Shakeel Singh and others vs State of Madhya Pradesh

Appellants have filed this appeal against the judgment dated 06.08.2013 passed in Sessions Trial No.186/2010. Trial Court held the appellants guilty for commission of offence punishable under Sections 148, 307 / 149 and 323 / 149 of IPC and awarded a sentence RI for 2 years in the first count, RI for 7 years with fine of Rs.500/- in the second count and RI for six months in the last count.

Learned counsel appearing on behalf of appellants has contended that he does not press the appeal on merits because the matter has been compromised between the parties hence, the appeal be considered on the question of sentence.

Appellants and complainant filed an application [I.A. No.17957/2016] for compromise. Both the parties appeared before the Registrar (J-II). Registrar (J-II) has recorded the following findings:- "In compliance of order dated 09.01.2017 of the Hon''ble Court, the case is listed today for verification of compromise:-

Appellant/Accused No. 1 :- Shakeel Singh, S/o Braj Singh.

Appellant/Accused No. 2 :- Sarman, S/o Braj Singh.

Appellant/Accused No. 3 :- Daulat, S/o Hari Chand Raghuwanshi.

Appellant/Accused No. 4 :- Hiralal, S/o Braj Singh Raghuwanshi.

Appellant/Accused No. 5 :- Harichand @ Hari Singh, S/o Braj Singh.

Appellant/Accused No. 6 :- Yuvraj, S/o Braj Singh.

All are residents of village Singodi Tola, Pachgaon, P.S. Chand, District Chhindwara, M.P. and

Complainant No. 1 :- Rajendra Singh, S/o Ajab Singh Raghuwanshi, R/o Singodi Tola, Pachhgaon, P.S. & Tahsil Chand, District-Chhindwara, M.P.

Complainant No. 2 :- Ved Singh, S/o Shri Ajab Singh Raghuwanshi, R/o Singodi Tola, Pachhgaon, P.S. & Tahsil Chand, District-Chhindwara, M.P.

Complainant No. 3 :- Santram, S/o Shri Shobharam Raghuwanshi, R/o Top, P.S. & Tahsil Chand, District Chhindwara M.P.

Complainant No. 4 :- Pappu @ Dashrath S/o Shri Raghuveer Raghuwanshi Singh, R/o Singodi Tola, Pachhgaon, P.S. & Tahsil Chand, District-Chhindwara, M.P.

The aforementioned Appellants/Accused persons No. 1 to 3 & 6 and complainants appeared before me.

Kind attention is invited to the fact that Appellants No. 4 Hiralal & 5 Harichand @ Hari Singh are in Jail.

Appellants/Accused persons are identified by Shri Mukesh Pandey Advocate (En.No. 1575/1989).

Complainants are identified by Shri Arvind Kumar Tiwari, Advocate (En.No. 2523/1996).

Appellant/Accused No.1 has submitted the copy of Aadhar Card and Appellants/Accused Nos. 2, 3 & 6 have submitted the copy of Voter ID for their identification.

Complainants No. 1, 3 & 4 have submitted the copy of their Aadhar Card and Complainant No. 2 has submitted the copy of Pan Card for his identification. This Cr.A. has been filed against the judgment dated 06.08.2013 passed by learned Additional Session''s Judge, Chhindwara in ST No. 186/2010, Appellants/Accused have been sentenced for the offence punishable u/s 148, 307/149 & 323/149 of IPC .

As per the order dated 06.08.2013 of Additional Session''s Judge, Chhindwara Appellants/Accused have been convicted in accordance with Para No.38 of the judgment.

Appellants and Complainants have filed an application i.e. I.A. No. 17957/2016 under section 320 (1), 324 (4) (a) and 320 (5). In compliance of order dated 09.01.2017 of the Hon''ble Court, I have recorded the statements of the complainants namely, Rajendra Singh, Ved Singh, Santram and Pappu @ Dashrath against whom offence is found proved by the Court of A.S.J. and also of accused Shakeel Singh. The statements are annexed wit this report for kind perusal.

Kind attention is also invited to the fact that offence under Section 307 / 149 of I.P.C. is non-compoundable. Hence, compounding under this Section is not permissible. Though as per the M.P. Amendment offence under Section 148 of IPC is compoundable but a proviso is also provided that if the accused is charged with other offence which is non-compoundable then, the offence under Section 148 is not compoundable. In this matter, accused persons are charged and convicted under Section 307 of the I.P.C. Therefore, Section 148 of the I.P.C. readwith the proviso does not appear to be compoundable.

I personally posed questions to the complainants to verify about the voluntariness of the proposed compromise. Complainants have expressed that, they voluntarily entered into a compromise with the Appellants/Accused persons with a view to improve their mutual relationships and to foster tranquility and peace between them and so to the society. Parties state that they on their own volition compromised and now bear cordial relations. They intend to maintain such relations in future also. I satisfied myself about the fact that complainants did not appear to be under any threat, inducement, force or pressure in entering into a compromise as proposed. Therefore, the proposed compromise stands verified.

Hence, the matter be placed before the Hon''ble Court as per order dated 18.01.2016 of the Hon''ble Court."

Prime facie, the aforesaid compromise, appears to be voluntarily and bonafide.

