Shahjahan Ali vs State Of H.P. Ors

Rakesh Kainthla, J

The petitioner has filed the present petition for issuing an appropriate writ, order or direction to release the petitioner on 42 days' parole as sanctioned vide release warrant dated 23.7.2025.

Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the petitioner was convicted of committing offences punishable under Section 302 and 376 read with Section 511 of Indian Penal Code (IPC) by learned Sessions Judge, Kinnaur, Sessions Division at Rampur Bushehr, District Shimla, H.P. and he was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life, pay a fine of ₹50,000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo further simple imprisonment for one year for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC, rigorous imprisonment for five years, pay a fine of ₹25,000/-for the commission of offence punishable under Section 376 of IPC read with Section 511 of IPC. The appeal preferred by the petitioner was dismissed by this Court on 11.12.2015. The petitioner had availed of 126 days' parole and surrendered within the stipulated time. The petitioner has served more than 16 years of his sentence, and his behaviour and conduct during his incarceration were satisfactory. He had applied for parole, and his parole application was not considered by the competent authority. The petitioner filed a Civil Writ Petition before this Court in which a direction was issued to decide the petitioner's parole application within 15 days. The respondents granted 42 days' parole to the petitioner and forwarded the release warrant to respondent No.4 for further action. Respondent No.4 sent a communication to Respondent No.5 for the acceptance of the surety bond. The petitioner's mother appeared before the respondent No.5 and submitted the surety bond, which was not accepted by respondent No.5. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and a direction be issued to the respondent No.5 to accept the surety bond.

The State filed the instructions dated 6.4.2026, stating that the petitioner has to furnish a surety bond to the satisfaction of the District Magistrate, Malda, West Bengal, in the sum of ₹1,00,000/- for observing the conditions specified in the release warrant. The letters were written to respondent No.5, who sent a surety bond of ₹1,00,000/- against Hibanama. Information was sought on whether respondent No.5 had accepted the surety bond, but no response was received.

I have heard Mr Parveen Sharma, learned Counsel for the petitioner, and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State.

Mr Parveen Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner was released on parole by the competent authority. His mother had furnished the surety bond before respondent No.5. Respondent No.5 had not accepted the bonds. The petitioner is unable to come out on parole due to the inaction on the part of respondent No.5. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the direction be issued to respondent No.5 to accept the surety bonds.

Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for respondents No.1 to 4 submitted that respondents 1 to 4 have already ordered the release of the petitioner subject to furnishing of the surety bond to the satisfaction of respondent No.5. Respondent No.5 is to accept the bond after which the petitioner can be released on bail. There is no inaction on the part of respondents No.1 to 4. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

It is an admitted case of the petitioner that an order of his release on parole has been passed by respondents No.1 to

The petitioner's grievance is that respondent No.5 is not accepting the bond, and the petitioner is unable to come out of jail on parole. Respondent No.5 is the District Magistrate, Malda, District Malda, West Bengal, which is located beyond the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Article 226(1) provides that the High Court shall have power throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction to issue any writ, etc. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Madan Gopal Rungta v. Secretary to Govt. of Orissa, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 123: 1962 Supp (3) SCR 906: AIR 1962 SC 1513 that the writs issued by the High Court cannot run beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Court. It was observed:

It is well settled by a series of decisions of this Court beginning with the Saka Venkata Subba Rao case [(1953) 1 SCC 320 : (1953) SCR 1144] that there is a two-fold limitation on the power of the High Court to grant a writ under Article 226. These limitations are firstly that the power is to be exercised throughout the territories in relation to which the High Court exercises jurisdiction, that is to say, the writs issued by the High Court cannot run beyond the territories subject to its jurisdiction, and secondly, that the person or authority to whom the High Court is empowered to issue such writs must be within those territories, which clearly implies that they must be amenable to its jurisdiction either by residence or location within those territories. The view taken in this case has been recently reaffirmed by this Court in Lt. Column Khajoor Singh v. Union of India [AIR (1961) SC 532 : (1961) 2 SCR 828]. Prima facie, therefore, as the final order in this case was passed by the Central Government, which is not located within the territories over which the High Court has jurisdiction, the High Court will have no power to grant a writ in this case.

In the present case, this Court is not exercising jurisdiction over a person residing in West Bengal, and the direction as prayed cannot be granted in favour of the petitioner.

The petitioner is seeking a direction to the learned District Magistrate to accept the surety bond furnished by the petitioner's mother. Such a direction cannot be issued. Accepting a bond is a quasi-judicial function and has to be discharged by the person accepting the bond. Since it is a quasi-judicial function, a direction cannot be issued to the authority to exercise the jurisdiction in a particular manner, as it would override the jurisdiction vested in the authority. Therefore, no direction can be issued to accept the bond furnished by the petitioner's mother.

No other point was urged.

Therefore, in view of the above, the present petition fails and is dismissed.

The observations made herein-above shall remain confined to the disposal of the present petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case.