Shiv Parbati Rice Mills vs The Commissioner, Bhagalpur Division and Others

Shambhu Pd. Singh, J.—This case has been placed before me on a difference of opinion between Uday Sin ha and Shivanugrah Narain, JJ. The facts of the case are fully stated in the judgment of Uday Sinha, J. and it is not necessary to state all the facts once again. The two learned Judges have agreed on almost all the points except one and learned counsel appearing for the parties have not urged before me that since the entire case is before me I should decide even those questions on which they are agreed. Learned counsel for the parties have made their submissions only on the question on which the two learn-ed Judges have differed. In other words, they did not appear dissatisfied with the decisions of the two learned Judges on the points on which they are agreed. It was a case of confiscation of foodgrains on the ground that the petitioner which is a licensee under the Foodgrains Dealer''s Licensing Order, 1967 (hereinafter referred to as the Order) had not maintained correct accounts as to the stock of rice and paddy. When the mill premises of the petitioner were inspected on 7th of July, 1975, by the District Supply Officer of Santhal Parganas, the stock register maintained by the petitioner showed only 100 quintals 58 kgs. of rice and 232 quintals 57 kgs. of paddy in the mill. On physical verification only 197 quintals 69 kgs. of rice and no paddy was found. Rice was found kept at two places. The quantity of rice kept at one place was 100 quintals 58 kgs. and that kept at another place was 97 quintals 11 kgs. The- Collector (Deputy Commissioner, Santhal Parganas) drew up a proceeding u/s 6A of the Essential Commodities Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") and after having issued notice to the petitioner and considering its show cause confiscated the entire stock of 197 quintals 69 kgs. On appeal, the Commissioner, Bhagalpur, modified the order. He set aside the order of confiscation in respect of 100 quintals 58 kgs. but maintained that in respect of 97 quintals 11 kgs. According to learned counsel for the petitioner, 232 quintals 57 kgs. of paddy when converted into rice even at the rate of 62, 5 quintals of rice out of every 100 quintals of paddy would come to about 145 quintals 35 kgs. and thus there was shortage of only about 48 quintals 24 kgs. The offence, if any, according to learned counsel for the petitioner, was committed in respect of this 48 quintals 24 kgs. of rice which was not found in stock and, therefore, seizure, if any, could be of that and not of 97 quintals 11 kgs. of rice which were found in the mill premises and were entered in the account books. In other words, according to learned counsel, the seizure and confiscation can be only of the goods in respect of which an offence is committed and not of the entire stock of the goods found in the godown. Uday Sinha, J. has taken the view that u/s 6A of the Act confiscation may be ordered of seized articles and seizure may be effected if there is contravention of the order or of the conditions of the licence. He does not appear to have recorded a definite finding whether an offence was committed, in the circumstances of the case, even in respect of 97 quintals 11 kgs. of rice except by observing that contravening articles were entire 232 quintals 57 kgs. of paddy, but has relied on a recent Bench decision of this court in (1) Narendra Kumar Vs. The State of Bihar and Others, and has expressed his agreement with the view taken in that case that the entire goods in possession of a licensee were liable to confiscation in terms of Section 6A of the Act if there had been any in-fraction of any Control Order made under the Act. Shivanugrah Narain, J. on the other hand, has taken the view that no offence at all was committed in respect of 97 quintals 11 kgs. of rice and, therefore, it could neither be seized nor could be confiscated. According to him, the decision in Narendra Kumar''s case was given per incuriam and as such not binding on the Bench hearing this case, or, at any rate, the Bench hearing the case ought to have held that the said decision does not lay down the correct law and referred the case to a larger Bench.

I was a party to the decision in Narendra Kumar''s case and I informed learned counsel for the petitioner when the hearing started before me that if he so liked he could get this case before another judge. He, how ever, insisted that the case be heard by me. He indicated that his line of submissions would be that Narendra Kumar''s case was not correctly decided as it failed to take into consideration certain decisions of this court as well as of other High Courts and Supreme Court.

