Shahbuddin Ismailbhai Ghaswala vs Keshavlal Lallubhai Tandel and Another

A.P. Ravani, J.—The petition is directed against the order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Pardi below Exh. 29 in Regular Civil Suit No. 97 of 1983 filed by the respondent No. 2. alleged tenant against respondent No. 1 the landlord. By the aforesaid order the petitioner, who was not a party to the suit, has been deprived of his possession of the suit premises which are situated at City Survey No. 327 of Vapi town and which consist of two rooms on the ground floor and two rooms on the first floor. The detailed description with regard to area of the property in dispute is given in the plaint a copy of which has been produced on record by the counsel for the petitioner. The description reads as follows:

The petitioner occupied the property since the year 1968. By sale document dated June 22,1979, the respondent No. 1 herein (hereinafter referred to as "the landlord") purchased the property from one Kansa Dadabhai forcible possession from the petitioner. Hence, on or about March 12,1980, the petitioner filed complaint before the Police under the provisions of Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code and asked for protection. The Police made report to the Executive Magistrate concerned, who initiated the proceedings under the provisions of Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code and attached the property and sealed the same and called upon the parties concerned to show cause as to who was in lawful possession of the property. After recording evidence and after hearing the parties, the learned Magistrate decided the case in favour of the landlord and held that the landlord was in possession of the property on the date of dispute. This order was passed on August 15,1981. On the same day, the landlord is alleged to have executed a lease in favour of respondent No. 2 herein (hereinafter referred to as "the alleged tenant") and as per the this lease deed, the landlord handed over the possession of the disputed property to the alleged tenant.

The petitioner challenged the legality and validity of the order passed by the learned Executive Magistrate by filing Criminal Revision Application in Sessions Court of Valsad at Navsari. The revision application was dismissed by the learned Sessions Judge who confirmed the order passed by the learned Magistrate. The petitioner preferred Special Criminal Application No. 171 of 1982 in this High Court. This High Court after hearing the parties quashed and set aside the orders passed by the lower courts and held that the petitioner was in lawful possession of the property on the date of dispute (which would be March 12, 1980 or March 15, 1980). This Court further directed that the learned Executive Magistrate should restore the possession of the disputed property to the petitioner within a period of two months from the date of receipt of the writ of this Court.

After the aforesaid judgment was delivered by this High Court, the alleged tenant, i.e. respondent No. 2 herein, filed Civil Suit No. 97 of 1983 in the Court of Civil Judge (JD) Pardi, against the landlord (respondent No. 1). The alleged tenant prayed in the Suit that the landlord be restrained from interfering with his possession of the property without obtaining a decree from a competent court. Thus the suit was filed for permanent injunction restraining the landlord from taking possession from the alleged tenant. The trial court granted the injunction as prayed for on September 23, 1983 and restrained the landlord from interfering with the possession of the alleged tenant the plaintiff. This injunction order was subsequently extended up to October 6,1983. The alleged tenant also submitted an application before the learned Executive Magistrate on October 10,1983 and stated that the Civil Court had granted injunction against the landlord and that he was in possession of the property in dispute and his possession should not be disturbed.

The petitioner approached the learned Executive Magistrate, Pardi, and prayed that as per the order of the High Court, he should be put in possession of the property. The learned Executive Magistrate ordered that the petitioner be put in possession of the property and accordingly he was put in possession of the property.

It may be noted that on September 29,1983 the petitioner submitted an application before the learned Judge praying that he be joined as a party to the proceedings. In the application the petitioner narrated the history of the litigation and pointed out that the suit was filed by the alleged tenant against the landlord in collusion with each other. He further submitted that his lawful right of getting the possession of the property as per the order of the High Court was being denied to him and that he was being deprived of the order passed by the High Court. He also submitted that he was a necessary party to the proceedings and therefore, he should be joined in the suit. However, the learned Judge did not pass any order below the application and the same remained pending.

