Shiv Pal vs Gurdev Singh

Swatanter Kumar, J.

Whether innocence or bona fide intention can be pleaded as an absolute defence in an action against the person under the Contempt of Courts Act for committing civil contempt, is the short question that falls for consideration in this case.

Late Shri Kehar Singh father of the present petitioner had purchased a plot in the abadi of village Lalana from one Ajmer Singh by means of a registered sale deed dated 28.3.1964. Mihan Singh and Gurdev Singh and encorached upon the said land in the year 1977 and had raised some construction.

He was compelled to file a suit for possession, by demolishing the wall and Chabutra constructed by these two persons, being Civil Suit No. 490 of 1979/1977. This suit was decreed in favour of the petitioner or their predecessors in interest on 3.11.1979. First appeal against this order was accepted by the First Appellate Court vide its judgment and decree dated 19.1.1981. In the meanwhile Kehar Singh died, consequently his heirs preferred Regular Second Appeal No. 620 of 1981. Along with this appeal the appellants had filed an application being C.M. No. 698C of 1981 which came up for hearing before a Bench of this Court on 2.4.1981 and the following order was passed:

"Present: Sh. M.S. Sular, Advocate

Notice of motion for 23rd April, 1981. Status quo be maintained.

April 2, 1981. Sd/ S.S. Dewan, Judge."

This order was confirmed vide order dated 23.4.1981 in the following terms after Mihan Singh and Gurdev Singh appeared through their counsel on 23.4.1981:

"Notice.Stay to continue.

Sd/ S.P. Goyal, Judge.

April 23, 1981."

The above order of status quo has to be construed and read in conjunction with the prayer made by the appellantpetitioner in the miscellaneous application for injunction. The prayer reads as under:

"It is, therefore, prayed that the defendantsrespondents be restrained from constructing, any portion of the land in dispute, and alienating any part of the property in dispute during the pendency of this appeal, or any other relief to which the appellants are found entitled, be also granted to them."

There was no dispute between the parties till 19.9.1995. It is stated by the petitioners herein that respondents No. 1 and 5 to 9 are parties to the Regular Second Appeal. Respondents No. 2 to 4 are sons of respondent No. 1 Gurdev Singh while respondent Nos. 5 to 9 are sons of the deceased Mihan Singh. Respondents No. 10 and 12 are alleged to be the associates of these respondents No. 1 to 9. Respondents No. 13 and 14 are stated to be the masons while respondents No. 15 and 16 are the police officials who are stated to be abetting the contempt and in fact positively participated in disobedience of the order of the Court. It is further alleged that on 19.9.1995 the respondent after demolition of the existing structure had started constructing a new structure on the same land which is subject matter of dispute and was specifically covered by the order of status quo. On 19.9.1995, the petitioner, his brother and nephew went to the police station, requested the S.H.O. to take appropriate action upon producing certified copy/photo copy and see to it that the order of the Court was not flouted. The S.H.O. had admittedly sent two constables to the village on the same day upon seeing the copy of the order passed by the Court. It is alleged that these constables had seen the construction going on and even confirmed the factum of the above orders being passed by the High Court from the respondents.

These constables asked the parties to come on 20.9.1995. The S.H.O. asked the parties to go to Deputy Superintendent of Police Shri Karan Singh respondent No. 15. In furtherance to this direction they went to respondent No. 15 and showed him the copy of the order dated 23.4.1981 passed by the High Court. The said respondent No. 15 abused the petitioners and their family members and threatened that the work of construction has to be completed and if they tried to stop, they would be involved in criminal case and he does not bother about the orders of the Court. It is further averred that he directed the S.H.O. to take them in illegal constody and beat them which was subsequently done by respondent No. 14. The S.H.O. and the Deputy Superintendent of Police permitted the said party to raise the construction. All this incident is stated to have been reported on 22.9.1995 itself to the Superintendent and the petitioners again went to the Deputy Inspector General of Police on 26.9.1995 and made even a representation in writing, the copy of which has been placed on record as Annexure P2 to the petition. It is averred that all these respondents in connivance with each other and in fragrant violation of the orders of the Court, raised the new construction on the suit land which is subject matter of the appeal in intentional and wilful violation of the orders of the High Court dated 2.4.1981 and 23.4.1981. The new construction has been reflected in a photograph which has been annexed to this petition as Annexure P3.

