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Judgment
5 paragraphs · 637 wordsDev Darshan Sud, J.—The petitioner challenges the order passed by the learned District Judge in appeal against the order passed by the learned trial Court on an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC directing the parties to maintain status quo qua the land comprised in Khata No. 223/22, Khatuni No. 485/33 min, Khasra Nos. 1214 to 1218. In D. Albert Vs. Lalitha and Others, , has clearly laid down that an order of status quo should define the position which the order seeks to maintain. The Court holds:
I am aware that many a court including the High Court have passed orders of ''status quo'' simpliciter. In fact, some time back, I came across an order of the High Court on the following lines: ''Petitioner claims to be in possession. Respondent filed a counter that he is in possession. In the circumstances, status quo should continue till the disposal of the appeal. It is obvious that such orders should not passed by any court, high or low. Whenever a Court passes an order directing the preservation of ''status quo'' it should by the same order state in unequivocal terms what the ''status quo'' is. Otherwise the court will be failing to do its duty.
In Kishore Kumar Khaitan and Another Vs. Praveen Kumar Singh, , the Court held:
5.It is necessary to notice at this stage that in an original suit of this nature, it was not appropriate for the Additional District Judge to pass an order directing the parties to maintain status quo, without indicating what the status quo was. If he was satisfied that the appellant before him had made out a prima facie case for an ad interim ex parte injunction and the balance of convenience justified the grant of such an injunction, it was for him to have passed such an order of injunction. But simply directing the parties to maintain status quo without indicating what the status quo was, is not an order that should be passed at the initial stage of a litigation, especially when one court had found no reason to grant an ex parte order of injunction and the appellate court was dealing with only the limited question whether an ad interim order of injunction should or should not have been granted by the trial court, since the appeal was only against the refusal of an ad interim ex parte order of injunction and the main application for injunction pending suit, was still pending before the trial court itself. Therefore, we are prima facie of the view that the Additional District Judge ought not to have passed an equivocal order like the one passed in the circumstances of the case. But of course, that aspect has relevance only to the extent that before ordering an interim mandatory injunction or refusing it, the court has first to consider whether the plaintiff has proved that he was in possession on the date of suit and on the date of the order and he had been dispossessed the next day. Unless a clear prima facie finding that the plaintiff was in possession on those dates is entered, an order for interim mandatory injunction could not have been passed and any such order passed would be one without jurisdiction.
The defendant appealed. The learned appellate Court has vacated the order on the finding that a partition had actually taken place between the parties before the revenue authorities and had attained finality. In these circumstances, the learned court holds that it is not open to the learned trial Court to exercise its powers under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C. and issued interim orders. In these circumstances, I find that the learned appellate Court has exercised its jurisdiction in accordance with law. Petition is disposed of.
