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272 paragraphs · 5,621 wordsBy this writ petition, filed under Article 226,read with sec.103 of the constitution of J&K, the petitioner is calling in question the validity of the
Government order dated 9,12.2003 by which he has been compulsorily retired from service. The service profile of the petitioner is that he came to
be appointed as Tehsildar in November 1977 in J&K Revenue service after having been declared successful in Combined Competitive
Examination conducted by the J&K Public Service Commission. He was promoted to the post of Assistant Commissioner in May 1986 and to the
post of Addl. Deputy Commissioner in November 1995. In December 1996 he was posted as Deputy Commissioner Kupwara and in February
1999 as Deputy Commissioner Pulwama. In February 2002 he was appointed as Director Rural Sanitation Jammu from which post he has been
compulsorily retired.
On the basis of the newspaper cutting attached with the petition it is alleged that on the floor of Legislative Assembly, on the demand of the
opposition in the Budget Session 2003, a list containing names of the officers, including IAS/IPS/IFS officers against whom corruption cases were
pending in Courts or were under investigation, was tabled. The petitioner was one of them against whom FIR No.19/2001 stood registered with
the Vigilance organization Kashmir on the allegation that he in connivance with his staff had made disbursement of exgratia amounts for nonexistent
structures and for such structures which were not migrant properties, during his posting as Dy. Commissioner Kupwara. It was also stated in the
news item published by Daily Excelsior in its issued dated 4.12.2003 that in a bid to check corruption in bureaucracy State Cabinet has
empowered the Chief Minister to sanction termination of the tainted public servants including Gazetted Officers in the State. Same paper in its
issued dated 11.12.2003 carried a news item that to remove the deadwood and tainted public servants from the administration the State
Government has retired 15 Government Officers (which includes the petitioner also) in exercise of its powers vested in it under Art. 226(2) of the
J&K C.S.R.
The petitioner has been compulsorily retired vide Government order No1546GAD of 2003 dated 9.12.2003 which reads as follows:
Whereas the Government is of the opinion that it is in the public interest to do so, Now therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by Art. 226
(2) of Jammu and Kashmir Civil Service Regulations, the Government hereby gives notice to Shri Shah Latif, KAS, Director Rural Sanitation
Jammu that he having already attained 48 years of age, shall retire from service with effect from forenoon of 9th of December, 2003.
He is allowed three months pay and allowances in lieu of three months notice.
By order of the Government of Jammu and Kashmir.
The abovesaid Government order is being challenged by the petitioner inter alia on the following grounds:
A The decision to retire the petitioner is based upon malaflde exercise of power; B There was no material available against the petitioner for being
made basis for arriving at the conclusion that the retirement of the petitioner would be in public interest, therefore it is arbitrary in nature;
C The order is punitive in nature and carries with it a stigma against the petitioner and being not based upon an inquiry is against law;
D The Chief Minister was not competent to order or recommend compulsory retirement of the petitioner.
The stand of the respondents is that the Government with a view to bring cleanliness in the administration and its day today functioning in the
State took up various measures, one of them being to see that the officers/officials whose continuation in the service was not in public interest
should be prematurely retired by taking recourse to Art.226 (2) of the J&K C.S.R. Accordingly a Committee was set up vide Govt. order
No.713GAD of 2003 dated 10.6.2003 comprising of the Chief Secretary, Financial Commissioner and Commissioner/Secretary to Government
Law Department. Subsequently vide Govt. order No.887GAD of 2003 dated 11.7.2003 the Principal Secretary Planning & Development
Department was also nominated to be as one of the members of the said committee. Said committee after its formation held series of meeting and
took note of the principles, which have been laid down by the High Courts and Hon'ble Supreme court through various judgments on the issue for
compulsory retirement. The committee in series of meetings scrutinized the service record and other relevant facts of various officers, including the
petitioner, and thereafter came to the conclusion that it was in the interest of the administration and public in general that the petitioner who had
already completed 22 years in government service shall be retired prematurely from Government service. It has further been stated in the
objections that the service record was not the sole criteria on the basis of which compulsory retirement of the petitioner was ordered but a number
of other aspects and factors have been taken note of. The order against the petitioner has been passed after due application of mind and in terms
of the rules on the subject.
