Sheojee Roy and Others vs State of Bihar and Others

S.S. Sandhawalia, C.J.—Doubts about the supposed enhancement of the criminal jurisdiction of the Gram Cutcherry to take cognizance of offences under Sections 379, 380, 381 and 411 of the Indian Penal Code u/s 62 of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act have necessitated this reference to the larger Bench.

The facts need recounting with relative brevity on a complaint preferred by opposite-party No. 2 the two petitioners along with three co-accused were brought to trial before the subdivisional Judicial Magistrate of Hajipur. The gravamen of the offence alleged against the accused persons was that they had removed 21 ghauds of banana fruits worth Rs. 150/- from the orchard of the complainant. In an exhaustive judgment, the trial court accepted the prosecution case and rejecting the defence version convicted the two petitioners under Sections 144 and 379, I. p. C and sentenced them to simple imprisonment of two months under the former Section and of four months under the latter. The other three co-accused were acquired of all charges. On appeal, the 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Vaishali, in a considered judgment, upheld the findings of the trial court and affirming the conviction, reduced the sentences.

It is significant to note that neither before the trial court nor before the appellate one was any objection, even remotely, raised with regard to the jurisdiction of the Criminal Courts to take cognizance. However, in the present revision petition it was alleged that the value of the property stolen being Rs. 150/- the case was execusively triable by the Gram Cutcherry of Milepakari Gram Panchayat. Reliance was apparently sought to be placed on Bimal Singh and Ors. v. State of Bihar 1965 BLJR 661. when this case originally came up for hearing before S. S. Hasan, J, the submission was raised on the basis of the observation in Bimal Singh''s case that the jurisdiction of the Gram Cutcherry to try cases u/s 379 I. P. C. extends to cases where the value of the property is two hundred rupees, which had been raised from Rs. 100/-. However, finding no adequate factual basis for the said observation, the matter was referred to a Division Bench.

As before the single Bench, so before us, the primary question sought to be urged was that the criminal jurisdiction of the Gram Cutcherry has been enhanced to try cases of theft up to the value of Rs. 200/- and, therefore, the offence herein was exclusively triable by the said Gram Cutcherry and not by the subdivisional Judicial Magistrate of Hajipur.

As the controversy herein would turn on the language of Section 62 of the Bihar Panchyat Raj Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), it is apt to quote the relevant part of Section 62:

Criminal Jurisdiction-Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedudure, 1898 (5 of 1898) and subject to the provisions of this Act, bench of the Gram Cutcherry shall have jurisdiction concurrent with that of the Criminal Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the bench is situate for the trial of the following offences as well as abatement of and attempts to commit any such offence if committed within the local limits of its jurisdiction namely.

(a) offences under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) Sections 379, 380, 381 .. .411 ;

(b)....

(c)....

(d)....

(e)....

Provided that the bench shall not take cognizance of any offence under Sections 379, 380, 381 or 411 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) in which the value of the property alleged to be stolen exceeds one hundred ruppes or

Provided further

....

There is no doubt that some handle or support to the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners herein is provided by a solitary passing observation in Bimal Singh''s case (supra) which has raised this cloud of doubt. Therein, after referring to Section 62 of the Act, it has been observed as follows:

The proviso says that the bench of the Gram Cuttcherry ''shall not take cognizance of any offence under Sections 379, 380, 381 or 411 of the Indian Penal Code, in which the value of the property alleged to have been stolen exceeds one hundred rupees (now it has been raised to two hundred rupees).

Now a close perusal of the judgment in Bimal Singh''s case (Supra) does not even remotely disclose as to how and when any amendment was made in Section 62 or the value of property mentioned therein had been raised to two hundred rupees. Since the observation has fallen from a Division Bench, we have carefully looked up the original Act and the subsequent amendments but were unable to find any provision indicating any such enhancement. Indeed, we adjourned the case to give time to the learned Counsel for the petitioners to buttress his submission on a firm foundation either enacting or indicating the enhancement to Rs. 200. It was, however, conceded by him that he could lay his hand upon nothing which could warrant the observation of the Division Bench in Bimal Singh''s case. Learned Counsel for the opposite party state was equally categoric that, in fact, no enhancement or consequential amendment in Section 62 has at all been made. It thus seems manifest that the observation made in Bimal Singh''s case (Supra) is pericardium, and has been patently occasioned by some inadvertance or some typographical error, with the greatest deference, we are construed to hold that the observation therein in this context is not factually correct and is an apparent misreading of the statutory provision.

Once it is held as above, it is plain that the wind is taken out of the sails of the virtually solitary argument raised on behalf of the petitioners, which must be rejected. It further suffices to notice that an attempt was sought to be made on behalf of the petitioners to claim a re-appraisal of the evidence for the third time for claiming an acquittal. However, I find no infirmity in the concureent finding of the courts below which can possibly merit any interference in the criminal revisional jurisdiction. The conviction is consequently affirmed.

However, on the very peculiar circumstances of this case, the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioners on the point of sentence is not wholly without merit. Considering the nature and matter of the offence, it would seem that an adequate fine would now meet the ends of justice. We, accordingly, setaside the sentences of imprisonment and impose a fine of Rs. 300/- Rs. (three hundred) on each of the two petitioners. In default thereof, they would undergo an imprisonment of two months each. The fine, if realised, would be paid to the complainant as compensation, with this modification in the sentence, the revision petition is dismissed.