Monika Khatotiya vs State Of Rajasthan And Ors

Sunil Beniwal, J

The petitioner has preferred the present writ petition with the following prayer:-

“(i) By an appropriate writ order or direction may kindly be issued against the respondent and the order dated 07.07.2025 (Annexure-22) issued by the respondents may kindly be quashed and set aside.”

The facts, as narrated in the writ petition, in nutshell are as under:-

2.1 The petitioner was elected as Chairperson of the Municipal Board, Nohar, District Hanumangarh, on 31.01.2021. In 2023, two FIRs were lodged against her alleging various irregularities in the day-to-day functioning of the Municipal Board, as well as in the issuance of pattas. Both FIRs were investigated, and the investigating agency submitted negative final reports. Nevertheless, on the basis of the FIR dated 11.10.2023, the department, by order dated 06.02.2024, proposed to suspend the petitioner and appointed the District Collector, Hanumangarh, to conduct an inquiry and submit a report.

2.2 The Additional District Collector, Nohar, prepared an inquiry report dated 09.02.2024 and forwarded it to the District Collector, clearly stating that since the police had submitted a negative final report, the petitioner had not committed any offence. In the meantime, anticipating her suspension, the petitioner filed SBCWP No. 2420/2024 before this Court. A Coordinate Bench directed the counsel for the respondents to complete instructions.

2.3 Subsequently, proceedings under Section 39(1) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009 (for short, “the Act of 2009”) were initiated against the petitioner. Three charges were framed, and she was called upon to submit her explanation vide communication dated 23.02.2024 (Annex. 7). Meanwhile, in the aforesaid writ petition, the Coordinate Bench restrained the respondents from placing the petitioner under suspension. The petitioner submitted her reply on 26.02.2024.

2.4 Thereafter, on 08.03.2024, another complaint was filed in the office of the Hon’ble Chief Minister. Based on this complaint, a fresh inquiry under Section 39(1) of the Act of 2009 was proposed against the petitioner on four charges, with a notice dated 21.06.2024 (Annex. 10) seeking her explanation. The petitioner responded to this notice. Being dissatisfied with her reply, the authorities placed her under suspension vide communication dated 13.08.2024 (Annex. 13), and the matter was referred for judicial inquiry.

2.5 Aggrieved by the order dated 13.08.2024, the petitioner filed SBCWP No. 13740/2024. No interim relief was granted therein, prompting her to file DBSAW No. 488/2025 before the Division Bench. During the pendency of the appeal, the judicial inquiry was concluded, and the charges were not proved against her. Consequently, the appeal (DBSAW No. 488/2025) was allowed, and thus, the writ petition No. 13740/2024 also stood allowed. While allowing the appeal, the Court granted liberty to the State Government to take a final decision on whether or not to proceed against the petitioner.

2.6 Subsequently, another complaint was made by Smt. Khatoon, the current acting Chairperson, alleging that the she was not being allowed to discharge her duties. Based on this complaint, the Deputy Director (Vigilance), Local Self Government, issued a communication dated 19.05.2025 directing an inquiry into the allegations contained in the communication dated 07.04.2025 and submission of a report. In pursuance thereof, a Four-Member Committee was constituted, which, in terms of order dated 11.06.2025 and amended order dated 25.06.2025, proceeded with the inquiry. Upon examining the complaint and available material, the Committee found that while no prima facie case of embezzlement was made out, certain irregularities in the relevant files were established. The Committee recommended that a detailed inquiry be conducted into these allegations.

2.7 The recommendations of the aforesaid Committee were forwarded by the Sub-Divisional Officer to the Deputy Director (Vigilance) vide communication dated 03.07.2025. Acting upon these recommendations, a communication dated 07.07.2025 was issued framing four charges against the petitioner and directing her to submit her explanation within three days. In response, the petitioner conveyed her inability to furnish a reply within such a short period and requested 30 days’ time to examine the records and prepare her defence. However, the respondents found her reply unsatisfactory and, by the impugned order dated 11.07.2025, referred the matter to the Judicial Officer and placed the petitioner under suspension.