All the respondents have filed separate replies. Respondent No. 1 Gurdev Singh, in his reply, admits the factum of raising new construction and the following is the relevant part in his reply:

"During last rainy season the roof fell due to heavy rains and the deponent got it rebuilt without extending the area under construction. The deponent did not violate any order of this Hon''ble Court nor he has changed the status quo. Rather the petitioner after the reconstruction of the room started creating trouble and abusing the family members of the deponent and Panchayat intervened where he undertook not to harass the deponent and his family members.

"It is stated that deponent with assistance of respondents No. 13 and 14 reconstructed the room which was affected by the heavy rainfall during the last rainy season."

It was further averred that he had approached the Panchayat and the entire matter was compromised by a Panchayatnama copy of which has been placed on record as Annexure R2/1 by this respondent. It is admitted that they were taken to the police station. However, other allegations have been vaguely denied.

All the other respondents except respondents No. 13 and 16 have in their replies taken up the stand that they had not raised any construction nor they have threatened the petitioner as alleged. Paragraph No. 9 is the standard reply filed on behalf of all the respondents which reads as under:

"Contents of para N. 9 of the contempt petition to the effect that the deponent was party to the alleged construction or contravention of the stay order of this Hon''ble Court are wrong and denied."

Respondents No. 13 and 14 have taken up the identical stand that they were not aware of the litigation of the parties. They acted as masons for the raising of the construction under the instructions of Gurdev Singh and they had raised the construction on the old foundation without encroaching any new area. Other paragraphs of the petition have not even been answered by these two respondents.

Somewhat similar reply has been filed by respondents No. 15 and 16 where it is admitted that on 19.9.1995 the petitioner had approached the police station and the constables were sent to the site. It is stated that they came to the police station on 20.9.1995 and immediately thereafter the matter was compromised between the parties by means of the a Panchayatnama (original of which directed to be placed on record during the course of hearing). It is stated that the petitioner is signatory to the said Panchayatnama. It is admitted that the photo copy of the injunction order passed by this Court was shown to the police officials. Other allegations with regard to slapping, arrest and harassment are denied. However, is it not denied that the representation was made to the higher authorities on the dates and time indicated in the petition. As usual both these respondents tendered unconditional apology in case the court feels that they have done any act which amounts to contempt of Court.

It is clear from the above facts that it is an admitted case of new construction which fact is duly supported by Annexure P/3 the photograph. This photograph does not indicate at all that it was repair or reconstruction of certain parts of the premises. It is really doubtful that there could be such heavy rains in the month of September, 1995. The petitioner has specifically averred that they had demolished the old structure and had raised the new one. The factum of any rain has been disputed and it has been reiterated in the rejoinder filed on behalf of the petitioner that the respondents had conspired with each other and have intentionally and wilfully flouted the orders of this Court and have raised entirely a new construction. In the petition a definite role has been attributed to all the respondents and it has been stated that they started new construction and completed the same inspite of definite protest by the petitioner. Further it is stated that it was possible because of definite connivance and favouritism shown by respondents No. 15 and 16. Mihan Singh and Gurdev Singh are parties to the main appeal and all heirs of Mihan Singh have duly been represented as representatives of deceased Mihan Singh. Respondent No. 1 and 5 to 9 have definite interest in the subject matter of the appeal and there is nothing on record to show that respondents No. 2 to 5 were not actually present on the site. Replies filed by all these respondents are identical and are vague.

Respondents No. 10 and 12 are stated to be present at the site and they have participated in violation of the order in spite of the fact that the order was duly shown to them as they were the members of the Panchayat. In the reply filed by these respondents they have supported the other respondents and alleged that the parties had compromised. They also admitted that the parties had gone to the police station. These replies are completely silent as to on which date the compromise was entered into and when it was presented to the police. The replies are onepage reply without specifically dealing with the averments made in the petition and are vague to its possible extent.