It is pertinent to mention here that the petitioner has impleaded Shri Mufti Mohd Sayeed, Chief Minister of J&K and Mr. Muzaffar Hussain
Beig, Minister of Finance, Law and Parliamentary Affairs as party to the writ petition and has arrayed them as respondents Nos.5&6. The
allegation of mala fide has been leveled against both of them in para 13 of the petition by stating as follows:
That the petitioner respectfully submits that during the period from December 1996 to July 1998 when he was posted as Dy. Commissioner
Kupwara, elections for parliamentary seat of Baramulla were held in the month of March 1998. Respondent No.6 was a contesting candidate from
the Parliamentary constituency of Baramulla which includes district of Kupwara as well. Since the respondent No.6 was defeated by Prof.
SaifudDin Soz the national conference candidate, as he then was respondent No.6 nourished a grudge against the petitioner attributing personal
motives to the latter for supporting the national conference candidate. Infact during the counting of the votes when respondent No.6 noticed that he
is losing the election, abused the petitioner for having sided with national conference candidate and threatened him of dire consequences, whenever
he gets a chance. Again unfortunately during the tenure of petitioner as Dy. Commissioner Pulwama from February 1999 to December 1999 the
midterm poll for Parliament was scheduled and held in the months of SeptemberOctober 1999 and to the misfortune of the petitioner the present
Chief Minister, respondent No.5 herein unsuccessfully contested from AnantnagPulwama Parliamentary constituency and he too publicly accused
the petitioner for having behaved as a District President of National Conference, since, Pulwama district falls within the parliamentary constituency
of Anantnag. In the circumstances, precisely narrated herein above both the respondent No.5 and 6 harbored grudge against the petitioner and
ultimately when it came to socalled weeding out of deadwood they did not find any senior officer from the administration, other than the petitioner
for weeding out as deadwood.
This Court after taking notice of the averments of the petitioner ordered for issuance of notice to the official respondents 1 to 4 in the first
instance only meaning thereby that the averments made in the writ petition against respondents 5&6 were not considered sufficient calling for
issuance of a notice to them. Pursuant to the notice, respondents 1 to 3 have filed objections. After filing of the objections the petition came to be
listed on 17.3.2004 on which date following order was passed:
Learned counsel for the parties stated that instead of admitting the writ petition it may be decided at this stage. As prayed, writ petition is directed
to be set down in order cases for final hearing in the week commencing from 12th of April 2004. Service record and any other record relevant for
the decision of this case shall be produced by the respondents at the adjournment date of hearing.
Thereafter the petition came to be taken up for final hearing on 2.9.2004. Learned counsel for the petitioner while making submission for taking
up the petition for final hearing does not appear to have insisted for issuance of notice to respondents 5&6 against whom malafide stood alleged,
Confronted with this position learned counsel for the petitioner at the time of hearing did not seriously press the ground of malafide. In all fairness I
must say that Mr. Goni was right in not pressing the ground of mala fide for the reason that the order impugned in the case has not been passed
either by the Chief Minister or by the Finance Minister. It has come to be passed by the Government on the basis of recommendations of the
Committee constituted by the Government. The Committee consisted of senior officers of the Government and against the members of the
committee no bias or mala fide has been alleged by the petitioner. The circumstances quoted by the petitioner in the writ petition even otherwise
are too fragile and remote in time to be taken note of for inferring any mala fide against respondents 5&6 or for that matter any of the functionary
of the Government which had the occasion of examining the case of the petitioner in the capacity of a member of the screening committee.
As far the ground of incompetence of the Chief Minister in ordering or recommending premature retirement of the petitioner is concerned, firstly
it has also not been pressed by learned counsel for the petitioner and rightly so because there is nothing on record to show that the Chief Minister
had made the order or recommendation individually directing for compulsory retirement of the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner has
restricted his challenge to the order impugned on the ground that except registration of FIR No.19/2001 against the petitioner there was no other
material available to the Government on the basis of which it could hold that the petitioner was a deadwood in the administration. According to him
in the list which was tabled in the Legislative Assembly by the Government in which name of the petitioner as being one of the officers against
whom FIR No.19/2001 was pending also contained the name of the Financial Commissioner Mr. Vijay Bakaya but instead of taking action against
him he was inducted by the Government as one of the members of the screening committee. Mr. Goni submits that simply on the basis of
registration of an FIR which was pending investigation the petitioner could not be compulsorily retired after having rated him as deadwood.