Hence this writ petition.

Learned counsel for the petitioner, in support of the writ petition, made the following submissions:-

(i) The charges levelled against the petitioner in the impugned order have already been the subject matter of a judicial inquiry, wherein, upon conclusion, the allegations were found to be unsubstantiated. Accordingly, the respondents are not entitled to initiate another inquiry on the same charges.

(ii) The Chairperson is the final signatory to the proceedings for the grant of pattas and, therefore, cannot be held solely responsible for any alleged irregularities in their issuance. No other officer involved in the process has been questioned on these charges, rendering the action of the respondents discriminatory. Counsel relied on judgment passed by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Kamli Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors.; S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.579/2023 (decided on 27.01.2023) and interim order granted by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Gautam Tak Vs. The State of Rajasthan & Ors. [SBCWP

No.14844/2024], dated 06.01.2025; and another interim order passed by this Court in the case of Ramswaroop Bhati Vs. The State of Rajasthan & Ors. [SBCWP No.11384/2025], dated 11.06.2025.

(iii) This is the third instance in which an attempt has been made to place the petitioner under suspension. The first attempt was made upon the lodging of FIRs against her; however, such suspension was stayed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court, and the police subsequently submitted negative final reports in respect of those FIRs. Thereafter, another inquiry was initiated, which was conducted by a Judicial Officer, and the charges against the petitioner were ultimately found to be unsubstantiated. That attempt too failed, as both the writ petition and the appeal preferred by the petitioner against the said proceedings were allowed. The present, third inquiry has been initiated solely with the object of placing the petitioner under suspension, which constitutes an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power.

(iv) The complaint was filed by Smt. Khatoon, the acting Chairperson in absence of the petitioner, leveling certain allegations regarding hindrance being caused in carrying out her duties. The enquiry committee was formed on the basis of this complaint however, the committee has went over and beyond its authority while framing its report as it has considered other complaints as well for which it was neither formed nor entrusted to enquire upon.

(v) The petitioner holds office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate, and the State authorities cannot remove such an elected representative at their whims and fancies. The respondents have acted in a high-handed manner, and on this ground as well, the impugned order is liable to be quashed and set aside. Counsel relied on following judgments for this submission:

(a) Makarand  Alias  Nandu  Vs.  State  of Maharashtra & Ors.; Civil Appeal No.14925/2017; decided on 25.04.2024 by the Apex Court;

(b) Geeta Devi Narooka Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors; S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.6023/2023; decided on 18.12.2007 by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court at Jaipur;

(c)Vimla Devi Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors; S.B. Civil  Writ  Petition  No.3729/2007;  decided  on 17.08.2007 by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court;

(d) Pradeep Hinger Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors.; S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.3740/2007; decided on 16.08.2007 by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court; and

(e) Parmanand Paliwal Vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr.; S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.2839/1997; decided on 01.10.1997 by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court.

(vi) The action proposed against the petitioner is nothing but is politically motivated and the same is, therefore, required to be deprecated. In support of this, the petitioner has relied upon the judgment passed by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Bheru Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors; S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.4390/2024 (decided on 16.04.2024).

Per contra, Shri Rajesh Panwar, learned Senior Counsel – cum – Addl. Advocate General, vehemently opposed the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner and made the following submissions:-

(i) The allegation of the petitioner that the present inquiry is a repetition of charges previously inquired into is wholly unfounded. On a plain reading, it is evident that the charges levelled in the present inquiry were neither framed against the petitioner in the past nor subjected to any earlier inquiry. This position is clear from the impugned order as well as the inquiry report. Accordingly, the assertion of the petitioner is false, frivolous, and baseless.