With due respect to Shivanugrah Narain, J. I have failed to appreciate how the decision in Narendra Kumar''s case can be said to have been given per incuriam. According to established convention of this court where one of the learned judges of the Bench thinks that a Bench decision of the court has been correctly decided and another thinks that is has been incorrectly decided, the Bench has to follow the decision; the matter can be referred to a larger Bench only if both the Judges think that the case has been incorrectly decided and requires reconsideration. In the circumstances, the observation of Shivanugrah Narain, J. that the matter should be referred to a larger Bench on the ground that Narendra Kumar''s case was incorrectly decided was not in accordance with the said convention.

The questions which now arise for decision in this case are;

(1) whether a property can be confiscated u/s 6-A of the Act only when there has been an offence committed in respect of that property?

(2) when correct accounts are not maintained, whether the offence is committed in respect of the entire property or only in respect of the property which is not mentioned in the accounts books or though mentioned therein is not found in stock on actual verification?

(3) whether Narendra Kumar''s case has been incorrectly decided and requires reconsideration in view of some decisions of this court, other High courts and of the Supreme court or the language of certain provisions of the Act?

The provisions as to confiscation of foodgrains even in absence of institution of a prosecution are to be found in Section 6A of the Act which was introduced by Act 25 of 1966. The section reads as follows:--

6.A. Confiscation of foodgrains, edible oilseeds and edible oils. Where any essential commodity is seized in pursuance of an order made u/s 3 in relation thereto, it may be produced, without any unreasonable delay, before the Collector of the district or the presidency town in which such essential commodity is seized and whether or not a prosecution is instituted for the contravention of such order, the Collector, if satisfied that there has been a contravention of the order, may order confiscation of--

(a) the essential commodity so seized;

(b) any package, covering or receptacle in which such essential commodity is found; and

(c) any animal, vehicle, vessel or other conveyance used in carrying such essential commodity;

provided that, without prejudice to any action which may be taken under any other provisions of this Act, no foodgrains or edible oil seeds seized in pursuance of an order made u/s 3 in relation thereto from a producer shall, if the seized foodgrains or edible oilseeds have been produced by him, be confiscated under this section.

The meaning of the clause "in pursuance of an order made u/s 3 in relation thereto'''' has been discussed in the judgments of both the learned Judges and even Shivanugrah Narain, J. in his judgment has conceded that the words "in relation thereto" in this clause mean in relation to the essential commodity which is the subject matter of the order u/s 3. Of course nothing can be confiscated u/s 6-A unless it has been seized and the seizure must be lawful, i.e. in accordance with the provisions of the Act or of an order made under it. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the provisions of the Act and that of the order as to seizure. Section 3(2)(j), inter-alia, provides that for the purposes mentioned in Sub-section (1) of that section, orders made under the Act may provide for seizure of any article in respect of which a person who is authorised to make entry, search or of examination of premises etc. has reason to believe that a contravention of the order has been, is being, or is about to be committed. It is manifest from this that a seizure can be made even of an article in respect of which no contravention of an order made under the Act has been committed but is likely to be committed. It is Clause 10 of the order which deals with the powers of entry, search, seizure etc. It inter alia, lays down that the authority mentioned therein my enter, inspect or break open and search any place or premises, vehicle or vessels in which he has reason to believe that any contravention of the provisions of the order of the conditions of any licence issued thereunder has been, is being or is about to be committed and seize the stock of foodgrains. According to this clause also, seizure can be made of stock of foodgrains even before an offence in respect thereof has been committed. Therefore, there can be seizure of foodgrains in respect of which an offence has not been committed and such a seizure is not unlawful. If the Collector is satisfied that there has been a contravention of the order, he may confiscate the foodgrains u/s 6A of the Act. As contravention of the order amounts to commission of an offence, it follows that there can be confiscation only if an offence has been committed. From the language of Section 6A, however; it does not follow that contravention of the order must have been in respect of the property seized. I do not propose to examine this question in any further detail for; in my opinion, it is question No. (2) as posed by me which is more relevant for the decision of this case. I will conclude discussion of this question by observing that it may be contended that property which has been lawfully seized may be confiscated u/s 6A of the Act even if no offence has been committed in respect thereof.