According to him the APRs of the petitioner recorded during his service tenure contained not even a single adverse entry to be used against the
petitioner. The petitioner infact was slated to be inducted to IAS cadre and in this behalf eligibility list contained his name and by communication
No. GAD(SCR)IAS/2002 dated 4.7.2002 the petitioner was called upon to furnish his letter of consent in duplicate within two days as per
Performa enclosed. The petitioner accordingly had submitted his letter of consent to the Government for considering his case for induction and
promotion to IAS cadre. Mr. Goni submits that on one hand the petitioner was considered to be a meritorious officer deserving for
promotion/induction to IAS by the Government and on the other hand he was prematurely retired on the ground that his continuation in service was
detrimental to public interest. He argued that the order of the Government is arbitrary in nature and therefore, cannot be sustained. In order to
support his contention that compulsory retirement of the petitioner could not be in public interest he relies upon case titled H.C. Gargi v. State of
Haryana, AIR 1987 SC 65 in which it was held as follows:
The test in such cases is public interest as laid down by this court in Union of India V.J.N. Sinha (19711 SCR 791); AIR 1971 SC40). It does
not appear that there was any material on the basis of which the State Government could have formed an opinion that it was in pubic interest to
compulsorily retire the appellant at the age of 57 years. There was really no justification for his compulsory retirement in public interest.
In that case the State Government had ordered the compulsory retirement of the appellant on the basis of two adverse entries made by the then
Excise & Taxation Commissioner.
Mr. Goni further submits that the material which was being relied upon by the Government against the petitioner had not been supplied to him,
therefore, he was not in a position to defend himself properly. He argued that in Kailash Chander Agarwal v. State of M.P. AIR 1987 SC 1871
the Supreme Court had directed the High Court to disclose to the petitioner the prejudicial material on which it had relied and to afford to the
petitioner opportunity to represent against it. He further submits that registration of FIR alone could not be made basis for his compulsory
retirement and in support of his argument he relies upon case titled State of Gujrat v. Umedbhai M. Patel (2001(2) Supreme 193) in which it was
held that where pending disciplinary action officer was kept under suspension and despite sufficient time available enquiry was not completed and
there was no adverse entries in service records, order of compulsory retirement without waiting for conclusion of enquiry was unjustified especially
when the officer successfully crossed the efficiency bar.
Mr. Goni also relied upon case titled State of Gujrat v. Suryakant Chunilal Shah reported in 1999 (1) SCT208 in which in para 21 it was held
as follows:
The whole exercise described above would, therefore, indicate that although there was no material on the basis of which a reasonable opinion
could be formed that the respondent had outlived his utility as a Govt. servant or that he had lost his efficiency and had become a deadwood, he
was compulsorily retired merely because of his involvement in two criminal cases pertaining to the grant of permits in favour of fake bogus
institutions. The involvement of a person in a criminal case does not mean that he is guilty. He is still to be tried in a court of law and the truth has to
be found out ultimately by the court where the prosecution is ultimately conducted. But before that stage is reached it would be highly improper to
deprive a person of his livelihood merely on the basis of his involvement. We however hasten to add that relevant material for compulsory
retirement or not would depend upon the circumstances of each case and the nature of offence allegedly committed by the employee.
Mr. Goni in support of his contention that order of compulsory retirement was illegal because the relevant facts in arriving at the conclusion that
continuation of the petitioner in service was detrimental to the public interest were nonexistent relied upon S.R. Venkataram v. Union of India, AIR
1979 SC 49 in which case public servant was ordered to be retired prematurely and relevant record of the public servant did not reveal that
compulsory retirement was in public interest. The Supreme court held the order of compulsory retirement amounted to abuse of power which was
vested in the authority concerned and thus was liable to be set aside.
To urge that the reputation of the petitioner in the recent past was relevant and there was nothing against him, rather he was being considered
for his induction into IAS cadre, he relied upon M.S. Bindra v. Union of India, AIR 1998 SC 3058 in which their lordships held as follows:
''While viewing this case from the next angle for judicial scrutiny i.e. want of evidence or material to reach such a conclusion, we may add that want
of any material is almost equivalent to the next situation that from the available materials no reasonable man would reach such a conclusion. While
evaluating the materials the authority should not altogether ignore the reputation in which the officer was held till recently. The maxim ""Nemo fruit
Repente Turpissimus"" (no one becomes dishonest all on a sudden). It is not unexceptional but still it is solitary guideline to judge human conduct,
particularly in the field of administrative law. The authorities should not keep the eyes totally closed towards the overall estimation in which the
delinquent officer was held in the recent past by those who were supervising him earlier.
