Shashi vs Principal, Govt. Post Graduate Degree College, Tehri Garhwal And Others

Ramesh Ranganathan, CJ

This intra-Court appeal is preferred against the order passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition (S/S) No. 2605 of 2019 dated 27.11.2019.

The appellant herein filed the said writ petition seeking a writ of certiorari to quash the order dated 26.06.2018 passed by the first respondent; and

for a mandamus directing the respondents to permit the appellant-writ petitioner to join duty pursuant to the letter issued by the second respondent on

08.03.2019.

Facts, as noted in the order of the learned Single Judge, are that the appellant-writ petitioner was appointed against the vacant post of Laboratory

Peon, from an outsourcing agency called the ‘District Youth Welfare and Prantiya Rakshak Dal Officer, Tehri Garhwal’, by letter dated

28.09.2016. She was permitted to work in the Government Post Graduate College, New Tehri at a remuneration of Rs. 400/- per day. Her services

were terminated, by proceedings dated 26.06.2018, on the ground that she was to complete six months of service on 01.07.2018.

The Chairman of the Nagar Palika Parishad addressed a letter to the District Magistrate, Tehri Garhwal on 11.02.2019 requesting him to continue

the services of the appellant-writ petitioner. Instructions appear to have been issued by the office of the Chief Minister to permit the appellant-writ

petitioner to be continued in the said post. While the second respondent appears to have addressed a letter to the Principal on 08.03.2019, the Principal

of the Government Post Graduate College, New Tehri Garhwal wrote a letter to the second respondent requesting him to send a proposal for

appointment of the appellant-writ petitioner as per law.

In the order under appeal, the learned Single Judge, after noting the submission of the learned Deputy Advocate General that the services of the

appellant â€"writ petitioner had been rightly terminated on expiry of six months as per the Government Order dated 22.12.2005, referred to Clause 3

of the Government Order dated 22.12.2005, which specifically provides that, in each and every District, a roster of trained members of the Rakshak

Dal shall be prepared; every member of the Rakshak Dal shall be given duty for at least six months, and thereafter as per the roster; and members,

who have served for six months, shall be replaced by another member as per the roster prepared, so that every member of the Prantiya Rakshak Dal

shall be given at least six months’ duty. The learned Single Judge observed that, in terms of the aforesaid Government Order, the services of the

appellant-writ petitioner had been rightly terminated after expiry of the six months’ period, so that equal opportunity of employment is provided to

every member of the Prantiya Rakshak Dal as per the Government Order dated 22.12.2005; thereby employment is provided to the members of the

Prantiya Rakshak Dal for a maximum period of six months, and thereafter by replacement of one member with another as per roster.

Thought the order, appointing the appellant-writ petitioner, does not specifically refer to the Government Order dated 22.12.2005, the appellant-writ

petitioner’s name was proposed by the Prantiya Rakshak Dal. It is evident, therefore, that her services could only have been engaged for a period

of six months, and not beyond. The entire scheme, as framed under the G.O. dated 22.12.2005, is for a roster of trained members of the Prantiya

Rakshak Dal to be prepared; and each member to be appointed as a Peon, on rotation, for a maximum period of six months. As the appellant-writ

petitioner had completed six months of continuous service, her services were terminated to enable another member to be appointed as a Peon for a

period of six months. After having secured appointment in terms of the Scheme, the appellant-writ petitioner now claims that an exception should be

made in her case alone on sympathetic grounds and, contrary to the said Scheme, she should be continued in service. The learned Single Judge

expressed his dis-inclination to grant such a relief.

Interference in an intra-Court appeal is justified only if the order under appeal suffers from a patent illegality. We find no such infirmity in the order

under appeal. The Special Appeal fails and is, accordingly, dismissed.

Sri M.S. Chauhan, learned counsel for the petitioner, seeks liberty for the appellant-writ petitioner to avail her other legal remedies. Suffice it, in

such circumstances, to observe that dismissal of this Special Appeal shall not be understood as disabling the appellant-writ petitioner from availing

other legal remedies, if any, available to her.