It is a settled principle of law that in the proceedings of the like nature the allegations should be specifically disputed and denied. The defence must be well explained and supported by such documents as is permissible in law. The petition, replies and the rejoinder(s) filed are all supported by the affidavits of the respective parties. Intentional violation of an order of injunction of a Court of competent jurisdiction does not permit raising of the defence which are sought to be raised by the respondents. The mere fact that respondent No. 1 owns such construction would not absolve other respondents who have abetted or participated in any manner whatsoever in violation of the orders of the injunction and that too in the manner indicated in the petition. In a matter of civil contempt of the present nature the Court has to be satisfied of its own whether a particular person has wilfully and intentionally committed and or abetted the violation of the orders of the court and is liable to be punished for such offence or not. Respondents No. 1 to 11 are directly interested parties. Respondents No. 12 and 13 hold an elected office of public importance which imposes an obligation upon them not only to respect orders of the court but to facilitate their implementation and not to permit violation of orders by misusing the public office they hold.

This brings me to the basic plea raised by Mr. Brar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents No. 1 to 14. The submission of the learned counsel is that his clients in raising the new construction had acted in innocence or under a bona fide belief. Ex. D/2 (in the suit proceedings and now on the records of the appeal), which is the copy of the map, has been placed on record during the course of arguments. This indicates that the wall was plinth level and on wooden pillars the roof was raised. Therefore, this was the admitted construction existing at the time of passing of the injunction order. Obviously the construction raised as shown in Annexure P/3 to this petition cannot be termed as an addition or alteration or renovation, though it will be doubtful even if such construction was permissible under the order of injunction passed by the High Court.

This plea of innocence is hardly a permissible defence in an action for civil contempt specially when the intention to flout the order is writ large from the facts of the case. In the case of Partap Singh and another v. Gurbaksh Singh, AIR 1962 Supreme Court page 1172, the Court specifically declined to accept the defence in a contempt petition that the action was in furtherance to Government circulars. The court held as under:

"Whether it had a tendency to interfere with the due course of justice. The action taken in this case against the respondent by way of a proceeding against him could have only one tendency, namely, the tendency to coerce the respondent and force him to withdraw his suit or otherwise not press it. If that be the clear and unmistakable tendency of the proceedings taken against the respondent, then the officials concerned had been guilty of comptempt of court, even though they were merely carrying out the instructions contained in the circular letter." (emphasis applied by Court)

Similar views were expressed where specifically innocence of contemner was held to be not a sufficient cause and not a defence in an action for contempt of Court except to the extent that such factors were considered to be relevant for determining the punishments to be awarded to the contemner (AIR 1945 Nagpur 33, Balkrishna Narayan Saoji v. Col. N.S. Natar, and another).

Another factor which must be taken into consideration is whether the stand of innocence is backed by any bona fide intentions on the part of the respondents. This has to be answered in the negative. Even if the Court assumes that the defence put forward by the respondents is correct, nothing prevented these respondents from approaching this Court in the Regular Second Appeal to seek directions for renovating or reconstructing the property even if it had demolished in the rains. The factum of heavy rains has specifically been disputed by the petitioner. On the contrary there is a specific averment that the old construction was demolished by the respondents and they had raised the new construction. In this part of the country one hardly sees such heavy rains towards 3rd week of September which could cause destruction of property to an extent that even the base of the old construction could not be visible. It is not even alleged by the respondents that there were heavy floods in the area. The stand taken by the respondents does not inspire confidence. On the contrary it is full of loopholes. Not even a whisper has been made in the reply filed as to why respondents No. 1 to 11 could not move the Court for seeking appropriate directions if the property had been destroyed by heavy rains. It is certainly expected of every person to carry out the orders and directions of the Court in their true spirit and substance and there should be no attempt to circumvent orders of the Court in a manner that such circumstances would have the effect of nullifying the order of the Court cannot be treated as a bona fide action on the part of the contemners entitling them for acceptance of any apology.

Even if the respondents No. 1 to 11 had understood the order as is now claimed, nothing prevented them from moving the Appellate Court for appropriate directions. Not approaching the court at any stage and raising the new construction in the manner as is clear from the above facts certain convey a wilful disobedience of the injunction order by all the respondents. The Supreme Court in the case of M/s Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. State of Bihar and others, AIR 1988 Supreme Court 127 observed as under :

"The proper course for respondent No. 4 to have adopted was to have approached this Court to seek clarification, if he had any doubt as to the meaning and effect of the status quo order. We highly deprecate the conduct of respondent No. 4 for having approached the High Court and obtained the impugned order by suppressing the fact that this Court had passed the status quo order."

