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Judgment
A.S. Bopanna, J.—Petitioner is before this Court assailing the order dated 06.02.2014 impugned at Annexure-N to the petition.
Petitioner was elected to the office of the President of Gram Panchayat, Togalur, under the provisions of the Karnataka Panchayat Raj Act, 1993 (for short, hereinafter referred to as ''the Act''). While the petitioner was working as President of the said panchayat, on an allegation that the petitioner had indulged in corruption, proceedings in C.C. No. 4/2012 was initiated against the petitioner for the offences punishable under Sections 7 , 13(1)(d) r/w Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption of Act, 1988. The allegations against the petitioner was that he had demanded bribe of Rs. 3,500/- to release payment under NREGS to the extent of Rs. 33,500/-.
In view of the said case being registered against the petitioner, the first respondent on invoking the provisions in Section 43(a), 48(4) and 48(5) of the Act has passed the impugned order removing the petitioner as President of the Panchayat and also as a Member of the Panchayat. The said order dated 06.02.2014 is impugned herein. Though the petitioner contends that the very allegation of corruption alleged against the petitioner is not justified, the details in that regard need not be adverted in this petition since that is a matter to be considered by the competent Court before which proceedings are pending.
The issue for consideration in this petition is only to the extent as to whether mere registration of a criminal case against the petitioner was sufficient reason for the first respondent to invoke the provisions contained in Section 43(a), 48(4) and 48(5) of the Act to remove the petitioner from the post of Presidentship and also Membership of the panchayat. While taking into consideration this aspect of the matter, the fact that the petitioner has ceased to be the president as there was no interim direction from this Court will have to be kept in view and as such, only consideration is as to whether the petitioner could be allowed to continue as member of the panchayat if ultimately case of the petitioner is accepted by this Court. The petitioner is yet to be convicted in the said proceedings.
In that light, the learned counsel for the petitioner while assailing the impugned order apart from relying on the proceedings invoked in the impugned order to contend that power available therein could not have been invoked in the present facts when only a criminal case had been registered against the petitioner has also relied on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Basanagouda Vs. The State of Karnataka and Others, . A decision of another Division Bench of this Court in the case of Rudragouda v. The Government of Karnataka and others in W.A. No. 3563/2014 dated 27.01.2015 is also relied upon.
The learned counsel for the respondents while seeking to sustain the order passed by the first respondent have also referred to the provision to contend that when there is misconduct or when the conduct is of such nature that it would bring disrepute to the panchayat, the first respondent is entitled to invoke provisions as has been done. The learned counsel would also contend that the Division Bench in the case of Rudragouda (supra) was considering a different circumstance wherein show cause notice had been issued and therefore, the said decision is not applicable to the facts of the present case. It is their contention that the case against the petitioner for having indulged in corruption has been registered and that fact cannot be in dispute and therefore, order passed is justified.
In the light of the rival contentions, I have perused the order impugned. Since the case registered under the Prevention of Corruption Act against the petitioner is pending and the same has not resulted in the conviction of the petitioner, the question that would arise for consideration is as to whether that in itself was sufficient for the first respondent to invoke the said provisions. It is no doubt true in the case of Rudragouda (supra), the Division Bench was considering the position in the light of notice being issued to the petitioner therein. However, the issue that was being considered therein was also as to whether mere registration of a case against the Member/Adhyaksha was sufficient to invoke the provision. Further, in the case of Basanagouda (supra), the Division Bench has considered the very same provisions which have been invoked presently in the instant case and has arrived at a categorical conclusion that the said provisions cannot be invoked when only an allegation has been made and the case has been registered. It has also been indicated therein that the right of the elected representative cannot be interfered with merely because an allegation is made and the case is registered. In that view, in the said case, the order impugned therein had been set aside.
Having noticed the position of law as enunciated by the Division Bench of this Court, since in the instant case there is no dispute to the fact that though a case has been registered against the petitioner the same is yet to result in conviction, I am of the opinion, the first respondent was not justified in passing the order impugned dated 06.02.2014 invoking the provisions in Sections 43(a), 48(4) and 48(5) of the Act. In that view, the order dated 06.02.2014 stands quashed. As already noticed, since at this juncture the petitioner cannot be restored to the position of Adhyaksha, the petitioner shall only continue to function as Member of the Panchayat.
The petition is accordingly disposed of.