Section 7 of the Act lays down that if a person contravenes any order made u/s 3 of the Act he makes himself punishable. In other words, he commits an offence. Clauses 3(1) of the Order lays down that no person shall carry on business as a whole sale dealer or retail dealer except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of a licence issued in this behalf by the licensing authority. The order prescribes two forms of licences, one in form B for whole-sale dealers and another in form C for retail dealers in foodgrains. According to condition No. 3 of either of the forms, the licensee has to maintain a separate register of daily accounts for each godown for each of the foodgrains he is authorised to sell under the licence and to show correctly details thereof as mentioned in that condition. Non-maintenance of a correct account register, therefore, amounts to contravention of the order as well as commission of an offence punishable u/s 7 of the Act. Now, the question is, as posed earlier (see paragraph 5 question No. 2), whether, in cases where correct accounts are not maintained, the contravention of the order and commission of an offence takes place in respect of the entire foodgrains or only in respect of that part of the foodgrain which is not entered in the accounts register or if entered, not found in the stock. It can be very well said that as the dealer is required to maintain correct register of accounts in respect of his entire stocks of foodgrains, if he does not maintain it correctly, the contravention of the order takes place in respect of the entire stock of food grains and the offence committed is also in respect of entire stock of foodgrains. But that may not be a correct answer in each and every case. If I may say so with respect, Uday Sinha, J. has rightly pointed out that for the purposes of finding out whether share has been a contravention of the order or not and whether an offence has been committed on that accounts or not one must find out whether there exists a nexus between goods to be seized and the contravention of the order or conditions of licence. For instance, if a dealer has been given a licence to deal in several foodgrains, say, wheat, rice, barlay, gram etc. and if his register of accounts maintained is correct in respect of all of them except rice, then it cannot be said that he has contravened the order even in respect of wheat, barlay, gram etc. but he must be held to have contravened the order or condition of his licence in respect of rice. It has so pointed out in Naresh Kumar''s case ''and observed.

In our opinion, a licensee who does not maintain correct accounts of the stocks commits, contravention of one of the conditions of the licence and thus also of the order in respect of the entire stock and not only in respect of the quantity which is not entered in the stock register. He contravenes the order by not maintaining correct accounts and thus makes himself liable to be punished u/s 7 of the Act.

It was further pointed out in that case that if the contention that a proceeding for confiscation can be started only in respect of such goods which are not entered in the stock register, then in case of black-marketing by a licensee there can be no confiscation as those goods will not be available with him for seizure and acceptance of such a contention will lead to absurd results. Referring to these observations, Shivanugrah Narain, J. has pointed out that they were erroneous for even the goods in respect of which there has been black-marketing may be seized from the person to whom the goods have been transferred and they can be confiscated after seizure. With all respects to the learned Judge I would say that ordinarily it is not possible to trace the person to whom the goods are sold in black-market and in majority of cases of black-marketing it will be difficult to pursue such goods and seize them from the transferees. The learned Judge has further pointed out that as the dealer would be liable to punishment u/s 7, the mere fact that goods are not confiscated would not lead to absurd results. The learned Judge appears to have missed that Section 6-A was introduced subsequently by amendment in the year 1966 and the reason behind such an amendment obviously was that the legislature thought that mere punishment u/s 7 of the Act was not sufficient and that there should be confiscation by the Collector of the goods if there has been contravention of the order irrespective of the fact whether a prosecution is initiated or not. Let us take the present case itself. The petitioner had not entered 48 quintals 24 kgs. of rice in his stock register. Could that rice be traced and seized? Perhaps not, and if the reasonings given by Shivanugrah Narain, J. are to be accepted, in that case, there could be no confiscation in this case of any part of the rice u/s 6A or forfeiture u/s 7(1)(b) of the Act. The Act has been passed for the benefit of the society so that the public at large may not have to suffer on account of non-supply to them of essential commodities. Though the Act contains penal provisions but they are not to be liberally construed. There should be no sympathy for those who commits offences against society. For the reasons aforesaid, for the reasons given in Naresh Kumar''s case and also for the reason given by Uday Sinha, J. I am of the view that where a licensee does net maintain correct accounts of a particular foodgrain he contravenes the order in respect of the entire stock of that foodgrains and not only in respect of that portion of it which is not entered in the stock register or if entered, not found in stock on actual verification.