Per contra, Mr. Naik, learned Advocate General, has argued that the order for compulsory retirement can be made by the Government against
a public servant where public interest so demands. The Government with a view of cleansing the administration decided to weed out the
deadwood and corrupt officers from the administration. For the said purpose a committee of senior officers was constituted. Said committee
considered the record and other available material in respect of the petitioner and after due application of mind and consideration of record came
to the view that continuation of the petitioner in service was detrimental to the public interest and therefore he should be compulsorily retired.
Against the petitioner a criminal case raising serious doubts about his integrity was pending but that was not the sole criteria, which had weighed
with the committee against the petitioner, there was other material also. He has argued that the judicial review to the sufficiency or adequacy of the
material relied upon is not permissible. According to him only it is to be seen whether on the basis of the available record could a committee
formulate an opinion that it was in the public interest to retire the petitioner compulsorily. He submits that while considering the case of a
Government servant for his compulsory retirement no opportunity of being heard is required to be afforded, as principles of natural justice have no
application in such matters. According to him the order of compulsory retirement of a Government servant is not an order of punishment and
therefore before passing such an order no formal enquiry is necessary. In support of his contentions he has relied upon the following judgments:
AIR 1995 SC 1623
AIR 1994 SC 1261
AIR 1987 SC 1871
AIR 1996 SC 227
AIR 1998 SC 982
AIR 1998 SC 1660
1993 (2) SCC 179.
Learned Advocate General also submits that the name of the petitioner was not included in the eligibility list of officers for induction into IAS
cadre on the basis of merit but was kept in view of his seniority position in a particular grade. His merit was yet to be assessed by the competent
committee. Therefore, simply because the name of the petitioner figured in the eligibility list it cannot be said that petitioner stood rated as
meritorious.
I have considered the contentions raised by learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the case. Learned Advocate General has
also produced the record pertaining to the petitioner. Same has also been perused by me meticulously.
Every Government servant has a right to continue in service subject however to the rule of superannuation fixed by the service rules and rule as
to compulsory retirement or removal by way of punishment. But Government in exercise of its power vested in it under Art.226 (2) of the C.S.R.
is empowered to retire a Government servant. Art.226 (2) reads as under:
226(2)Notwithstanding anything contained in these Regulations Government may, if it is of the opinion that it is in the public interest to do so,
require any Government servant other than the one working on a post which is included in schedule II of these Rules, to retire at any time after he
has completed 22 years/44 completed six monthly period of qualifying service on attaining 48 years of age; provided that the appropriate authority
shall give in this behalf a notice (in one of the forms prescribed in annexures A and B hereto as the case may be), to the Government servant at
least 3 months before the date on which he is required to retire or 3 months of pay and allowance in lieu of such notice. Such a Government
servant shall be granted pensionary benefits admissible under these rules on the basis of qualifying service put in by him on the date of such
retirement
From the above reading of the afore quoted rule it is manifest that Government is empowered to retire a government servant at any time after
he has completed 22 years/44 completed six monthly period if it is in its opinion, in public interest. The object and purpose of premature retirement
appears to be to weed out inefficient, corrupt, deadwood or dishonest employees from the Government service. Though it is in the domain of
administrative powers of the Government to decide, as retirement of which government servant would be in the public interest yet every
administrative action to be legally valid has to be reasonable and fair and must have been taken uninfluenced by the extraneous considerations and
must not be malafide.
The Supreme Court in number of cases laid down various principles on the question of compulsory retirement. In Allahbad Bank Officers
Association v. Allahbad Bank, AIR 1996 SC 2030 it was held:
The power to compulsorily retire a Government servant is one of the facets of the doctrine of pleasure incorporated in Article 310 of the
constitution. The object of compulsory retirement is to weed out the dead wood an order to maintain efficiency and initiative in service and also to
dispense with the services of those whose integrity is doubtful so as to preserve purity in the administration. While misconduct and inefficiency are
factors that enter into the account where the order is one of dismissal or removal or of retirement, there is this difference that while in the case of
retirement they merely furnish the background and the enquiry, if heldand there is no duty to hold an enquiryis only for the satisfaction of the
authorities who have to take action, in the case of dismissal or removal they form the very basis on which the order is made, as pointed out by this
court in Shyam lal v. State of U.P. AIR 1954 SC 369"".
In State of Orissa v. Chandra Das AIR 1996 SC 2436 it was held:
It is needless to reiterate that the settled legal position is that the Government is empowered and would be entitled to compulsorily retire a
government servant in public interest with a view to improve efficiency of the administration to weed out the people of doubtful integrity or are
corrupt but sufficient evidence was not available to take disciplinary action in accordance with the rules so as to inculcate a sense of discipline in
the service. But the Government, before taking such decision to retire a Government employee compulsorily from service has to consider the entire
record the government servant including the latest reports. (Emphasis supplied).
