Shanthilal M. Thakker and Others vs The State of Tamil Nadu and Others

Bakthavatsalam, J.—The petitioners originally challenged the award proceedings which was dated 22.9.1986 under the Land Acquisition

Act. By a subsequent amendment to the prayer in the Writ petition, the petitioners attack the Notification u/s 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act

which was published on 31.3.1982 and the declaration which was published on 21.11.1984.

The lands were acquired for providing a splay at the junction of Dr. Alagappa Road and Gangadeeswarar Koil Street, within the limits of

Corporation of Madras. The petitioners purchased the lands in June, 1986 long after the declaration u/s 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. Only at the

stage of award proceedings, the petitioners came in. They had filed their objections during the award inquiry.

The only question which is raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioners Mr. Veluswami is that a larger extent had been acquired than the

extent which was notified originally u/s 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. There is no dispute that the survey numbers are one and the same. The

only objection of the petitioners'' learned Counsel seems to be that a larger extent in each survey number has been acquired and as such the whole

proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act is vitiated. Learned Counsel for the petitioners further argues that even taking the petitioners as

subsequent purchasers, they are to be taken as ''persons interested'' under the provisions of the land Acquisition Act.

Per contra, learned Advocate appearing for the State and the Corporation contend that the petitioners are being subsequent purchasers after

declaration u/s 6 of the Act and they have come into picture only at the stage of the award proceedings, this Court should not exercise

discretionary jurisdiction in favour of the petitioners. Learned Counsel for the Corporation of Madras pointed out that all other lands which are the

subject matter of acquisition have been taken possession except this piece of land which belongs to the petitioners. Learned Advocate for the State

contends that Notification u/s 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act shows that only an approximate extent is notified and as such there is nothing wrong

if a larger extent is acquired within the survey number.

The point for consideration is whether the acquisition is valid in view of the objections raised by the petitioners with regard to the extent.

Learned Counsel for the petitioners relies upon a decision of a Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, which is reported in Radhey

Sham Gupta and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Others, for the proposition that the petitioners have to be taken as ''persons interested'' even

though they are the subsequent purchasers. The petitioner in that case purchased the lands after the Notification u/s 4(1) of the Land Acquisition

Act. It is well settled that the acquisition gets finality only at the stage of declaration u/s 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. Here in this case on facts the

petitioners purchased the lands only after the declaration u/s 6 of the Act when the previous owner already made his objections during the inquiry

u/s 5-A of the Act. It has to be seen that the declaration has been made only after taking into account the objections of the previous owner and the

petitioners cannot now try to contend that the acquisition is invalid on some other grounds. If the petitioners had taken the risk of purchasing the

lands after declaration u/s 6 of the Act, they have purchased at their own risk. Whatever objection the predecessor in interest has given before the

authorities has to be taken as the objection of the petitioners. No-doubt, the petitioners can raise objections as ''persons interested'' under the

Land Acquisition Act, for compensation. But it does not mean that they can challenge the vires of the Notification itself at this stage.

Mr. Velusamy, learned Counsel then relied on the decision in A. Muthalif Vs. The Special Tahsildar, Harijan Welfare and Another, , wherein a

Division Bench of this Court has held that an opportunity has to be given to the petitioner the rein. The Division Bench has taken note of the fact of

the Notification published u/s 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act as enumerated by the Supreme Court in Babu Barkya Thakur Vs. The State of

Bombay and Others, , wherein their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the non-mention of the public purpose in Section 4(1) notification

does not matter and in this connection, they have observed as follows:

The purpose of the notification u/s 4 is to carry on a preliminary investigation with a view to finding out after necessary survey and taking of levels,

and, if necessary, digging or boring into the sub - soil whether the land was adapted for the purpose for which it was sought to be acquired. It is

only u/s 6 that a firm declaration has to be made by Government that land with proper description and area so as to be identifiable is needed for a

public purpose or for a company. That was a mere proposal u/s 4 which becomes the subject matter of a definite proceeding for acquisition under

the Act. Hence it is not correct to say that any defect in the notification u/s 4 is fatal to the validity of the proceedings, particularly when the

acquisition is for a company and the purpose has to be investigated u/s 5-A or Section 40 necessarily after the notification u/s 4 of the Act.

Learned Counsel for the petitioner further relies upon a decision of Justice Veeraswami as he then was in ILR (1965) 2 Mad. 638 for the

proposition that there cannot be any legal sanction after stage of publication to enlarge extent of acquisition. In that case an erratum was published

after the publication of the declaration altering the extent. The learned Judge held that there is no legal sanction after the stage of publication of the

declaration u/s 6 to enlarge the extent of land to be acquired on the ground that a mistake had crept in.

The case before me is not of that sort. Here the extent has been given even at the stage of Section 6 declaration. As such I do not think the

principle enumerated by the learned single judge will apply to the facts of this case.

Learned Judge of the Division Bench in A. Muthalif Vs. The Special Tahsildar, Harijan Welfare and Another, , has referred to a decision of

this Court reported in Gangadhara v. State of Madras ILR (1964) 2 Mad. 273 which case squarely applies to the fact on hand. Where it has been

held that the vagueness of the Section 4(1) notification will not vitiate the proceedings and the fact that the subsequent declaration u/s 6 fixed the

area, inclusive of some more grounds in the same survey number, the property having been described as situate in a particular locality, cannot

invalidate the prior proceedings. But on facts, the Division Bench of this Court thought it fit to interfere. I think that the issue is settled by that case

in ILR (1964) 2 Mad. 273 Here is a case where the petitioners are subsequent purchasers long after the declaration u/s 6 of the Act. They had

taken part in the award proceedings also. As such I do not see any reason to exercise the discreation in favour of the petitioners. As I have already

stated, originally the petitioners started challenging the award proceedings in January, 1987 and only in 1989, the petitioners obtained the order of

this Court to amend the prayer. At the stage of filing the writ petition, if the petitioners challenged the land acquisition proceedings, i.e., the

declaration u/s 6, of the Land Acquisition Act, the Writ petition would have been thrown out on the ground of laches. The Supreme Court has

categorically held that in land acquisition Cases even a delay of two years is fatal to the acquisition. So on the ground of delay also, I am not

inclined to interfere with the acquisition proceedings impugned in this case.

As I have already stated, it is well settled that notification u/s 4(1) of the Act is only preliminary in nature and there is no change in the survey

number here. Survey numbers are one and the same. Only the extent varies. Under these circumstances, I do not think that the petitioners are

entitled to the relief asked for. Accordingly the writ petition is dismissed. No costs.