The facts of Narendra Kumar''s case were that the petitioner of that case who was a licensee under the Bihar Sugar Dealer''s Licensing Order, 1973 had been allotted and had lifted 134 quintals of sugar but had entered only 124 quintals of sugar in his stock register. According to the authorities, the petitioner had sold in black-market 10 quintals of sugar which had not been entered in the stock register and which was not found available in his business premises at the time of the search. The entire quantity of sugar which was found in the business premises of the petitioner at the time of the search and which tallied with the balance shown in the stock register had been seized and thereafter confiscated in a proceeding u/s 6A of the Act. According to the petitioner of that case, only the offending goods, i.e. 10 quintals of sugar which was not found mentioned in the stock register could be confiscated u/s 6A of the Act. This contention was over, ruled and it was held that by not maintaining correct accounts the petitioner of that case had committed an offence in respect of entire stock of sugar and the confiscation was lawful. The petitioner of that case was a licensee only in respect of sugar and had not maintained correct accounts of the Sugar supplied to him. The question whether a person who is a licensee in respect of more than one essential commodity and maintains correct accounts in respect of one of them but docs not maintain correct accounts in respect of another does commit an offence in respect of both the essential commodities did not arise for decision in the case. The observation (quoted in paragraph 7) made in that case, therefore, has to be read with reference to the facts of that case and in the light of what has been observed earlier in this judgment. The Bench deciding that case did not approve of the observation made in another case, namely, (1) Krishna Pd. V. State of Bihar (1975 BBCJ 608) by a learned single Judge that contravention of the order concerned takes place only in respect of such goods which are not entered in the stock register.

It has been contended that Narendra Kumar''s case has not been correctly decided for it failed to take into consideration the Bench decisions of this court in (2) Mani Ram and Another Vs. Emperor, and (3) Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. V. State ( ILR 33 Pat. 661). In Mani Ram''s case, licence-holders for taking out mica from a mine were found by the Mica Accounts Inspector to be in possession of some excess quantity of mica which was not shown in the account books required to be maintained by them, The excess mica was seized and they were prosecuted u/s 17(2)(a) of the Bihar and Orissa Mica Act (I of 1930). They pleaded guilty and were convicted for an offence u/s 17(2)(a) of the Act without recording any evidence and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 90/- each, or in default, to suffer one month''s simple imprisonment each. Thereafter they applied for the return of the mica which had been taken into custody. This prayer was opposed by the Inspector of Mica Accounts who asked for confiscation of the mica seized. The court which had convicted the two persons ordered the mica to be returned holding that he had no right to confiscate it under any provision of the Mica Act. The Inspector of Mica Accounts then asked for a review of the said order.