On October 24, 1983, the alleged tenant submitted an application before the learned Judge and prayed that his possession of the property was disturbed by the petitioner, who had submitted an application for being joined as party in the proceedings that he was in lawful possession of the property since August 15, 1981 and his possession of the property was disturbed by the petitioner otherwise than in due course of law and he should be put in possession of the property in dispute. The alleged tenant in the application submitted that inherent powers u/s 151 of the CPC be exercised by the court. The trial court on the same day allowed the application of the alleged tenant. The trial court inter alia observed that in absence of the alleged tenant, and pending the suit the possession was taken by the petitioner whose application for being joined as a party was pending and was yet to be heard. The trial court found that prima facie the possession of the alleged tenant was as tenant and his possession was disturbed and therefore it was necessary to exercise powers u/s 151 of the CPC and the alleged tenant, the plaintiff, should be placed in possession of the disputed property by removing all the obstructions. As per the order passed by the trial court, the alleged tenant-the original plaintiff of Civil Suit No. 97 of 1983 has been put in possession of the disputed property.

It is the aforesaid order passed by the trial court which has been challenged in this High Court by invoking the provisions of Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Before dealing with the contentions on merits raised by the counsel for the petitioner, it would be proper to dispose of the preliminary objections raised by the counsel for the respondents.

It is contended that the petitioner had challenged the legality and validity of the impugned order by filing an appeal before the District Court of Valsad, and therefore, the petition should not be entertained and the same should be rejected. Counsel for the petitioner has stated that the appeal has already been withdrawn and the appeal was field on erroneous advice because an order passed u/s 151 of the CPC is not an appealable order. In view of the fact that the appeal has already been withdrawn by the petitioner, the contention that the petitioner has availed of an alternative remedy and therefore, the petition should not be decided on merits, does not survive.

Counsel for the respondent No. 2-alleged tenant has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Yunus Vs. Mohd. Mustaqim and Others, . Reliance is placed on the following observations in para 6 of the judgment:

Even if no appeal lay against the impugned orders of the learned Subordinate Judge, the petitioner had the remedy of filing a revision before the High Court u/s 115 of the Code. Upon any view of the matter, the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the impugned orders passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, under Article 227 of the Constitution. A mere wrong decision without anything more is not enough to attract the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227.

It may be noted that only the last sentence in the aforesaid observations made by the Supreme Court applies to the facts and circumstances of the case., The principle laid down by the Supreme Court is only to the effect that a mere wrong decision without anything more is not sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. Therefore, what is required to be seen in this case is: is it a case of mere wrong decision without anything more? or, is there a case of overstepping the limits of its authority by the trial court? or that there is failure on the part of the lower court to exercise jurisdiction and that there is disregard of principles of natural justice? The aforesaid factors are required to be taken into consideration in view of the observations made by the Supreme Court in Para 7 of the aforesaid judgment. The Supreme Court has observed:

The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited "to seeing that an inferior Court or Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority," and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record, much less an error of law....

The Supreme Court has further observed:

There was no failure on the part of the learned Subordinate Judge to exercise jurisdiction nor did he act in disregard of principle of natural justice. Nor was the procedure adopted by him not in consonance with the procedure established by law.

As per the settled legal position and as per the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, it is clear that it is not open to the High Court to act as an appellate court or-Tribunal and this High Court cannot review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior court or Tribunal is based. Even this High Court cannot correct errors of law in the decision of the lower court in exercise of its power under Article 227 of the Constitution.

In the instant case, it clearly appears that the trial court has overstepped its limits and has acted without jurisdiction and that too in dear disregard of the principles of natural justice. This is so because the order has been passed against a person who was not party to the proceedings. The petitioner had submitted an application for being joined as party, but his application was kept pending. Behind the back of the petitioner, an order is passed depriving him of his possession, I confess my ignorance of any provision of law which empowers a court to direct a person who is not a party before it to handover the possession of the disputed property. Counsel for the respondents were asked a pointed question to show me any provision of law which empowers a lower court (or for that matter any superior court) to issue orders against any person who is not party to the proceedings, directing him to handover possession of the property in dispute to someone else. A counsel for the respondents submitted that such powers would be there with the court under the provisions of Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code. He particularly relied on the phrase "shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power" of the court are not limited in any way and the court has ample power to pass orders which may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of court. True, the court has these powers. But the question is, would the inherent powers of the court take within sweep the powers to direct a person who is not party before the court, to handover possession of disputed property. I am Unaware of any such provision in law and the counsels appearing for the parties are also unable to show me any such provision by which a court of law is empowered to pass any such orders. In this view of the matter on the face of it, the order passed by the trial court against the petitioner, who was not a party to the proceedings, directing him to handover the possession of this property in dispute, is without jurisdiction. By passing this order, the trial court has overstepped its authority and has acted in an illegal manner.