In Baikuntha Nath Das v. Chief District Medical Officer, AIR 1992 SC 1020 the Apex court held:
(i) An order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment. It implies no stigma or any suggestion of misbehavior.
(ii) The order has to be passed by the Government on forming the opinion that it is in the public interest to retire a government servant
compulsorily. The order is passed on the subjective satisfaction of the government.
(iii) Principles of natural justice have no place in the context of an order of compulsory retirement. This does not mean that judicial scrutiny is
excluded altogether. While the High Court or this court would not examine the matter as an appellate court, they may interfere if they are satisfied
that the order is passed (a) mala fide or (b) that it is based on no evidence or (c) that it is arbitrary in the sense that no reasonable person would
form the requisite opinion on the given material; in short, if it is found to be a perverse order;
(iv) The Government (or the Review Committee, as the case may be) shall have to consider the entire record of service before taking a decision in
the matter of course attaching more importance to record of and performance during the later years. The record to be so considered would
naturally include the entries in the confidential records/character rolls, both favourable and adverse. If a government servant is promoted to a higher
post notwithstanding the adverse remarks, such remarks lose their sting., more so if the promotion is based upon merit(selection) and upon
seniority.
(v) An order of compulsory retirement is not liable to be quashed by a court merely on the showing that while passing it uncommunicated adverse
remarks were also taken into consideration. The circumstance by itself cannot be a basis for interference.
In State of Gujrat v. Umedbhai M. Patel, AIR 2001 SC 1109 their lordships of the Supreme court have stated the law relating to compulsory
retirement as follows:
The law relating to compulsory retirement has now crystallized into definite principles which could be broadly summarized thus:
(i) Whenever the services of a public servant are no longer useful to the general administration, the officer can be compulsorily retired for the sake
of public interest;
(ii) Ordinarily the order of compulsory retirement is not to be treated as a punishment coming under Article 311 of the constitution.
(iii) For better administration it is necessary to chop off dead wood but the order of compulsory retirement can be passed after having due regard
to the entire service record of the officer;
(iv) Any adverse entries made in the confidential record shall be taken note of and be given due weightage in passing such order;
(v) Even uncommunicated entries in the confidential record can also be taken into consideration;
(vi) The order of compulsory retirement shall not be passed as a short cut to avoid departmental enquiry when such course if more desirable;
(vii) If the officer was given a promotion despite adverse entries made in the confidential record, that is a fact in favour of the officer;
(viii) Compulsory retirement shall not be imposed as a punitive measure.
In Thakur Prasad v Rajkaran AIR 2003 SC 1365 the order of compulsory retirement was not interfered with by the Apex Court saying:
In the present case no mala fides are attributed. The Screening Committee consisting of high officials had perused the record including the report
of the Rao Committee and recommended for compulsory retirement. Thereafter on that recommendation the order of compulsory retirement was
passed. The learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench of the High Court did not find any good ground to interfere with the order of
compulsory retirement. This being the position we do not find any merit in this appeal. Consequently it stands dismissed but with no order as to
costs.
Now keeping in mind the basic principles relating to compulsory retirement I proceed to examine the validity of the order impugned by virtue
of which petitioner has been compulsorily retired. In view of the law laid down in Baikuntha's case (supra) judicial interference is permissible if the
court is satisfied that the order is passed (a) malafide (b) or it is based on no evidence (c) that it is arbitrary in the sense that no reasonable person
would form the requisite opinion in the given material, in short if it is found to be a perverse order.
In the present case the ground of challenge being pressed for by the learned counsel for the petitioner is ground(c). The contention of Mr. Goni
is that against the petitioner the only available material was registration of FIR 19, which alone could not be made basis for the compulsory
retirement of the petitioner. The submission of learned Advocate General is that other material besides the FIR was considered by the Screening
Committee for arriving at the relevant conclusion.
I have perused the record of the Government. From the perusal of the record it transpires that Screening Committee formulated the following
three principles for adjudging and deciding the issue of compulsory retirement of Government Officers, including the petitioner:
(a) Order of compulsory retirement is not regarded as a punishment under Article 311 of the constitution of India;
(b) An employee who has outlived his utility can be compulsorily retired in public interest;
(c) If the general reputation of the officer/official is not good, he can be compulsorily retired in public interest.