The learned Sub Divisional Officer sent the matter to the Deputy Commissioner, Hazaribagh, as he felt that he could not review his own order. The Deputy Commissioner held that the mica in question could be confiscated u/s 517 of the Code of Criminal Procedure even though there was no provision for its confiscation under the Mica Act. On a revision which was filed against the said order of the Deputy Commissioner, this court held that the complaint being chiefly for an offence u/s 17(2)(a) of the Mica Act for keeping wrong accounts thereof and no evidence having been recorded that the mica in question had been obtained by illicit means, it could not be said that an offence was committed in respect of that mica which was seized and, therefore, that mica could not be confiscated u/s 517 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. According to Section 17(2)(a) of the Mica Act, a licensee or a registered proprietor makes himself liable for conviction if he fails to keep any account required to be kept by Section 10 or keeps an account which does not contain the particulars required by the said Section or it is false in any material particular. Section 19(1) of the said Act requires every licensee and every registered proprietor to keep accounts showing particulars as mentioned in clause (a) thereof. The Act docs not provide for confiscation or forfeiture of mica in respect of which any offence is committed, but Section 24(3) lays down that the Magistrate on receipt of a report u/s 24(2) shall with all convenient despatch take such measures as may be necessary for the disposal of the mica according to law. The argument of learned counsel for the petitioner that Section 517 of the Code of Criminal Procedure could have no application to such a case was not accepted; rather, it was held that if other conditions were satisfied, steps could be taken under that Section. The ultimate finding, however, was that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the order of confiscation was not proper. It was held by this court that the offences u/s 17(2)(a) of the Mica Act deals with the offence of keeping wrong accounts and the petitioners of that case could not be said to have committed an offence in respect of mica not entered in the account books on the ground that they were convicted for an offence u/s 17(2)(a) of that Act. The purposes for which Bihar and Orissa Mica Act and the Essential Commodities Act were enacted were quite different. The very language of Section 7(1)(b) of the Act which provides for forfeiture by the Government of the property in respect of which the order has been contravened shows that it proceeds on the assumption that an offence is committed in respect of that property. Really it could not be and was not seriously contended that when account books are not properly maintained only the account books can be forfeited to the Government and not the property in respect of which account books are not properly maintained. The decision in Mani Ram''s case, therefore, is not an authority on the basis of which it can be said that Narendra Kumar''s case has been wrongly decided.

In the case of Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. the facts were that on a particular date two salesmen were found to have been removing 105 thans of long cloth from the shop of the petitioner of that case in the presence of the manager. Several persons assembled at the place and challenged them. One of them proceeded to the police station and lodged information and the police party arrived at the scene. The bundles of cloth which had been loaded on three rickshaws were taken in custody on information being sent to the District Magistrate, the Supply Inspector arrived. The two salesmen who were removing the bundles managed to escape. The police went to the house of the manager and arrested him. The manager supplied the names and addresses of the two salesmen who were also arrested later on. The manager was brought to the shop and on being required produced the papers and the registers kept in connection with the business of the shop for the inspection of the Supply Inspector. A search list was prepared. The stock and stock book of the shop were checked and it was found that the stock book was not being maintained properly in accordance with condition No. 2 of the licence and on checking the stock, 105 thans, besides some other cloths, were found short. The two salesmen and the manager were sent up for trial. The case against the manager, however, was withdrawn and the trial concluded with the conviction of the two salesmen for an offence u/s 7(1) of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 as amended up to 1st January, 1953. Besides the punishment which was imposed on the two salesmen, an order was passed for forfeiture of 105 thans of long cloths to the State. The order of forfeiture was passed under Clause 11 of the Bihar Cotton Cloth and Yarn (Control) Order, 1948. The convicted salesman appealed. During the pendency of the appeal, the petitioner before this court, namely, Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. filed an application before the appellate court alleging themselves to be proprietor of the shop and praying for setting aside the order of forfeiture of 105 thans of cloths and for delivery of the same to them. The appellate court acquitted the two salesmen but refused to set aside the order of forfeiture of 105 thans of cloth. The revision of the petitioner of that case against the said order was allowed by this court; the main ground being:--

In the present case before us, the learned Additional Sessions Judge was unable to record any order of punishment of any one, and yet he has upheld the order of forfeiture.