Similarly, the order has been passed without affording an opportunity of being heard to the petitioner. In fact, it was shown in the application, Exh. 20, that the petitioner was in possession of property and he had taken possession of the property pursuant to the order of the High Court through the agency of Executive Magistrate. Even so, the learned Magistrate passed order against the petitioner and directed that the possession of the disputed property be given to the alleged tenant, i.e. plaintiff in the Civil Suit No. 97 of 1983. This order was certainly against the interest of the petitioner and could not have been passed so as to affect his rights and interest in the property without affording an opportunity of being heard to him. Thus the order being in contravention of the principles of natural justice is a nullity and therefore also, in the instant case this Court can exercise its power under Article 227 of the Constitution.

In above view of the matter, the preliminary objection raised by the counsel for the respondent No. 2 that the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable, has got to be rejected.

The learned Counsel for the respondent No. 2 (alleged tenant) submitted that the impugned order is under the provisions of Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 and not u/s 151 of the Civil Procedure Code. Therefore, in his submission, the petitioner must file civil misc. appeal in the court of District Judge. It is further submitted that the petitioner should have gone to the learned Judge himself and should have requested him for modifying the order passed behind his back. Counsel further submitted that even if the order is considered to be one u/s 151 of the Civil Procedure Code, the petitioner should be directed to file civil revision application u/s 115 the CPC and his petition under Article 227 of the Constitution should not be entertained.

The application ex-29, is itself u/s 151 of the CPC and the order passed by the learned Judge is also u/s 151 of the Civil Procedure Code. The bare reading of the application and the order passed below it, shows that the application is filed u/s 151 and the order is also passed u/s 151 of the Civil Procedure Code. Moreover, the provisions of Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 would be applicable only when an order is passed against the party to the suit. Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 makes provision for issuing temporary injunction against a person who is party to the suit. This provision does not empower the court to pass any injunction order against one who is not a party to the suit. Therefore, on this ground alone, it can be said that the order is not under the provisions of Order 39 Rules land 2 of the Civil Procedure Code. It appears that the learned Judge was conscious of this fact and therefore, he has expressly stated in the order that he was passing the order under the provisions of Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code. In this view of the matter, the contention that the petitioner should be directed to pursue the appeal filed by him or that the petition should be rejected and he should be directed to file fresh appeal and/or revision in the court of proper forum has no merits.

The contention that the petitioner should be directed to approach the learned Judge himself with a prayer that the impugned order be modified has also no merits. If one looks at the order it is clear that a mandatory order has been passed which is final in its nature. The order does not speak of any interim stage. The order is passed finally. Moreover, when the order is in flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice and when it is evident that the lower court has acted beyond the scope of its authority, this Court will be failing in its duty, if powers under Article 227 of the Constitution are not exercised and the lower court it not kept within the bounds of its authority. The argument that the remedy is by way of civil revision application u/s 115 of the CPC has also no merits. As stated hereinabove, when the lower authority acts beyond, the limits of its jurisdiction and acts in contravention of the principles of natural justice the powers of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India can be invoked. Moreover, the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution has already been admitted as far back as on January 13, 1984 (prior to that date, notice was issued and the parties were heard before admitting the matter.) Therefore, now it would serve no purpose to convert this proceedings into civil revision application. Even if the petition is treated as civil revision application, u/s 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, the same result would follow. Therefore, it would only be an academic exercise without any difference in substance. Hence this contention has also no merits and has got to be rejected.

The learned Counsel for the respondent No. 2-alleged tenant submitted that the order passed by the learned Executive Magistrate on October 12, 1983 directing the respondent No. 2 to hand over the possession of the disputed property to the petitioner was nullity. According to him, the High Court in its order delivered on September 7/8, 1983 in Special Criminal Application No. 171 of 1982 granted two months time for restoration of the possession of the disputed property. While the possession has been taken over on October 12, 1983, i.e. within two months from the date of order passed by the High Court, the contention is not based on correct factual position. The High Court passed the following direction:

It is further directed that the Executive Magistrate, Valsad, shall restore the possession of the disputed property to the petitioner within two months from the date of receipt of the writ of this Court.

