman was that he had worked for more than 240 working days in preceding 12 months as from the date of his termination, yet his services were terminated without complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. Learned Labour Court held that except his bald assertion, no material was placed on record by the petitioner to substantiate this fact and, therefore, the petitioner was not entitled for any relief as it could not be established by him that there was any violation of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act by the respondents.

Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner has filed this writ petition.

During the course of the hearing of this writ petition, earlier on 23.08.2011, this Court had directed the respondent-Board to produce the entire record relating to the engagement of daily waged employees on the establishment of the Board in Division No.7, from June 1989 upto October, 1990. Again on 27. 03.2012,  the  record  was  called  for  and  thereafter,  on 20. 04.2012, the case was ordered to be listed on 09.05.2012, on which date, Chief Executive Officer of the Board was called upon to remain present in the Court with records to assist the Court. On 09.05.2012, the judgment was reserved and the writ petition was dismissed by the Hon’ble Coordinate Bench on 28.05.2012.

Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner filed a Letters Patent Appeal, which was allowed by the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court, on the ground that as no reasons were assigned by the parties as to why the record directed by the Court was not produced before the learned Single Judge, therefore, the Hon’ble Division Bench was having no option, but to remand the matter back to learned Single Judge, who shall proceed afresh in the matter, in light of order passed on 23. 08.2011.

Thereafter also, parties were directed to produce the relevant record. In this backdrop, when the case was listed on 27.02.2025, the following order was passed:-

“Ms. Sunita Sharma, learned Senior Counsel submits that she has instructions to appear on behalf of respondent No. 1 and she be granted some time to prepare the case.

Taking into consideration the fact that the writ petition pertains to the year 2008, the same is ordered to be listed for hearing on 17.03.2025. It is clarified that ordinarily no adjournment shall be granted in the matter.”

Certain record has been produced by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent-Board, but she submitted that Board has no record as was directed to be produced.

Be that as it may, the fact of the matter is that it is the petitioner who raised the industrial dispute. It was on his demand that a Reference was made by the appropriate Government to the learned Labour Court. Because it was the allegation of the petitioner that he had served for more than 240 days in preceding 12 months before his alleged termination, the onus was upon him to prove that indeed he had served for more than 240 days in the preceding 12 months as from the date of his alleged termination. As has been recorded by the learned Labour Court and as is also evident from the record, not even an iota of evidence has been produced on record by the petitioner to substantiate this fact. He has not examined any of his co-workers also to substantiate or prove this fact that he indeed was (a) serving, and (b) serving for more than 240 days in the preceding 12 months as from the date of the termination of his services.

In this backdrop, as this Court also is not in a position to hold that there was indeed a violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, but natural the findings returned to this effect by the learned Labour Court, cannot be disturbed. Though, this Court had directed the respondents to produce the record but because they are not producing the record an adverse inference is being drawn against respondent No.1, but this adverse inference cannot be drawn to such an extreme that this Court starts imagining facts which otherwise do not exist. In other words, by drawing adverse inference, this Court cannot hold that simply because respondent No.1 has not been able to produce the record in terms of the directions passed by this Court, therefore, it will be assumed that the petitioner was engaged by it and had completed more than 240 days in the preceding 12 months as from the date of his alleged termination.

Even otherwise, this Court is of the considered view that because it is the Award of learned Labour Court under challenge, therefore, whether or not the Award is sustainable, has to be ascertained on the basis of the material which was produced by the parties before the learned Labour Court.

During the course of the arguments learned counsel for the petitioner could not demonstrate that there was either any misreading or mis-appreciation of the documents on record by the learned Labour Court. In this background also, in exercise of its power of Judicial Review, this Court finds no reason to interfere with the Award passed by the learned Labour Court.

In light of the findings returned hereinabove, this writ petition is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.