The Screening committee is stated to have gathered information from a crosssection of the people about the general reputation of officers. It
also consulted the Vigilance Commissioner, the Inspector General of Police, Crime & Railways, the Director Accounts and Treasuries, the
Directors of Consumer Affairs and Public Distribution Systems Jammu & Srinagar. It came to decision to recommend compulsory retirement of
the petitioner on the basis of the following material:
When Shri Shah Lateef, was posted as Deputy Commissioner Kupwara there were confirmed reports from cross sections of the people that he
would take money from exgratia relief sanctioned for the damaged infrastructure and from the exgratia relief sanctioned in favour of NOKs of
those who got killed due to militancy.
There are also allegations that as Deputy Commissioner Kupwara, Shri Shah Lateef withdrew Rs.2.78 lakhs interest money for EAS/GRY Bank
account on the pretext of repairing vehicles damaged during elections and which amount has allegedly been misappropriated by him.
As Tehsildar Mendhar he was alleged to have taken money in the matter of appointments in Fire brigade organization and a case was challaned in
the court of law under file No.219/challan of the court of Special Judge Anti Corruption Jammu. Although he was acquitted by the court yet there
are general complaints that he had been resorting to malpractices on the various posts he has held from time to time.
The relevant material from which the aforementioned allegations have emerged against the petitioner is available on the record and the same
appears to have been taken note of. It is thus not a case of no evidence. The material is available. Whether the material was sufficient for drawing
the inference that petitioner was not suitable for continuation in service, is the question, which cannot be gone into by this court in exercise of its
power of judicial review being not a court of appeal.
The service record of the petitioner has not remained completely clean. When he was Tehsildar he was prosecuted on corruption charges in
the court of Special Judge Anticorruption. He was acquitted because the witnesses of the prosecution had turned hostile. Another FIR is pending
investigation. During the period of his stint as Dy. Commissioner Kupwara he is alleged to have withdrawn Rs.2.78 lacs interest money and having
misappropriated the same. In this behalf communication No.AgriPC/9798 dated 2.6.1999 of the Addl. Secretary to Government Rural Dev.
Department written to the Secretary to Government G.A.D. existing in the record is relevant which is reproduced hereunder:
Commr/Secretary to Govt. General Administration Department may kindly refer communication No.DRDK/377954 dated 26.09.1998 of District
Dev. Commissioner Kupwara addressed to him copy endorsed to this department. It is abundantly clear from the report received from the present
District Dev. Commissioner Kupwara that withdrawal of Rs.2.78 lakhs from EAS/JRY bank account by Ex. District Dev. Commissioner
Kupwara Shri Shah Latif, is a simple case of embezzlement. Copy of the letter received from District Dev. Commissioner Kupwara is enclosed.
The said officer on the pretext of repairing vehicles belonging to District Dev. Commissioner has not spent the amount on the said repair and has
simply pocketed it. Besides repair of vehicles belonging to District Dev. Commissioner is not a charge on EAS/JRY funds. This is a clear violation
of the guidelines. It may also be added that in our administrative arrangement where wages employment programmer and self employment
programmes have separated administrative set up in the form of Assistant Commissioner Development and Project Officer DRDA, the governing
body of DRDA has absolutely no jurisdiction over the funds of EAS/JRY. Therefore, the action of the governing body is also bad in the eyes of
law. In view of the circumstances stated above, it is requested to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the erring officer.
The service record of the petitioner is not such that no finger can be raised against him. Such being the position it can also not be said that no
man of ordinary prudence would doubt the integrity of the petitioner. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that there
was no material available against the petitioner does not merit acceptance.
The Screening Committee has objectively applied the valid principles for considering the case of the petitioner for compulsory retirement.
Therefore no exception can be taken to its decision. The order impugned passed by the Government in my considered opinion merits to be upheld.
The power to compulsorily retire a Government servant being one of the facets of the doctrine of pleasure incorporated in Art.310 of the
constitution and being not in the nature of a punitive action, the requirement of establishing misconduct during the service tenure of the Government
servant sought to be compulsorily retired is not necessary. A Government servant against whom a reasonable doubt about his integrity can
reasonably be entertained on the basis of the available material, he can be retired compulsorily.
In the facts and circumstances of the case, therefore, no exception to the compulsory retirement of the petitioner merits to be taken and the
order impugned therefore calls for no interference. The petition of the petitioner is accordingly dismissed alongwith connected CMPs.
Record Returned.