(ii) As the head of the local body, the Chairperson is duty-bound to act strictly in accordance with law. The role entails not only adherence to statutory provisions but also active oversight of the functioning of the local body. Therefore, the petitioner cannot evade responsibility solely on the ground that he/she was merely the final signatory to the proceedings for issuance of pattas.

(iii) Referring to the inquiry report dated 03.07.2025, it is submitted that grave allegations stand against the petitioner. In one instance, a patta was issued despite a specific note in the file indicating the existence of an interim order in the matter. In another, a patta was issued for 1,479 sq. ft. whereas the applicant had sought only 410 sq. ft. There is also an allegation concerning the issuance of a patta outside the planning area of Khasra No. 391/9. Further, a patta purportedly issued on 17.03.2023 is in question as the original file is missing from the record, for which an FIR has already been lodged. In view of these serious allegations, the respondents have rightly proceeded with the inquiry, and the decision to place the petitioner under suspension is fully justified.

(iv) Placing reliance on the judgment of a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Nirmal Pitaliya v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.

[SBCWP No. 17285/2021, decided on 01.02.2022], it is submitted that Section 39(6) of the Act of 2009, unequivocally empowers the State Government to place a Member or Chairperson under suspension upon initiation of an inquiry under Section 39(1) of the Act of 2009.

Attention is invited to the provisions of Section 39(6) of the Act of 2009, which clearly reflect the legislative intent to vest the State Government with complete discretion to suspend a delinquent as soon as a decision is taken to commence proceedings under Section 39(1) of the Act of 2009.

In the present case, the decision to refer the matter for judicial inquiry was taken after seeking an explanation from the petitioner. Although the petitioner did not choose to furnish her response, a plain reading of the impugned order makes it clear that the State Government duly applied its mind before deciding to proceed with judicial inquiry and took its decision on basis of a fact finding inquiry conducted by a Committee consisting of four members. Consequently, the decision of the respondents to place the petitioner under suspension, in exercise of powers under Section 39(6) of the Act of 2009, is neither illegal nor contrary to the rules in any manner.

(v) In response to the contention of the petitioner regarding the initiation of inquiry for the third time, it was stated that a bare perusal of the charges in the earlier proceedings vis-à-vis those in the impugned order makes it clear that the present charges have never been the subject matter of any prior inquiry. Therefore, this is not a case of re-investigating the same allegations.

(vi) With respect to the interim orders passed in the cases of Gautam Tak (supra) and Ramswaroop Bhati (supra), it was submitted that the said orders are merely interim orders and the observations made therein do not bind the Court.

(vii) In response to the Committee report, it is stated that initially there was only one complaint of Smt. Khatoon but later some more complaints were noted by the respondent-department. Therefore, those were sent directly to the Committee. The Committee, accordingly submitted report on all the complaints. Even if it is assumed that the Committee exceeded its jurisdiction in entertaining all the complaints, which were not specifically referred, yet the State Government is competent to look into any material available before it and take decision under Section 39(1) so also under Section 39(6) of the Act of 2009.

Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record.

Although in the writ petition, the petitioner sought quashing of the impugned order dated 11.07.2025, however, during the course of arguments it was submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner has no objection to the initiation of inquiry pursuant to the said order. The grievance is confined solely to the aspect of placing the petitioner under suspension.

In light of the above submission, this Court would confine its adjudication only to the extent of the decision taken by State Government to place the petitioner under suspension on initiation of inquiry.

7.1 The net analysis of the judgment in the case of Nirmal Kumar Pitaliya (supra) clearly indicates that the State Government is competent to place a Member/Chairperson under suspension on the commencement of the inquiry. Meaning thereby, the moment the State Government decides to initiate proceedings under Section 39(1) of the Act of 2009, it can place a Member/ Chairperson under suspension.