The High Court did not say that for two months, the respondent-landlord should be allowed to remain in possession. The maximum time limit within which the learned Executive Magistrate should execute the order was indicated in the direction given by the High Court. Therefore, it cannot be said that there was stay order from the High Court. On this basis it; cannot be said that the order passed by the learned Executive Magistrate directing the respondent-landlord to hand over the possession of the disputed property on October 12, 1983 was a nullity.

Counsel for the respondent No. 2-alleged tenant submitted that when the learned Executive Magistrate issued order directing to hand over the possession of the disputed property on October 12, 1983, third party {i.e. alleged tenant, who was not party to the proceedings before the Executive Magistrate) was in possession of the property and the learned Magistrate could not have passed such order against third party. The contention does not seem to be factually correct. In the entire proceedings before the High Court no where it was stated by the respondent-landlord that he parted with the possession of the disputed property on August 15, 1981 and that respondent No. 2-alleged tenant'' was inducted in possession since then. The respondent-landlord filed an application before the High Court on October 14, 1983. By that application the respondent-landlord prayed for stay of the execution of the order passed by the High Court. In that application also nothing was stated by the respondent-landlord regarding the possession of third party meaning thereby, the possession of respondent No. 2-alleged tenant. Therefore, it appears that the story of third party (respondent No. 2-alleged tenant) being in possession appears to have been concocted. There appears to be much substance in the allegation made by the petitioner that the suit is filed by the respondent No. 2-''alleged tenant'' against respondent No. 1-landlord in collusion with each other. Apart from this factual position, it may be assumed that when the learned Executive Magistrate passed order on October 12, 1983, the respondent No. 2-alleged tenant was in possession of the property. Then also, the learned Executive Magistrate was bound to carry out the directions given by the High Court. When the High Court decided Special Criminal Application No. 171 of 1982 on September 7/8, 1983, the High Court decided the question regarding possession of the disputed property on the date of dispute. Be it noted that the proceedings u/s 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code were initiated on March 15, 1980. On that day the learned Executive Magistrate passed an order u/s 146 of the Criminal Procedure Code and attached and sealed the disputed property. At this stage it would be profitable to look at the provisions of Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code. As per Section 145 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Executive Magistrate is required to decide "whether any and which of the parties was on the date of the order made by him under Sub-section (1) in possession of the subject of dispute". The proceedings before the High Court arose out of the order passed by the learned Executive Magistrate u/s 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Therefore, when the High Court decided Special Criminal Application No. 171 of 1982 on September 7/8, 1983, and quashed and set aside the order passed by the lower courts, the High Court decided the question as to which of the parties was in possession of the disputed property on the date of dispute, meaning thereby, March 15, 1980. The High Court accordingly-directed that the party who was found to be in possession of the property on the date of dispute, i.e. the petitioner herein, should be put into possession of the property within a period of two months from the date of receipt of the order. Therefore, when the respondent No. 1-landlord inducted the respondent No. 2-alleged tenant into possession on August 15, 1981, this cannot affect the rights and interests of the petitioner, who, according to the High Court, was unlawfully and wrongly dispossessed of the disputed property on or about March 15, 1980.

The learned Counsel for the respondent No. 2-alleged tenant submitted that by an application dated October 10,1983, the learned Executive Magistrate was informed about the injunction granted by the trial court by which the respondent-landlord was restrained from interfering with the possession of respondent No. 2-''alleged tenant''. Despite this fact having been brought to the notice of the learned Executive Magistrate, he passed an order directing the respondent No. 1-landlord to handover the possession of the disputed property. Therefore, according to the counsel, the order passed by the learned Executive Magistrate was unlawful and'' illegal because it was against the injunction order passed by the trial court. The submission cannot be accepted. The learned Magistrate has followed the direction given by the High Court. It is not understood for what reason, the trial court thought it fit to by pass and/or ignore the order passed by the High Court, in Special Criminal Application No. 171 of 1982 decided on September 7/8 1983. The learned Judge ought not to have granted any injunction whatsoever in favour of the respondent No. 2- ''alleged tenant''. Even if he had granted the injunction, it was not an injunction against the learned Executive Magistrate. The learned Executive Magistrate was within his rights when he directed the respondent No. 1-landlord to hand over the possession of the disputed property to the petitioner. In fact, had the learned Executive Magistrate not passed such order he would have been guilty of flouting the directions given by the High Court.