There is no doubt that in a civil contempt the disobedience has to be wilful because the Legislature while defining civil contempt has specifically added the words "wilful disobedience" of any order or direction. Thus, wilful or intentional disobedience of an order is a prerequisite to find a contemner guilty of contempt (Niaz Mohammad and others v. State of Haryana and others, JT 1994(6) SC 260)

In the case in hand the intention to flout the orders of the Court can not only be inferred but is more than apparent on the face of the record. Every person whether a party to the proceedings or not has to comply with the orders issued by the court unless such orders are varied or vacated by the court of competent jurisdiction. In the entire reply there is no denial to the facts that order, violation of which is complained of, was passed in the presence of the parties and was shown to all the respondents without exceptions. None of the respondents has tendered any plausible explanation which will ultimately go to prove that the disobedience was not wilful or was not intended. One fails to understand as to how the entire Panchayat, the police officers who are conversant with the process of law, could conduct themselves in the manner aforestated. The learned counsel for the petitioner to argue that it is a wilful disobedience of the order of status quo passed by the High Court has relied upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Court on its own motion v. N.S. Kanwar, 1995(1) Recent C.R. 201 . The Bench after detailed discussion on the subject, in para no. 26 of the judgment, held as under:

"From the above quoted dictionary meaning of the term wilful and the decisions of the courts, it is reasonable to derive that term wilful disobedience used in section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 cannot be construed to mean that an act must in all cases be designed and deliberate to be held as Civil Contempt. If a party who is fully in know of the order of the Court or is conscious and aware of the consequences and implications of the Court''s order, ignores it or acts in violation of the Court''s order, it must be held that disobedience is wilful. In our view ordinarily it is never practicable to prove the actual intention behind the act or omission. A court can approach the question only objectively and it may presume the intention from the act done as every man is presumed to intend the probable consequence of his act."

The role played by the police officials respondents No. 14 and 15 in in the present case is certainly regretable and their conduct is not worthy of any appreciation. In the stream of administration of justice the police has a definite role to play. Where every person is expected to comply with the directions of the court and honour ever undertaking given to the court irrespective of any inconvenience of hardship which may result therefrom, the officials are expected to do much better job than the common man. The stand of these two respondents is nothing but a vague denial, except admitting the fact that they had received a complaint from the petitioners and had deputed two constables for this purpose. It is averred that thereafter there was a Panchayatnama (compromise) and consequently the case was closed. In view of these specific admissions and in fact on denial of the allegations that specific complaint was made against the police officials and other respondents to the Superintendent of Police and even to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, the Court was compelled to call for the Roznamcha maintained by the concerned police station under the control of respondent No. 14. D.D. Entry No. 42 which was relied upon by the learned counsel for the State dated 19.9.1995 did not indicate the receipt of the complaint or that two constable were deputed for this purpose. On the contrary it is recorded in the said D.D. Entry that they had sent one constable for ''Gashat'' in the village. This constables Krishan Kumar has reported his ''Vaapasi'' after more than two hours and entry in this regard was made. But the constable did not report this incident, the action taken by him, what is most noteworthy is that the entire Roznamcha from 18th to 20th of September, 1995 did not contain any entry specific to this incident and closing of the case in view of the Panchayatnama alleged to have been executed by the petitioner voluntarily.

Daily Diary of the Police Station is a document directed to be maintained under the statute. Under the provisions of Section 44 of the Police Act read with Rules 22.48 and 22.49 of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934 as applicable to the State of Haryana, a diary has to be maintained by every police Station and entries with regard to arrival and departure of every Police Officer/official on the rolls, of whatever rank he may be, has to be entered upon. It further requires the said police officer/officials to make appropriate entry with regard to the commission of an offence cognizable or otherwise. The records produced before Court shows complete violation of these statutory directions by the concerned police officers and more particularly respondents No. 14.

Faced with this situation, Mr. N.S. Bhinder learned counsel for the State, during the course of arguments fairly conceded that there ought to have been entries in the Roznamcha to support the facts stated in the reply on behalf of these respondents. Another factor which the court has to consider is that the Panchayatnama R2/1 is not signed by the petitioner Shiv Pal or any other son of the complainant. It has been alleged by the respondents that the person who signed as Pala Ram is the petitioner as his name is Pala Ram alias Shiv Pal. This defence again does not inspire any confidence. This is more so in view of the fact that the petitioner denies entering into any such agreement. On the other hand he has made specific allegations that the police authorities had after beating them obtained some signatures on the blank papers. The complaint which was made to the police authorities complaining about the respondents including the police officials does not describes Shiv Pal as Pala Ram. This also does not stand to reason the if the petitioner had peacefully compromised that matter as alleged and Panachayatnama was executed, where was the occasion for the petitioner to run from pillar to post, make various complaints, meet D.I.G. and immediately thereafter file the present petition for contempt without any inordinate delay. This conduct of the petitioner certainly falsifies the stand taken by the respondents and the alleged Panchayatnama neither bears a date nor was entered in the police records as per the requirement of rules, is of no consequence and does not appear to be a genuine document.