An observation was also made--

..A conviction for a contravention and punishment of the person contravening must be a condition precedent for making an order of forfeiture u/s 7(1) of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946.

Of course, it was further observed that in that case the contravention was of condition No. 2 of the licence, i.e. for not maintaining the stock register properly and the 105 thans of cloths which were ordered to be forfeited could not be said to be property in respect of which the order had been contravened. The learned Judge have not given any reason in support of this observation. Section 7 of the Essential supplies (Temporary Powers) Act which read as follows:--

If any person contravenes any order u/s 3 relating to cotton textiles he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine, and property in respect of which the order has been contravened or such part thereof as to the court may seem fit shall be forfeited to the Government.

Itself provided for forfeiture of the property (or a pan thereof) in respect of which the order had been contravened. In my opinion it is not correct to say that contravention of the order by not maintaining the stock register properly as required by condition No. 2 of the licence did not amount to contravention in respect of the property for which the stock register was not properly maintained but in respect of the stock register only. There could be no gain to the State or loss to the offender by forfeiture of the stock register. In other words, forfeiture of the stock register could not be a punishment to the offender and Section 7 of the said Act is a section which imposes punishment for an offence. Stock register, therefore, cannot be interpreted to be a property within the meaning of Section 7 of that Act. It is also so far another reason, namely, that while Section 7 of that Act contemplates forfeiture of the entire property or a part thereof, there could be no meaning in forfeiting a part of the of the stock register only. In my humble opinion, therefore, the said observation of the learned Judges that by not entering 105 thans of cloth in the stock register the contravention was only as to not maintaining the stock register properly and not in respect of 105 thans of cloth was against the spirit of the law and was a decision per incuriam which does not bind any other Bench of this court. Of course, the decision, if I may say so with respect, is quite correct on the other ground, namely, that when there was no conviction of any person there could be no forfeiture. It was to remove this lacuna that Section 6A has been included in the Act. The decision in Narendra Kumar''s case, therefore, also cannot be said to be incorrect on the ground that it does not consider an earlier decision of this court in Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. or that it is in conflict with it.

I would like at this stage to refer to some other decisions relied on by learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his contention that Narendra Kumar''s case was not correctly decided. These decisions are (4) AIR 1944 Sindh 207 , (5) L. Kashi Nath Vs. The Collector, Central Excise, Allahabad and Others, , (6) The Collector, Central Excise, Allahabad and Others Vs. L. Kashi Nath Jewellers, , (7) Hindustan Aluminium Corporation Ltd. Vs. Controller of Aluminium and Others, and (8) Motibhai Fulabhai Patel and Co. Vs. R. Prasad and Others, . Mahromal Widhomal''s case was not a case of maintenance of accounts. It was a case where statutory declaration was made in respect of some of the bags of the foodgrains but not in respect of all. The forfeiture of only those bags in respect of which no statutory declaration had been made was upheld; forfeiture of bags in respect of which statutory declaration had been made was not upheld. The case, therefore, is not relevant for the question arising for decision in the present case.

The two decisions which are reported in AIR 1972 Allahabad and relied on by learned counsel for the petitioner relate to the same case; the one reported at page 16 is the single Judge decision and the other reported at page 231 is a Bench decision in the letters patent appeal from the said judgment of the Single Judge. Thus it is that in this case also accounts were not maintained but the case arose out of the Gold Control Act and different consideration to arise in interpreting the provisions of Gold Control Act and the Act dealing with commodities essential for the existence of society at large. In my opinion, learned counsel fop the petitioner is not correct in submitting that Narendra Kumar''s case has not been correctly decided for the view taken by the learned Judges of Allahabad in a case arising out of Gold Control Act is not in consonance with the view taken in the said case. The Hindustan Aluminium Corporation''s case is also not a case of maintenance of account and, therefore, not relevant for the decision in this case.

