Sharif Ansari vs State Of Madhya Pradesh @RESPONDEN

This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed seeking the following reliefs:-

''(7-i) That, the present petition filed by the petitioner may kindly be allowed;

(ii) That, the order dated 9.6.2020 Annexure P/1 passed by the respondent no.2 may kindly be directed to be quashed.

(iii) That, it may be held that the order Annexure P/1 cannot be passed and observation made therein are unsustainable without following the procedure prescribed under Rule 14 of the MP Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 and accordingly the respondents may be directed not to give effect to the order Annexure P/1 and the same may kindly be quashed.

(iv) That, any other just, suitable and proper relief, which this Hon'ble Court deems fit, may also kindly be granted to the petitioner. Costs be also awarded in favour of the petitioner.''

It is submitted by the counsel for the petitioner that upon conviction of the petitioner in a criminal trial for offence under Section 409 of IPC, the respondent No.2 has issued the order dated 09/06/2020 (Annexure P1) thereby directing the District Education Officer, Sheopur to suspend the petitioner, to issue charge sheet and thereafter, to dismiss the petitioner from service. It is submitted that a direction to dismiss the petitioner from service makes the entire proceedings a mockery of justice. Once the senior officer has already given a direction to the District Education Officer to dismiss the petitioner from service, then the act of issuing charge sheet would be merely a formality. The direction to dismiss the petitioner, clearly means that the defence of the petitioner shall not be taken into consideration and after following the paper formalities, the petitioner would be dismissed from service. Accordingly, it is submitted that the direction to dismiss the petitioner from service makes the order vulnerable and, therefore, said direction is required to be quashed.

In the alternative, it is submitted by the counsel for the petitioner that the order may be quashed and the respondents may be granted liberty to proceed in accordance with law under the facts and circumstances of the case.

Per contra, the petition is vehemently opposed by the counsel for the respondents. It is submitted by the counsel for the respondents that the Public Prosecutor, Sheopur by his letter dated 3/03/2020 has informed that the petitioner has been convicted under Section 409 of IPC by judgment dated 05/05/2018, against which an appeal is pending before the High Court. If the conviction of the petitioner is for an offence involving moral turpitude, then he is not entitled to continue in service. However, it is fairly conceded by the counsel for the respondents that the direction issued by the respondents to dismiss the petitioner after issuing the charge sheet appears to have been issued in excess of jurisdiction vested in the respondents.

Heard the learned counsel for the parties.

The undisputed fact is that the petitioner has been convicted for offence under Section 409 of IPC. Whether the petitioner is entitled to continue in service or not, is a matter, which is yet to be decided by the disciplinary authority. However, the direction to dismiss the petitioner clearly indicates that the discretion of the disciplinary authority has been taken away. Thus, this Court is of the considered opinion that the direction to "dismiss the petitioner from service" after issuing the charge is not in accordance with law. Accordingly, while maintaining the order dated 09/06/2020, so far as it relates to placing the petitioner under suspension and issuing charge sheet, the "direction to dismiss the petitioner" is hereby quashed. The disciplinary authority is directed to proceed in accordance with law without getting prejudiced by the direction to dismiss the petitioner from service. The disciplinary authority shall be free to take any decision in the light of the conviction of the petitioner for offence under Section 409 of IPC as it involves moral turpitude. Let the entire exercise be completed within a period of six months from today. The petitioner is directed to supply a copy of this order to the respondents within a period of 10 days from today, failing which he shall not be entitled for the fruits of this order.

With aforesaid observations, this petition is finally disposed of.