Shakuntala vs State of M.P.

Sheel Nagu, J.—Heard learned counsel for the rival parties, on the question of final disposal.

This common order shall govern the disposal of above said writ petitions which have been analogously heard since all these petitions contain common question of law based on similar factual matrix. The facts attending W.P. No. 1459/2013 are being referred to in passing of this common order.

Learned counsel for the petitioners contends in all the above said petitions that the petitioners were granted temporary lease of different pieces of agricultural land situated on different survey numbers as described in table mentioned in para 2 of the impugned order situated in village Phadalaya, Tehsil & Dist. Sheopur in the years 2003, 2004 & 2006.

One Smt. Geeta Bai lodged written complaint in regard to the said grant of temporary lease in favour of the petitioners raising various grounds including the petitioners not being residents of the village concerned and so also not being land less persons, etc. Since the said complaint was preferred before Tahsildar who was incompetent to cancel the temporary lease in question, the Tahsildar vide letter dated 24.03.2010 Annexure P-9 after holding preliminary enquiry and finding the complaint to be prima facie correct forwarded the same before the competent authority i.e. Collector, Sheopur.

Thereafter, when the matter reached the Collector, an enquiry was ordered which was conducted by Tahsildar, Tehsil Sheopur, which is evident from order sheets dated 11.10.2012, 26.10.2012, 22.11.2012 & 24.11.2012 (Annexure P-6). The Tahsildar after initiating enquiry, summoned the parties concerned and after perusing the record forwarded his report to the Collector on 24.11.2012.

It is further contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that the said report of the Tahsildar which prima facie found the temporary leases to be illegal was taken cognizance of by the Collector, Sheopur on 18.12.2012 directing for issuance of show cause notice. Thereafter the show cause notice was issued on 18.12.2012 vide Annexure P-11 to all the petitioners as to why the temporary lease issued in their favour be not cancelled. The Collector after conducting enquiry and hearing the affected parties including the petitioners passed the impugned order on 12.02.2013 Annexure P-1 and cancelled the temporary leases issued earlier in favour of the petitioners and directed the Tahsildar u/s 115 of MPLRC (for brevity ''Code'') to make amendment in the revenue record by entering the name of the State in place of the petitioners.

Learned counsel for the petitioners has made three submissions, firstly the order impugned is beyond jurisdiction of the Collector as despite passage of more than 180 days since the date of knowledge of illegality which came to the Collector on 24.03.2010, the impugned order could not have been passed after 180 days of the said knowledge in view of decision of Full Bench in the case of Ranveer Singh and Others Vs. State of M.P., Secondly, there was no material before the Collector to invoke suo motu revisional power u/s 50 of the Code and thirdly the Collector could not have decided all the matters together without dealing with each individual case separately.

Per Contra, learned State counsel supporting the order of the Collector impugned herein submits that the date when the Collector took cognizance of the report of Tahsildar is the date when the period of 180 days should start to run and not from any earlier date. It is contended that gaining of knowledge from where the period of 180 days starts to run is the stage when the competent authority comes to prima facie finding that illegality has been committed. It is further contended by the State counsel that the said crucial date of gaining knowledge of illegality is 18.12.2012 when the Collector decided to invoke his suo motu revisional power u/s 50 of the Code. It is the further contention of the State counsel that the order impugned herein dated 12.02.2013 has been passed within 180 days of the said date of 18.12.2012 and thus the Full Bench decision as cited by learned counsel for the petitioner in the case of Ranveer Singh (supra) is of no avail to the petitioners. The learned State counsel has also submitted that the table mentioned in the impugned order clearly shows that each and every case has been dealt with separately by the Collector who has given thoughtful consideration to the contentions raised including the contention of exercise of suo motu revisional power u/s 50 of the Code.

This Court need not dwell into the aspect of time frame within which suo motu revisional power u/s 50 of the Code is required to be exercised since the said issue has been decided by the Full Bench in the case of Ranveer Singh (supra) wherein the Full Bench has unanimously held thus:-

" Hence, according to us, the maximum period which has been envisaged in any of the provision of any other chapter of the Code cannot be made applicable for the purpose of this chapter because that particular period of limitation has been enacted by the Legislature to achieve the aim and abject of that particular chapter and its provisions only. The maximum period of limitation of 90 days has been enacted for filing the revision, but since this restriction is not for exercising suo moto powers and to serve the purpose, the aim and object for which this provision has been enacted, according to us, within a period of 180 days the revisional authority should exercise suo moto powers from the date of the coming into knowledge to it that any particular illegality, impropriety or irregularity of the proceeding has been exercised by any officer subordinate to it."