The Apex Court in the case of Yogendra Yadav and others vs State of Jharkhand and another, (2014) 9 SCC 653 has quashed criminal proceedings against the accused persons for the offences punishable under Sections 326 and 307 read with Section 34 of the IPC on the basis of compromise. The Apex Court has held as under:

"4. Now, the question before this Court is whether this Court can compound the offences under Sections 326 and 307 of the IPC which are non- compoundable? Needless to say that offences which are non-compoundable cannot be compounded by the court. Courts draw the power of compounding offences from Section 320 of the Code. The said provision has to be strictly followed ( Gian Singh v. State of Punjab ). However, in a given case, the High Court can quash a criminal proceeding in exercise of its power under Section 482 of the Code having regard to the fact that the parties have amicably settled their disputes and the victim has no objection, even though the offences are non- compoundable. In which cases the High Court can exercise its discretion to quash the proceedings will depend on facts and circumstances of each case. Offences which involve moral turpitude, grave offences like rape, murder etc. cannot be effaced by quashing the proceedings because that will have harmful effect on the society. Such offences cannot be said to be restricted to two individuals or two groups. If such offences are quashed, it may send wrong signal to the society. However, when the High Court is convinced that the offences are entirely personal in nature and, therefore, do not affect public peace or tranquility and where it feels that quashing of such proceedings on account of compromise would bring about peace and would secure ends of justice, it should not hesitate to quash them. In such cases, the prosecution becomes a lame prosecution. Pursuing such a lame prosecution would be waste of time and energy. That will also unsettle the compromise and obstruct restoration of peace. 5. In Gian Singh this Court has observed that: "58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that the dispute between the offender and the victim has been settled although the offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor." Needless to say that the above observations are applicable to this Court also."

The Apex Court in the case of Narinder Singh and others vs State of Punjab and another, (2014) 6 SCC 466 has also quashed the criminal proceedings registered under Section 307 of the IPC on the basis of compromise. The Court has held as under:

"17. We would like to expand this principle in some more detail. We find, in practice and in reality, after recording the conviction and while awarding the sentence/punishment the Court is generally governed by any or all or combination of the aforesaid factors. Sometimes, it is the deterrence theory which prevails in the minds of the Court, particularly in those cases where the crimes committed are heinous in nature or depicts depravity, or lack morality. At times it is to satisfy the element of "emotion" in law and retribution/vengeance becomes the guiding factor. In any case, it cannot be denied that the purpose of punishment by law is deterrence, constrained by considerations of justice. What, then, is the role of mercy, forgiveness and compassion in law? These are by no means comfortable questions and even the answers may not be comforting. There may be certain cases which are too obvious namely cases involving heinous crime with element of criminality against the society and not parties inter-se. In such cases, the deterrence as purpose of punishment becomes paramount and even if the victim or his relatives have shown the virtue and gentility, agreeing to forgive the culprit, compassion of that private party would not move the court in accepting the same as larger and more important public policy of showing the iron hand of law to the wrongdoers, to reduce the commission of such offences, is more important. Cases of murder, rape, or other sexual offences etc. would clearly fall in this category. After all, justice requires long term vision. On the other hand, there may be, offences falling in the category where "correctional" objective of criminal law would have to be given more weightage in contrast with "deterrence" philosophy. Punishment, whatever else may be, must be fair and conducive to good rather than further evil. If in a particular case the Court is of the opinion that the settlement between the parties would lead to more good; better relations between them; would prevent further occurrence of such encounters between the parties, it may hold settlement to be on a better pedestal. It is a delicate balance between the two inflicting interests which is to be achieved by the Court after examining all these parameters and then deciding as to which course of action it should take in a particular case.

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Thus, we find that in certain circumstances, this Court has approved the quashing of proceedings under section 307, IPC whereas in some other cases, it is held that as the offence is of serious nature such proceedings cannot be quashed. Though in each of the aforesaid cases the view taken by this Court may be justified on its own facts, at the same time this Court owes an explanation as to why two different approaches are adopted in various cases. The law declared by this Court in the form of judgments becomes binding precedent for the High Courts and the subordinate courts, to follow under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. Stare Decisis is the fundamental principle of judicial decision making which requires ''certainty'' too in law so that in a given set of facts the course of action which law shall take is discernable and predictable. Unless that is achieved, the very doctrine of stare decisis will lose its significance. The related objective of the doctrine of stare decisis is to put a curb on the personal preferences and priors of individual Judges. In a way, it achieves equality of treatment as well, inasmuch as two different persons faced with similar circumstances would be given identical treatment at the hands of law. It has, therefore, support from the human sense of justice as well. The force of precedent in the law is heightened, in the words of Karl Llewellyn, by "that curious, almost universal sense of justice which urges that all men are to be treated alike in like circumstances."

In this view of the matter and keeping in mind the principle of law laid down by the apex Court, the appeal filed by the appellants is partly allowed. The judgment of the trial Court in regard to holding the appellants guilty for commission of offence punishable under Sections 148, 307 / 149 and 323 / 149 of IPC is hereby upheld. However, the sentence awarded by the trial Court is modified upto the extent of already undergone. The appellants are on bail, their bail bonds are discharged.