Applying the principle as laid down in the case of Nirmal Kumar Pitaliya (supra), in the present case, the decision to place the petitioner under suspension on initiation of inquiry cannot be faulted. The fact, which requires consideration is, only to the extent that as to whether the decision to place the petitioner under suspension is rational and do not suffer from the vice of arbitrariness.

7.2 A plain reading of the impugned order indicates that the respondents have placed the petitioner under suspension following initiation of inquiry under Section 39(1) of the Act of 2009. To portray the arbitrariness of the authorities, learned counsel for the petitioner has narrated the previous actions taken against the petitioner allegedly for the same cause of action. To deal with the said arguments, it is necessary to examine the circumstances which led to the suspension and inquiry.

The petitioner had earlier been proposed to be placed under suspension on similar allegations of issuing illegal pattas, in connection with which an FIR was lodged. However, the allegations were found to be without sufficient basis for trial, and the police authorities consequently proposed a negative Final Report. Subsequently, a second inquiry was initiated regarding certain other irregularities in the issuance of pattas. This inquiry was adjudicated by a Judicial Officer, who concluded that the charges against the petitioner were not proved vide his order dated 17.06.2025.

8.1 During the course of arguments in the present matter, a specific query was put to the learned counsel for the respondents regarding acceptance of the report of the Judicial Officer. It was stated in response that the Government had not accepted the report and had decided to conduct a further re-investigation.

8.2 It is further observed that the inquiry now proposed pursuant to the impugned order is based on entirely different charges. Accordingly, the petitioner’s contention that this is the third instance of suspension on the basis of the same charges is not found to be correct.

8.3 The petitioner has further contended that the charges presently framed against her were also the subject matter of the earlier judicial inquiry. This contention, however, is not borne out from the record. The earlier judicial inquiry pertained specifically to Entry No. 3270 dated 06.09.2023 in the entry/dispatch register, and was primarily concerned with Plot No. 186 situated in Khasra No. 41/1, as well as allegations regarding the withholding of 185 files for nearly a year. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that these 185 files allegedly withheld by the petitioner included the four files now sought to be examined under the impugned order. While this assertion has been made, no supporting material has been placed on record to substantiate it. Accordingly, this Court finds no reason to accept the argument of the petitioner that the charges in the present inquiry are identical to those already adjudicated upon by the Judicial Officer.

8.4 With regard to the allegation of arbitrary and discriminatory exercise of power at the instance of the Government, in selectively initiating action against the petitioner, it is pertinent to note that in paragraph 18 of the writ petition, the petitioner has alleged that no action has been taken against the office bearers in respect of the alleged charges. For ready reference, paragraph 18 of the writ petition is reproduced below:-

“18. That it would not be out of place to mention here that so far the alleged charges are concerned, admittedly no action has been taken against the office bearers. This fact also shows that only petitioner has been targeted due to political rivalry.”

8.5 In reply to the said averments, the respondents have responded in the following manner:-

“18. That the contents of para no.18 of the writ petition, are not admitted in the manner as stated and hence denied. The petitioner’s allegations suggesting that the actions of the answering respondents are arbitrary or politically motivated are entirely baseless and false. On the contrary, it is the petitioner who has repeatedly misused his official position for personal gain, leading to misappropriation of public funds and causing substantial financial loss to the Municipal Board.”

8.6 Upon perusal of the reply, it is noted that the allegations made by the petitioner have not been specifically denied. Further, the submissions advanced by the petitioner during the course of arguments have not been addressed by the respondents. This Court is of the view that, even in the absence of a direct response to such submissions, the action of the respondents could still be justified, provided it is established that the action is free from malafides, arbitrariness, or unreasonable exercise of power.

8.7 By making such arguments, the petitioner is claiming ‘negative parity’. If any wrong has been done by a person or more while issuing pattas illegally by misusing their power and position, the petitioner cannot be allowed to claim immunity on the ground that no action has been taken against the other officers/officials, who were also counter signatory of the pattas. There is no substance in this argument that the respondents have followed the practice of pick and choose while taking action against the petitioner alone as the same is legally not sustainable. If the pattas have been issued illegally and the same have been counter-signed by other persons, stern action ought to have been taken against them as well in accordance with law, after affording opportunity of hearing and this Court thinks that such action will be taken against the other erring officers/ officials, if their involvement is found to be established.

