Shankar vs State of Haryana and others

M.S. Liberhan, J.—The facts appositely adverted to in the petition are: the land in dispute was acquired as described in the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act for public purpose namely, for the development and utilisation of land as Residential, Commercial and Institutional Sectors 44 and 47, Faridabad. The public purpose in the notification under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act dated 2.9.1993 was described as ``for the development and utilisation of land as Residential, Commercial and Industrial Sectors 44 and 47 of Faridabad." It may be noticed, that concededly that compensation was awarded and some of the owners of the acquired land have already received the same.

The validity of the acquisition of the land in dispute has been challenged by the petitioners by way of this writ petition broadly on the following grounds:

(i) That the public purpose, notified, is vague and indefinite, as no scheme was framed, for the planned development, before issuance of notification under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act, which resulted in depriving the petitioners of their substantive right to raise effective objections under Section 5A, against the acquisition.

(ii) There is variance of public purpose in the Notification under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act. One of the public purposes, as mentioned in the Notification under Section 4 of the Act is Institutional while in the Notification under Section 6, it is described as `Industrial''; the public purpose for Institutional has been dropped.

(iii) That the petitioners were treated discriminately by declining to release the house of the petitioners which in fact is the only house in the entire acquired area, while a temple and school attached with it were released from acquisition.

(iv) Lastly, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that since the petitioners are the only residents in the acquired land and are ready and willing to construct the houses according to the building standards, design, and planning provided by the respondents, the acquired land should be released.

Learned counsel for the petitioners in support of his submission has relied on Munshi Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1973 SC 1150.

The submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioners have been refuted on behalf of the respondents, with the exception, that a religious institution like temple and adjoining school were released from the acquisition. It has been contended that the petitioners are estopped by their own act and conduct to challenge the acquisition in view of the efflux of time of 3 years. The notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act categorically, and explicitly define the public purpose. The petitioners had the opportunity to raise effective objections against the acquisition.

There is no dispute with respect to proposition of law laid down in the judgment cited by learned counsel for the petitioners, to the effect that the public purpose has to be stated in the notification under Section 4. However, the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the facts and circumstances of the case where the only public purpose described in the notification was "planned development of the area" found the same as a fact to be vague. The observations made by Hon''ble the Supreme Court in the case cited run as under:

"As already noticed, in the notifications under Section 4 all that was stated was that the land was required for "planned development of the area". There was no indication whatsoever whether the development was to be of residential and building sites or of commercial and industrial plots nor was it possible for any one interested in the land sought to be acquired to find out what kind of planned development was under contemplation i.e. whether the land would be acquired and the development made by the Government or whether the owners of properties would be required to develop a particular area in a specified way".

Thus the observations made and the findings arrived at by Hon''ble the Supreme Court in the judgment cited were in the context of the text. The facts in the case in hand are not even remotely parimateria with the facts of the case cited. In the case in hand in the notification under Section 4 of the Act if has been categorically mentioned that the land in dispute is being acquired for the development and for utilisation of land as residential, commercial and institutional sectors 44 and 47 of Faridabad. In the case in hand the petitioners have never raised any objection that the public purpose is vague and they want any specific particulars as was done in the facts of the case cited. The petitioners never raised even a little finger that they did not have any effective right of hearing or raising objections. The public purpose has been well defined and indicated in the notifications. The public purpose as reproduced above has been accepted as a definite public purpose in numerous cases relating to development of various Sectors of Faridabad prior to this acquisition. The claimants or the residents are well aware of the public purpose and were provided categoric and explicit opportunity to raise objections under section 5A of the Act. In our considered view there is no ambiguity or vagueness in the notifications with respect to public purpose in terms of law laid down by Hon''ble Supreme Court, rather it is in conformity with the observations made above. We fail to comprehend what more could be required to be stated with respect to public purpose. Sections 4 in fact is a terminus quo for planning the scheme etc. It confers jurisdiction on the authorities to enter into the land in dispute and plan it out etc. We may hasten to add that there is no bar on the jurisdiction of the State to change the site planning. Even in some cases the change of purpose has been held to be valid provided it continues to be a public purpose. The Land Acquisition Act nowhere contemplates framing in complete detail as such, of the public purpose before the acquisition. The objectivity of the State with respect to the determination of the public purpose is not in dispute even today. Thus the acquisition does not suffer on account of any ambiguity of public purpose as contended by learned counsel for the petitioners.

The variation of the public purpose in the notification under Sections 4 and 6 viz. describing a public purpose as `institutional'' in one and `industrial'' in the other is relatively of no consequence as the object of the institutional can include industrial and vice versa. The variation of the public purpose in the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 is just illusory. Even describing the public purpose as institutional in one notification and indistrial in the other notification would not denude the character of the acquisition for public purpose. At the most it can be termed to be a clerical error which has not resulted in any substantial injury to any of the rights of the petitioners much less changing the character of the acquisition of land from public purposes to any other purpose.

Learned counsel for the respondents has specifically submitted that no land of any similarly situated person like the petitioner was released. We may hasten to add that releasing of land from acquisition qua religious institute like temple and school is not pari materia with respect to releasing of the land for residential purpose. The petitioners are not similarly situated in any manner. The releasing of the land for temple and the school attached to it can reasonably be termed as reasonable classification qua the petitioners and the ones running the temple etc. particularly in view of the public purpose for which the land is being acquired.

The judgment cited by learned counsel for the petitioners is not relevant to the facts of the present case as in the case cited Court on a finding of fact came to the conclusion that releasing of the acquired land and declining to release the land of one of the petitioners amounted to discriminatory treatment with respect to two persons similarly situated which is not the case in hand. Thus there is no substance in the contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioners that the petitioners have been discriminately treated as observed in the earlier part of the judgment. The request made for release of the land with an undertaking that they would construct the houses according to the design and planning of the respondents would not only open a pandora''s box for releasing the land of other right holders but would defeat the very purpose of planned development itself, rather it will denude the State from acquiring any land for planned development as ordinarily every landowner would offer to develop the land in the locality according to the specifications of the State. The petitioners would be at liberty to apply to the State for allotment of plot for their rehabilitation but we hasten to add that this observation would not cast any duty on the respondents to allot plot to the petitioners as they are at liberty to claim compensation under Section 23 of the Act for their rehabilitation.

We are further of the view that in view of the efflux of time of 3 years from issuance of notification under section 4 and some of the claimants having accepted the compensation, we do not find it a fit case to interfere in exercise of writ jurisdiction on account of laches.

In view of the observations made above, the writ petition is accordingly dismissed with costs. Costs Rs. 1000/.