Counsel for the respondent No. 2-''alleged tenant'' further submitted that the High Court had given direction for handing over the possession to the leared Executive Magistrate, Valsad and not to the learned Executive Magistrate, Pardi. Even so in this case the learned Executive Magistrate, Pardi, had issued the orders directing the landlord to handover the possession of the property in dispute. Therefore, according to the counsel for the respondent No. 2-alleged tenant, the order passed by the learned Executive Magistrate Pardi, was without jurisdiction. The submission cannot, be accepted for the simple reason that when the High Court give direction to the learned Executive Magistrate, Valsad, is did not mean that even if the property is situated within the jurisdiction of the Executive Magistrate, Pardi, the Jurisdiction should be exercised by the Executive Magistrate, Valsad. There is no dispute with regard to the fact that the disputed property is situated within the jurisdiction Executive Magistrate, Pardi. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that simply because in the operative portion, of the order passed by the High Court, the direction is given to the Executive Magistrate, Valsad, the Executive Magistrate, Pardi, in whose jurisdiction the disputed property is situated, could, not and should not have issued the directions for handing over the possession of the disputed property. It may also be noted that the initial order attaching the property was passed by the learned Executive Magistrate, Pardi. Later on, the proceedings were transferred to the Executive Magistrate, Valsad. Therefore, for the purpose of carrying out the directions given by the High Court, if the party has approached the learned Executive Magistrate, Pardi, in whose jurisdiction the property is situated, is cannot be said that any irregularity or illegality has been committed.

The learned Counsel for the respondent No. 2-''alleged tenant'' submitted that on equitable considerations also, this High Court should not exercise its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. According to him, the respondent has paid Rs. 10,000/- to the respondent No. 1-landlord and he is paying Rs. 500/- per month as and by way of rent to the respondent No. 1-landlord. The argument based on equitable consideration, if examined properly, comes to this: "Don''t look at the manner in which I have come into possession. Since I am in possession of the property for the last about 2-3 years, allow me to retain the possession." Such an argument cannot be accepted, much more so, when, on the face of it, it appears that here is collusion between the respondent No. 1-landlord and respondent No. 2-alleged tenant''. Moreover, apart from this collusion, the respondent No. 2-alleged tenant cannot claim any legal right, whatsoever in the disputed property when he has been inducted in the property on August 15, 1981, i.e. after the initiation of the proceedings u/s 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code (The proceedings u/s 145 of Criminal Procedure were initiated and the property was attached on March 15,1980). The High Court decided the question as to the lawful possession of the parties on September 7/8, 1983 and held that on the date of dispute, i.e. on March 15,1980, the petitioner was in lawful possession of the property. Thus, it is clear that the respondents have been able to keep the petitioner out of possession of the disputed property from March 15,1980 onwards, except for a brief period of a fortnight are so in the month of October 1983. Without there being any fault whatsoever on the part of the petitioner and even though the petitioner succeeded in High Court in getting the order in his favour the petitioner has been kept out of possession of the disputed property because the learned Civil Judge was not aware of the legal position and did not look at the order passed by the High Court and did not understand the implications of the order passed by him. Thus, even on the grounds of equitable considerations, the petitioner should be ordered to be put into possession of the disputed property immediately, and his continued dispossession on the basis of wholly illegal and erroneous order should not be permitted even for a day more.

The learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1-landlord submitted that the High Court decided Special Criminal Application No. 171 of 1982 on September 7/8, 1983 and granted stay for a period of two months and therefore, according to him, up to November 7,1983 possession of the disputed property should not have been ordered to be handed over to the petitioner. This contention has already been dealt with by me while dealing with the argument advanced by the respondent No. 2-alleged tenant. Therefore, it does not require to be repeated here.

