High CourtsSingle Bench

Shiv Lal vs Shori Lal

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 2 January 1962 · Citation: (1962) 2 ILR (P&H) 108

HON’BLE JUDGES
Shamsher Bahadur, J
RESULT
Allowed
CASE NUMBER
Second Appeal from Order No. 98-D of 1961
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Judgment

4 paragraphs · 641 words

Shamsher Bahadur, J.—This is a landlord''s petition for revision from the appellate order of the Rent Control Tribunal remitting the dispute relating to the fixation of standard rent for redecision of the Rent Controller.

2.

The tenant, who had taken the suit premises on an agreed rent of Rs. 45/- per month on 1st of July, 1958, applied to the Rent Controller for fixation of its standard rent on 27th of August, 1959. On the 1st October, 1960, the parties made statements before the Rent Controller, the landlord agreeing to charge Rs. 31/4/- per month as rent with effect from 1st September, 1959, and the tenant expressing his willingness to pay it. The Rent Controller, in accordance with their statements, made the following order-

The respondent having agreed to charge the applicant Rs. 31/4/- per month w.e.f. 1st September 1959 the petition is dismissed as infructuous.

3.

The tenant filed an appeal to the Rent Control Tribunal and without any allegation being made that he had been overborne or over reached in any manner by the landlord in making the statement on 1st of October, 1960, it was contended that the Additional Rent Controller should have independently determined the standard rent of the premises in accordance with the law. The argument commended itself to the Rent Control Tribunal which set aside the order of the Rent Controller and remanded the case to him for redecision in accordance with the law. In my opinion, this petition must succeed on the principle that one is not at liberty to reprobate what he has already approbated. It is true that the Act enjoins a Rent Controller to settle a dispute with regard to standard rent between a landlord and a tenant but it cannot be inferred there from that a tenant is prevented from abandoning the dispute at any stage of a proceeding and agreeing that the rent proposed by the landlord should be determined as the proper standard rent. As pointed out by a Division Bench of Dixit and Vyas JJ. in Popatlal Ratansey Vs. Kalidas Bhavan, an agreement which is embodied in a lease and the decision which is embodied in consent decree. What is embodied in a consent decree is the decision of the Court as to standard rent. Such a decision or judgment of the Court would estop the tenant from contending in a subsequent application under the Act that the standard rent to which he had previously agreed was not the fair rent. This principle of law was accepted in the two single Bench judgments given by Gajendragadkar J. (now Justice of the Supreme Court) and Shah J. (now Justice of the Supreme Court) in two unreported decisions mentioned at page 6 of Popatlal Ratansey Vs. Kalidas Bhavan, . The matter came up recently before Chief Justice Khosla in Sat Parkash v. Parkash Chand, Civil Revision No. 648 of 1960, and it was held by him in that judgment of 6th of April 1961, that a tenant, who has agreed to a consent order regarding fixation of standard rent, cannot reagitate the same question in subsequent proceedings. The single Bench decisions of this Court in Ladha Ram v. Khushi Ram (1955) 57 P.L.R. 188 and Niranjan Singh v. Murti Shri Bhagwan Ram (1955) 57 P.L.R. 530 were distinguished by Chief Justice Khosla on the ground that the second application was moved in those cases by a person other than the one who had actually entered into a compromise. I am in respectful agreement with the view expressed by Chief Justice Khosla and would accordingly allow this petition for revision, restore the order of the Rent Controller and set aside that of the appellate Tribunal. As there is some authority in favour of the view taken by the appellate Tribunal, I would leave the parties to bear their own costs.