Sheodatt Roy vs Emperor

Wort, J.—In this case the petitioner has been convicted u/s 16, Motor Vehicles Act and fined a sum of Rs. 30 and the permit granted to him has been suspended for a period of four months. The permission or permit so called is in a form of authorization to ply for hire the motor lorry, which was the subject matter in this prosecution, and one of the conditions was that passengers should not exceed twenty in number.

A number of points have been taken, but the last of which was that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to suspend the permit for a period of four months which he has done. It is pointed out that the learned Magistrate purported to act under R. 41 of the Rules made under the Motor Vehicles Act being Act 8 of 1914.

It is to be noticed that this rule refers to a cancellation or suspension fore period not exceeding one year of a driving license of any person if it is proved to his satisfaction that the person has driven recklessly and negligently and sp on. Now, there is no other reference" in the rules which makes any provision for the cancellation of this permit as distinguished from a license and it seems to me perfectly clear that Rule 41 gave no authority to a Magistrate to cancel the permission. There might have been a rule framed entitling a Magistrate hearing a case of this kind to cancel such permission. But in the absence of any such rule I am quite clearly of the opinion that the Magistrate''s order, in so far as it relates to the suspension of the licence, as bad in law. The other points relate to the actual conviction.

The first point taken is that the Magistrate has relied upon the statement made by the driver who was the applicant''s co-accused stating that the responsibility, for the overloading which was the offence of which the applicant was convicted was the entire responsibility of the owner. It is pointed out that the applicant was prejudiced in this way as his co-accused driver was tried with him.

But it is to be noticed that the Magistrate merely adds that statement of the co-accused as corroboration of another part of his finding that the overloading took place in the presence of the present applicant If that be a fact, which is quite clearly established, then it is equally clear that the conviction u/s 16 was right in law and cannot be set aside on the ground merely that the Magistrate made reference to the statement of the co-accused. It cannot be said that in the circumstances the applicant is in any way prejudiced.

The other point is that by reason of the provisions of Sections 242 and 342, Criminal P.C., an examination on two occasions of the accused is contemplated, that is to say, when he is first brought before the Magistrate as provided by Section 242 and an examination after the closing of the evidence under the latter section which I have mentioned. Now no kind of prejudice is shown assuming for a moment that no second examination was held and it seems to me that this conviction cannot be disturbed on that ground.

he conviction of the applicant, therefore, remains; but the suspension of the "permit" being bad in law, as I have already found, that part of the order of the learned Magistrate must be set aside.