The learned Counsel for the respondent-landlord was asked to explain as to why the landlord did not bring to the notice of the High Court that he had already parted with the possession of the property as far back as August 15, 1981 and the respondent No. 2-alleged tenant was in possession of the property in dispute, His attention was drawn to the pursis (page 36 of the compilation) filed by him before the learned Executive Magistrate on October 12, 1983 and application dated 14-10-1983 (Page 42 of the compilation) submitted by him in this High Court being Misc. Criminal Application No. 1805 of 1933. In the pursis filed before the learned Executive Magistrate, lie has not stated that the possession of the disputed property was handed over by him to the respondent No. 2-''alleged tenant'' on August 15,1981, Similarly, in the application before this Court submitted on October 14,1983, he has not stated that respondent No. 2-''alleged tenant'' was in possession of the disputed property. Even on that day, the application has been submitted on the basis that he was in possession of the disputed property and the same was likely to be disturbed. He had come before this Court for stay of the execution and implementation of the order passed by the court. In above view of the matter, the counsel for the landlord was asked to explain as to why he suppressed these material facts from the High Court and why he did not disclose that he, (the landlord) had parted with the possession of the property as far back as August 15, 1981. He was not in a position to explain this conduct of the respondent-landlord. No explanation whatsoever has been rendered by him for suppressing these material facts from the High Court. This is a very strong circumstance indicating that the entire story of respondent No. 2-alleged tenant having been inducted into the property as tenant as far back as August 15,1981 is a bogus and concocted story created subsequently with a view to deprive the petitioner of the fruits of the order passed by this High Court in Special Criminal Application No. 171 of 1982 on September 7/8, 1983.

The impugned order is admittedly passed without affording an opportunity of being heard to the petitioner. The petitioner''s application for being joined as party which was submitted on September 29,1983 was kept pending and no decision was given by the learned Civil Judge either allowing the application or rejecting the same. Thus, on the date of the order passed below Exh. 29, i.e. on October 24, 1983, the petitioner was not a party to the proceedings. Therefore, it is very clear that the order has been passed affecting the interest of the person who was not a party to the proceedings. Such an order cannot be passed by the trial court even under the provisions of Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code. No Court, much less the court of Civil Judge (JD) possesses any inherent power to pass orders against a person who is not a party to the proceedings. As stated hereinabove, in the beginning of this judgment, the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 2-''alleged tenant'', was requested to point out any provision of law which confers jurisdiction on the trial court or for that matter on any court whatsoever to pass orders affecting the possession of the property of a person who is not a party to the proceedings. The learned Counsel for the respondent-alleged tenant was not in a position to show any such provision of law. Moreover, the learned Judge has also acted against the settled legal position. In the case of Mesa Ahir v. Shamla Surat reported in 14 GLR 812, decided by this High Court, it is clearly held that in inquiry u/s 145 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Court decides the question as to possession on the date of the dispute between the parties. The Court has further observed:

As the Magistrate does not enter into an enquiry as to the title or right to such possession, the protection of that possession would be by virtue of an order made under Sub-section (6) of Section 145 irrespective of the question of title or right to such possession. This provision, in my opinion, confers a statutory right on a person found and declared to be in actual possession on the date of the order u/s 145 (1) to continue that possession till he is evicted in due course of law. Both the courts below have ignored this statutory right of the defendant. That right comes to an end only on passing of a decree or order for eviction in due course of law. So long as that right exists, no injunction could issue against the successful party.

True, in that case the party who lost in the proceedings u/s 145 ''of the Criminal Procedure Code had instituted civil suit and tried to obtain injunction from the trial court and had tried to disturb the possession of the party who succeeded in the proceedings u/s 145 of Cr. Pro. Code. Here, the only difference is that the landlord has set up another person the alleged tenant No. 2 - He has filed the suit and by obtaining order from trial court has tried to disturb the possession of the petitioner, who has succeeded in the proceedings u/s 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The principle laid down in the aforesaid case of Mesa Ahir (Supra) would be equally applicable to the facts and circumstances of present case. In this view of the matter, it is clear that the learned Civil Judge (JD) has acted in clear disregard of the principles laid down by this High Court. Moreover, the learned Civil Judge failed to take into consideration that the High Court had decided the question of possession of the parties. This possession could not have been disturbed finally by him without following the due process of law, meaning thereby, without final adjudication of the rival claims of the parties. In the instant case the learned Civil Judge even refused the petitioner to enter the fray and put up his claim. Even before he is allowed to enter into the fray, he has been deprived of his right to continue in possession of the disputed property.

In above view of the matter, the petition is required to be allowed. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge, (Junior Division), Pardi, below Exh. 29 in Civil Suit No. 97 of 1983 is quashed and set aside. The petitioner is directed to be put in possession of the disputed property forthwith. Rule made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs.

Office is directed to send the writ of the order immediately to the appropriate authorities.