While there is wilful disobedience on the part of the respondents No. 1 to 13 who are parties interested in the litigation or have been employed by them for violating the orders of the Court, there is intentional interference by respondents No. 15 and 16 in active participation of the wilful disobedience of the orders passed by the Court. It is clear from the record that but for the help rendered by these police officials the other respondents would not have been able to violate the orders of the Court with this disregard. These police officers have exercised their authority for an oblique motive and have caused interference with the administration of justice and directly and wilfully helped the other respondents in wilfully disobeying the orders passed by the Appellate Court. At this stage it may be appropriate to make a reference to the case of Chandra Shashi v. Anil Kumar Verma, JT 1994(7) SC 459, wherein their Lordships of the Supreme Court held as under:

"The stream of administration of justice has to remain unpolluted so that purity of court''s atmosphere may give vitality to all the organs of the state. Polluters of judicial firmament are, therefore, required to be well taken care of to maintain the sublimity of court''s environment; so also to enable it to administer justice fairly and to the satisfaction of all concerned. Anyone who takes recourse to fraud, deflects the course of judicial proceedings or if anything is done with oblique motive, the same interferes with the administration of justice. Such persons are required to be properly dealt with, not only to punish them for the wrong done, but also to deter others from indulging in similar acts which shake the faith of people in the system of administration of justice."

Also reference can be made to the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Aslam alias Bhure, Acchan Rizvi v. Union of India, State of Uttra Pradesh and others, JT 1994(7) SC 245, where their Lordships with approval reiterated the observations of the House of Lords in the case of In se. M. v. Home Office, 1994(1) AC 377 to say that "For the purpose of enforcing the law against all persons and institutions, including ministers in their officials capacity and in their personal capacity, the Courts are armed with corrective powers exercisable in proceedings for contempt of court."

These observations of far reaching impact and consequence are recent development of law and are primarily intended to ensure the compliance and are to prevent violation of orders of the Court by any person irrespective of his status and position. As already indicated above the obligation to prevent violation of the orders of the Court is much heavier on the police authorities. But certainly in no case they ought to be instrumental in violating the orders of the Court or even stand like a simple spectator to watch the scenes of violation of the order of the court with complete immunity. Such officers could hardly tender explanation in a case where the restraint order of the Court was admittedly brought to their knowledge and copy thereof shown to them. The matter did not rest there, but the said police officers even ignored the written complaints made by the petitioner in this regard.

The socalled Panchayatnama is of no avail to the respondents inasmuch as the petitioner before this Court in any case is not vested with any right much less an authority to forgive or condone the violation of the orders of the Court. The contempt of the order(s) of the Court can be brought to the notice of the court not only by the parties interested in the lis but for that matter by any person who might be affected by the violation of such orders or by the person who has a direct and implicit duty to ensure compliance of the orders of the Court. Once the facts constituting violation of orders of the Court or disobedience by a party are brought to the notice of the Court, there upon the matter falls primarily and essentially is in the domain of exclusive jurisdiction of the Court.

The alleged Panchayatnama, thus, is inconsequential and cannot be used as a lever to avoid consequences of violating the orders of the court if otherwise proved. In other words an arrangement or agreement between the parties does not govern or affect in any manner whatsoever, the proceedings initiated by the Court on an application by affected party like this case or even action taken suo moto under the provisions of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971.