8.8 It is settled proposition of law that no negative equality can be claimed as a matter of right under Article 14 of the Constitution of India, as has been held by the Apex Court in the cases of R. Muthukumar & Ors. Vs. The Chairman and Managing Director, TANGEDCO & Ors. [2022 SCC Online SC 151]; Basawaraj and Anr. Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14 SCC 81] ; and The State of Odisha Vs. Anup Kumar Senapati [2019 SCC Online SC 1207].

8.9 In other words, Article 14 of the Constitution of India cannot be invoked to perpetuate an illegality by extending the benefit of wrong decisions taken in other cases. If any illegality has been committed by the authorities, it cannot be allowed to continue in similar matters. Equality cannot be claimed in respect of an illegality and, therefore, cannot be enforced by either a citizen or the Court in a negative manner. This Court is of the view that appropriate action should be taken by the respondents against all officers found to be involved in the issuance of illegal pattas in contravention of the Rules.

8.10 The record reveals that the impugned order stems from the initiation of a judicial inquiry based on a complaint dated 07.04.2025 made by one Ms. Khatoon, the present Chairperson of the Municipal Board, Nohar. On 13.05.2025, the concerned Minister endorsed the said complaint for holding an inquiry. Acting on this endorsement, the Deputy Director (Vigilance) directed the S.D.O., Nohar, to investigate the complaint and submit a report within seven days. Pursuant to this, a Four-Member Committee was constituted on 11.06.2025 by the S.D.O., Nohar, as communicated on 19.05.2025. The Committee submitted its report on 03.07.2025.

8.11 The subject matter of the report refers to the earlier order dated 11.06.2025 and the amended office order dated 25.06.2025. A reading of the original complaint dated 07.04.2025 suggests that the allegations pertained only to certain anti-social elements obstructing the current Chairperson in discharging her duties. However, the inquiry report refers to the amended office order dated 25.06.2025 and takes into account five separate complaints. Based on these complaints, a factual report was obtained from the Municipal Board, Nohar, which was received by the Committee on 02.07.2025.

8.12 Although learned counsel for the petitioner argued during the hearing that the process of entertaining the complaints, constituting the Committee, and obtaining a report on charges outside the scope of the original complaint suffered from the vice of malafides, it is significant that no such averments have been made in the writ petition. Consequently, there is no corresponding response from the respondents in their reply.

It is therefore appropriate to examine the decision to place the petitioner under suspension in the light of the provisions contained in Section 39 of the Act of 2009. Section 39(2) of the Act of 2009 reads as under:-

“39(2) The power conferred by sub-Section (1) may be exercised by the State Government of its own motion or upon the receipt of a report from the Municipality in that behalf or upon the facts otherwise coming to the knowledge of the State Government: Provided that, until a member is removed from office by an order of the State Government under this Section, he shall not vacate his office and shall, subject to the provisions contained in sub- Section (6), continue to act as, and exercise all the powers and perform all the duties of, a member and shall as such be entitled to all the rights and be subject to all the liabilities, of a member under this Act.”

A plain reading of Section 39(2) of the Act of 2009 makes it evident that the power under Section 39(1) of the Act of 2009 may be exercised by the State either on its own motion, upon receipt of a report from the Municipality, or upon the facts otherwise coming to its knowledge. This clearly shows that the decision to initiate an inquiry under Section 39(1) of the Act of 2009 is neither contingent upon a fact-finding inquiry nor does it require the holding of any preliminary inquiry prior to such initiation.

