Shiam Lal (deceased) by LRs. vs Chob Singh (dead) and Another

S.P. Srivastava, J.—Heard the learned counsel for the parties.

Perused the record.

Learned Counsel for the appellant does not propose to file any counteraffidavit and relies on materials on record.

Sri Gajadhar Singh had been impleaded as a defendantrespondent in the second appeal. On 1591986, this Court on an application moved by Sri Klmb Singh and another, who had been brought on record as the heirs and legal representative of Shiam Lai, the plaintiffappellant vide the order dated 1121986 had issued an interim injuction restraining the defendantrespondents from alienating the land in dispute which was the subjectmatter of the appeal. The aforesaid interim injunction was confirmed on 27111987. In the affidavit filed in support of the interim injunction, it had been asserted that Gajadhar Singh in order to harass the original plaintiff was negotiating to sell the land in dispute. The parties to the appeal moved an application on 24101991 praying that the appeal be decided in terms of compromise which may form part of the record. This application was supported by the joint affidavit of Khub Singh and Gajadhar Singh. The deed of compromise which was signed by all the parties to the appeal was sent for verification before the Munsif Hawaii, Aligarh who verified the same on 2911992.

The appeal which had been admitted on 451977 was finally disposed of vide the judgment and order dated 2631992 holding that the compromise was lawful and was ordered to be recorded. This Court accordingly set aside the judgment and decree passed by the Civil Judge, Aligarh and ordered that the suit shall stand decreed in terms of compromise which shall form part of the decree.

On 2nd June, 1992, the applicants came forward with an application that they had purchased the land in dispute from Gajadhar Singh under a registered sale deed dated 20th April, ''1990 registered on 18th June, 1990 and had no knowledge of the pendency of the second appeal in this Court and therefore, could not seek their impleadment therein. The application further asserted that the parties to the second appeal has played fraud upon this Court as by the date the compromise had been entered into, Gajadhar had parted with his interest in the land in dispute and could not in any case represent them. It was asserted that Gajadhar did not have any legal right to execute any compromise deed in the second appeal and any such compromise is in effective and inoperative in the eye of law. The applicants have prayed that the order dated 631991, disposing of the second appeal be recalled and the appeal be heard on merits after impleading the applicants as respondents in the appeal.

The aforesaid application has been vehemently opposed by the appellant.

From the facts and circumstances brought on record, it is apparent that the only edifice on which the applicants rest their claim is the deed of sale dated 3041990 registered on 1861990 which had been executed by Gajadhar, the defendantrespondent No. 2 in the appeal. The aforesaid defendant respondent was a party to the application filed by the appellant, wherein an interim order of injunction had been granted restraining Gajadhar Singh from alienating the property in dispute. The order of interim injunction which was passed after hearing the defendantrespondents was confirmed on 27111987. In the face of the interim injunction running against the defendantrespondent No. 2, there could be no occasion for him to transfer the property in dispute in favour of any other person. Any such transfer which is in utter violation and in defiance of an interim injunction of the nature as granted in the present case is liable to be ignored, as otherwise it would defeat the ends of justice and the prevalent public policy.

In this connection, it may be emphasised that a transfer of an interest in any immoveable property which is the subjectmatter of the suit in difiance of an injunction pendente lite is a serious matter. When the court intends a particular state of affairs to exist while it is in seizing of a lis, that state of affairs is not only required to be maintained but it is presumed to exist till the court order directs otherwise. The Court in these circumstances has the duty as also the right to treat the alienation as having not taken place at all for its purpose.

Taking into consideration the ratio of the decision of the Apex Court in its decision in the case of Surjit Singh and others v. Harbans Singh and others, reported in 1995 (6) JT SC 415 : 1995 (2) JCLR 781 (SC), and the circumstances of the present case, the saledeed relied upon by the applicant is liable to be ignored and cannot be taken notice of in the present proceedings.

In any view of the matter, this transfer lis pendens cannot come 10 the rescue of the applicant to get over the compromise which had been found by this Court in its order dated 2631992 to be lawful.

In the aforesaid view of the matter, I find absolutely no justification for either the impleadment of the applicants as sought for or the recall of the final order disposing of the second appeal and reopening the matter.

The application is accordingly rejected.