From conjoint reading of the decision of Full Bench followed by learned Single Bench, it is evident that maximum time limit of 180 days has been prescribed for passing an order for exercise of suo motu revisional power u/s 50 of the Code. The period of 180 days starts from the date of acquisition of knowledge of illegality by the competent authority. The relevant extract of section 50 of the Code is reproduced herein below for ready reference:-

"50 Revision:- (1) The Board may, at any time on its motion or on the application made by any party or the Collector or the Settlement Officer may, at any time on his motion, call for the record of any case which has been decided or proceeding in which an order has been passed by any Revenue Officer subordinate to it or him and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if it appears that such subordinate Revenue Officer:---

(a) has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in him by this Code, or

(b) has failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or

(c) has acted in the exercise of his jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity,

the Board or the Collector or the Settlement Officer may make such order in the case as it or him thinks fit:

Provided that the Board or the Collector or the Settlement Officer shall not under this section vary or reverse any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of the proceeding, except where ---

(a) the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision to the Board, would have finally disposed of the proceeding, or

(b) the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made.

(2) The Board or Collector or the Settlement Officer shall not under this section vary or reverse any order against which an appeal lies either to the Board or to any Revenue Officer subordinate thereto.

(3) A revision shall not operate as a stay of proceeding before the Revenue Officer except where such proceeding is stayed by the Board or the Collector or the Settlement Officer, as the case may be.

(4) No application for revision shall be entertained -----

(a) against an order appealable under this Code;

(b) against an order to the Settlement Commissioner u/s 210;

(c) unless presented within sixty days to the Board;

Provided that where the order, against which the application for revision is being presented, made before the coming into force of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code (Amendment) Act, 2011, in such case revision shall be entertained within ninety days from the date of order.

(5) No order shall be varied or reversed in revision unless notice has been served on the parties interested and opportunity given to them of being heard.

(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) -----

(i) where the proceeding in respect of any case have been commenced by the Board under sub-section (I) no action shall be taken by the Collector or the Settlement Officer in respect thereof;

(ii) where proceeding in respect of any such case have been commenced by the Collector or the Settlement Officer under sub-section (I) the Board may either refrain from taking any action under this section in respect of such case until the final disposal of such proceeding by the Collector or the Settlement Officer, as the case may be, or may withdraw such proceedings and pass such order as it may deem fit."

From above said statutory provision and the interpretation it has received at the hands of the Full Bench and also the Single Bench, it is crystal clear that the term "knowledge" does not merely means hear say evidence or a hunch or suspicion. The knowledge regarding illegality is necessary to be acquired by competent authority, before exercising suo motu revisional power u/s 50 of the Code. The extent of this knowledge is required to be of such level that the competent authority after gaining knowledge has no option, but to initiate suo motu revisional power u/s 50 of the Code, failing which the competent authority may expose itself to the rigours of disciplinary action.

Reverting to the factual matrix of this case, it is evident from the order sheet dated 18.12.2012 Annexure P-6 that on this date the Collector after applying his mind to the report of the Tahsildar came to the prima facie conclusion that suo motu revisional power u/s 50 of the Code ought to be exercised for rectifying the illegality discovered by way of inquiry held by the Tahsildar.

The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that the Collector had gained knowledge much prior to the said date as per letter dated 24.03.2010 Annexure P-9 of the Tahsildar does not hold water. True it is, that the said letter elicits prima facie satisfaction of the Tahsildar as regards commission of illegality, but it does not in any manner indicate that the Collector who is the competent authority has gained knowledge as regards alleged illegality to the extent that the Collector is left with no option, but to exercise suo motu revisional power u/s 50 of the Code.

Thus, the contention of learned State counsel appears to be correct that the Collector gained knowledge of alleged illegality and decided to invoke suo motu revisional power u/s 50 of the Code on 18.12.2012 and not at any earlier date.

The other contentions of learned counsel for the petitioners that the Collector ought to have dealt with each case of the petitioners individually is merely heard to be rejected. Bare perusal of the impugned order shows that though the matter was decided by common order in respect of number of petitioners, but the illegality pointed out in respect of each cases were separately taken considered by the Collector. The table contained in the impugned order is manifestation of this fact.

The third and last contention of learned counsel for the petitioners that there is no material in respect of exercise of suo motu revisional power u/s 50 of the Code also does not appear to have much force. The petitioners have not brought on record any documents to indicate that the petitioners herein were land less persons and they fulfilled the eligibility criteria for grant of temporary lease in their favour in 2003, 2004 & 2006. In absence of any material, the ground raised cannot be considered and decided and, therefore, is rejected for want of material.

In view of above discussion and the legal position, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the Collector, Dist. Sheopur has exercised his suo motu revisional power u/s 50 of the Code within the prescribed period of 180 days as laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Ranvir Singh (supra) and the other two grounds raised by the petitioners as discussed herein above are untenable.

Consequently, this petition is dismissed with liberty to the petitioners to assail the impugned order herein before the higher Revenue Court, if permissible by the Code, in case, the petitioners are able to demonstrate they were eligible to be granted temporary lease in 2003, 2004 & 2006 (as the case may be). The said liberty can be exercised by the petitioners, if concerned higher Revenue Court is approached by preferring appropriate appeal/revision as the case may be within a period of 60 working days from the date of this order. No order as to cost.

A copy of this order passed today be kept in the record of aforesaid connected writ petitions.