10.1 Accordingly, the decision of the State Government to initiate an inquiry against the petitioner cannot be termed unlawful. Even if certain complaints were subsequently received and made the subject matter of inquiry, or if the facts otherwise came to the notice of the State Government, that alone was sufficient to justify initiation of proceedings under Section 39(1) of the Act of 2009.

10.2 Therefore, this Court finds no merit in the argument advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner regarding the manner in which the initial and subsequent complaints were entertained. In any event, in view of the specific statement made by learned counsel for the petitioner that there is no objection to the initiation of judicial inquiry, this Court refrains from deliberating on the issue further. Once such a statement is made, it clearly indicates that the petitioner is prepared to face the judicial inquiry.

Turning to the question of suspension at this stage, in light of the charges mentioned above, it is observed that the petitioner has failed to establish that the present inquiry pertains to the same charges as were inquired earlier. While it is true that the petitioner is an elected representative and holds a public mandate, it must be borne in mind that when allegations of misconduct are made, the State Government is fully entitled to conduct an inquiry, bring it to its logical conclusion, and take appropriate action on the basis of the inquiry report.

11.1 As regards the two interim orders relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner in Gautam Tak (supra) and Ramswaroop Bhati (supra), it is significant that, firstly, both orders are interim in nature and therefore do not carry the weight of binding precedent; and secondly, even upon scrutiny of those orders, it is apparent that they were passed in the context of the particular facts of those cases. Consequently, the petitioner cannot claim parity on that basis.

11.2 It is well settled that this Court will not ordinarily interfere with an order of suspension, as such an order merely entails a temporary deprivation of status and does not amount to a penalty. Suspension is generally resorted to when allegations of misconduct and/or corruption are under examination. The power of the Court to intervene in such matters must be exercised sparingly and with utmost caution. In the judgments cited by learned counsel for the petitioner in the cases of Makrand (supra), Geeta Devi Narooka (supra), Vimla Devi (supra), Pradeep Hinger (supra) and Parmanand Paliwar (supra), the Courts have not deviated from this position of law, however, considering the facts and circumstances therein, the petitioners therein have been granted indulgence. In the present case, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate any exceptional circumstances warranting interference with the order of suspension.

11.3 A Coordinate Bench of this Court, at the Jaipur Bench, in Durga Ram Mali v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. [(2011) 4 RLW 3552], held that the question of suspension is not a matter for judicial determination and should be left to the objective satisfaction of the Government.

A perusal of the facts stated in the writ petition indicates that serious allegations have been levelled against the petitioner, a public representative holding the highest office of Chairperson, Municipal Board, Nohar, including the illegal issuance of pattas in violation of the Rules for her personal benefit. Considering such conduct to be disgraceful, the State issued a charge-sheet containing multiple charges, placed her under suspension, and initiated a judicial inquiry. In view of these circumstances, this Court is of the opinion that the decision of the State Government warrants no interference.

In view of the foregoing discussion, the decision to place the petitioner under suspension cannot be regarded as an unreasonable or colourable exercise of power. Although learned counsel for the petitioner has sought to rely on past incidents to support the allegation of malafides, this contention holds no merit in light of the fact that the charges forming the subject of the present inquiry were never part of the earlier inquiries. Moreover, under Section 39 of the Act of 2009, the State Government is empowered to examine any matter on the basis of material obtained from the concerned Municipal Board or otherwise, to decide on the initiation of an inquiry, and, in cases involving serious allegations, to place the person concerned under suspension. In the present case, the decision so taken cannot be said to be arbitrary or unreasonable in any respect.

Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be and is hereby dismissed.

All pending application (s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.

However, as observed above, the State Government is expected that it will look into the matter positively and if some other officers are also found to be involved in committing misconduct or irregularity in issuing the pattas, will take appropriate action against them also, in accordance with law.

Looking to the fact that the matter pertains to an elected member, the inquiry proceedings initiated against the petitioner shall be concluded as early as possible, preferably within a period of two months from today.