M/s. Motibhai Fulabhai Patel and Co.''s case has been considered and distinguished in Narendra Kumar''s case. On the other hand, there are two cases (9) State Vs. Mohanlal Sutadiya and Another, Ass. 30--a Bench decision and (10) Lakshmi Narain and Others Vs. State, --the decision of a learned single Judge of this court which support the view that the entire stock of foodgrains can be confiscated if there is contravention of an order made under the Act.

Lastly, it was argued by learned counsel for the petitioner that in case it is held that in case of non-maintenances of correct accounts the entire stock of foodgrain can be confiscated u/s 6-A of the Act that will be unduly harsh and the whole Section may have to be declared ultra vires on that score. It was submitted that in the circumstances the provisions of Section 6-A regarding confiscation and Section 7(1)(b) regarding forfeiture in the Act should be given a limited meaning so that they may not have to be declared ultra vires in support of the contention that in cases where provisions for confiscation are unduly harsh they have to be declared ultra vires, reliance was placed on the decisions (11) Badri Prasad and Others, etc. Vs. Collector of Central Excise and Others, etc., . (12) State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Azad Bharat Finance Co. and Another, and (13) Tirath Singh Vs. Bachittar Singh and Others, . Of these cases, the decision in Badri Prasad''s case was given with reference to Gold Control Act. Section 71 of that Act was held ultra vires because that made the owner ipso facto liable to pay an unconscionably high penalty. As I will show hereafter, in the instant case under the Act, the licensee does not become ipso facto liable to pay an unconscionably high penalty as a result of confiscation or forfeiture. In State of Madhya Pradesh''s case the word "shall" in Section 11 of the Opium Act was interpreted to mean "may" so that the penalty did not become unduly harsh. Section 6-A of the Act uses the words "may order confiscation." Therefore, it is not obligatory on the Collector to order confiscation of the entire stock of essential commodity seized or even part thereof in each and every case. Under the Section it is always open to him to order confiscation not of the entire stock of essential commodity seized but only a part of it according to facts and circumstances of each case. Then Section 6-C also provides for an appeal against the order of confiscation passed u/s 6-A and the appellate authority may set aside the order of confiscation or may modify it. In the instant case itself the appellate authority did modify the order of confiscation. Sub-section (2) of Section 6-C further provides that in case where a prosecution is started against the person whose stock of essential commodities has been seized and confiscated and that prosecution ends in his acquittal, that person will be entitled to the return of the stock of essential commodity seized and confiscated and in case that has been disposed of, return of its price with reasonable interest calculated from the date of the seizure. The provision of the confiscation as contained in Section 6A of the Act, therefore, cannot be held to be unduly harsh and declared ultra vires on that score.

The decision in Tirath Singh''s case merely lays down certain rules of interpretation of statutes, namely, that where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the structure of the sentence. Really it lays down only what has been reiterated in (14) Jagir Singh and Others Vs. State of Bihar and Another etc. etc., a case relied on by both the learned Judges, Uday Sinha, J. and Shivanugrah Narain, J. in Jagir Singh''s case it has been said that the general rule of construction is not only to look at the words but to look at the context, the collocation and the object of such words relating to such matter and interpret the meaning according to what would appear to be the meaning intended to be covered by the use of words under the circumstances. Lastly, I would refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in (15) State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Bathu Prakasa Rao and Others, in which the Supreme Court uphold confiscation of food-grain (broken rice) ordered by the Revenue officer and as modified by the District Judge on appeal setting aside the order of the High Court in favour of the persons whose foodgrains were confiscated and observing as follows with reference to the words "may order the confiscation of the essential commodities seized" in the Act:--

It is arguable that the power is there to confiscate whatever essential commodity may have been seized for the purpose of proceeding against the person who has contravened the control order, yet it cannot be denied that this power is discretionary.

After hiving given my most anxious consideration to the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner and respondents and the reasoning given by the two learned Judges in support of their decisions, I agree with the view taken by Uday Sinha, J. and direct that the writ application be dismissed.