In the present case not only that execution of the Panchayatnama is disputed but no effort was made by the respondentscontemners to place this Panchayatnama on record before the Appellate Court. This fact is of some relevance because in all reasonable probability and keeping in view of the fact that compromise was without prejudice to the rights of the parties in appeal, one would reasonably expect that respondents would have brought this fact to the notice of the Appellate Court as present contempt was filed approximately after a month from the date of incident. Two other relevant factors which falsify the stand of the respondents are that the photographi which is stated to have been taken on 22.9.1995 i.e. immediately after the occurrence does not even show the land surrounding the construction wet inspite of the fact that there were alleged to be heavy rains. On the contrary it indicates nothing to support the stand of the respondents and specially in view of the fact that this photograph has not been disputed by any of the respondents. Even the alleged Panchayatnama and reply on behalf of the official respondents indicate that there was fight between the parties with regard to the construction on the disputed land. Thus, at least the police officials and respondents No. 13 and 14 owed a duty to exercise their public office or authority in consonance with the orders of the Court. The abuse of power or authority by these respondents in helping by active participation and wilful disobedience of the orders of the Court render them liable for action.

The admission of family scuffle in reply by the respondents on this issue clearly indicates involvement of other brothers and sons of the family of the respondents. Their effective and wilful participation cannot be ruled out. On the contrary it stands established because no facts have been stated as to the whereabouts of the respondents on the date and time of the occurrence. Onus to prove their absence lay on them which they have utterly failed to discharge. It is thus clear from facts of this case that the respondents have intentionally and wilfully violated and/or intentionally participated and effectively encouraged violation of the orders of the court. Their conduct is such which not only tends to interfere but has actually interfered with the due course and administration of justice.

This brings me to the last submission raised on behalf of the respondents that since respondent No. 1 has taken the entire responsibility of the alleged violation upon himself, the other respondents cannot be held guilty of violation of the orders of the court. This contention does not admit any merits. Contempt of orders of a Court and the proceedings initiated thereupon is primarily a matter between the contemner(s) and the Court. The petitioner is merely an informant. It is for the Court to consider every case on its merits and to punish every person who has violated the orders of the Court or has been instrumental in wilful disobedience of the orders of the Court. The contemners cannot be permitted to choose between themselves as to who is liable to be proceeded against or liable to be punished for contempt of Court. If this kind of procedure is permitted to be adopted in contempt proceedings it will be completely destructive of the scheme of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and would result in frequent disobedience of orders of Court rather than prevent its reoccurrence. In this regard it will be appropriate to make reference to the following observations of the Full Bench of Delhi High Court in the case of Brig E.T. Sen (Retd.) v. Edatata Narayanan and others, AIR 1969 Delhi 201:

"If contempt of court is committed by a person then merely because some one else takes the responsibility for the contempt committed by the former it is no ground in law to absolve him or to decline to take notice of the former''s guilt. Hence where the Editor of a newpaper takes the entire responsibility for what has appeared in his newspaper and also expresses unconditional regrets for the contempt of Court, it is not open to him to contend that the correspondent of the newspaper who is actually responsible should not be made a party to the proceedings for contempt."

Thus, in view of the above discussion I find that all the respondents are guilty of willful and intentional disobedience of the orders passed by a Bench of this Court dated 2.4.1981 and 23.4.1981 in Civil Misc. No. 696C of 1981 moved in Regular Second Appeal No. 620 of 1981. The necessary corollary to this finding it that all the respondents are liable to be punished for contempt of court.

Of course a usual paragraph has been incorporated in every reply in identical language to say " in case this Hon''ble Court comes to the conclusion that the depondent has in any way violated the order of this Hon''ble Court, he tenders unqualified apology and begs to be pardoned." I find that such kind of tender of apology on behalf of the respondents lacks bona fide and is in no way a sincre regret or repentance for their aforesaid commission. The conduct of the respondents and more particularly of the police officers during the hearing of this petition does not indicate any intention on the part of all respondents that apology is offered bona fidely and towards a measure of a atonement. This apology is merely a lip offer and is more as a pretext to escape the consequentces of the contemptuous act. Once the apology is not bona fide, genuine and a sincere offer as a measure of atonement, the Courts would be most unwilling to accept such an apology and to give benefit to the contemners to purge the contempt instead of facing the sentence.

In view of the aforesaid discussion and reasoning, I find all the respondents guilty of wilful, and intentional disobedience of the orders of the Court dated 2.4.1981 and 23.4.1981. Consequently they all are sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a term of one month and are further directed to pay a fine of Rs. 1500/ each. Resultantly the contempt petition is allowed with costs of Rs. 2000/ which all the respondents shall be liable to pay in equal shares to the petitioner.