Shivendra Kumar. vs State of Jharkhand

Pramath Patnaik, J

In the accompanied writ application, the petitioner has inter alia prayed for quashing office order dated 14.05.2002 whereby the petitioner was

served with a notice of superannuation w.e.f 30.06.2002, which is contrary to his date of birth and further prayer has been made to direct the

respondents to allow the petitioner to continue in his service as per the date of birth mentioned in Statutory Form â€"B.

Bereft of unnecessary details, the facts in nutshell is that the petitioner was initially appointed on the post of Electrician in the year 1971. It has

further been averred that after joining the said post, he was issued Identity Card, wherein his date of birth was mentioned as 01.07.1949 and further in

the Statutory Form- B register also his date of birth was mentioned as 01.07.1949. But, to the utter shock and surprise, the petitioner was served with

notice of superannuation dated 14.05.2002 w.e.f 30.06.2002.

Immediately, thereafter the petitioner made a protest by filing protest petition on 05.04.2002 but it did not fetch any fruitful result. Thereafter, the

petitioner raised the issue before ‘ Koyla Ispat Mazdoor Panchayat’, whereupon the General Secretary of the Union raked up the issue of

correction of date of birth of the petitioner and accordingly the matter was discussed between the respondents and representative of the ‘ Koyla

Ispat Mazdoor Panchayat’. In the meeting, it is alleged that though it was decided that the matter of date of birth would be looked into taking into

account the date of birth mentioned in Form B register and accordingly action would be taken but no action was taken and in the meantime, the

petitioner superannuated from the services, prior to attaining the original age of superannuation. Being aggrieved, the petitioner has approached this

Court invoking extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for redressal of his grievances.

Heard Mr. Shailesh, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Anoop Kumar Mehta, learned counsel for the respondents.

Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner has wrongly been superannuated on the basis of some fictitious date of birth denying

the entry made in Form B register, as such the petitioner after lapse of such time is entitled to get the consequential benefits. It has further been

submitted that respondents have no right to override/undo the Statutory Form “B†register as maintained under Section 48 of the Mines Act so far

as entry contained therein with respect to date of birth of the petitioner is concerned. It has further been submitted that the respondents even after

admitting the Statutory Form “Bâ€​ register containing the date of birth of the petitioner as 01.07.1949 cannot forcibly superannuate the petitioner on

the basis of any imaginary and factitious date of birth.Â

As against this, learned counsel for the respondents raised the issue of limitation and submitted that even after superannuating on 30.06.2002, the

petitioner moved this Court after inordinate delay of seven years, which has not been sufficiently explained. On the merit of the case, learned counsel

for the respondents submitted that the date of birth of the petitioner has been recorded as 1942 in the Service Excerpts, which has been duly

acknowledged and accepted by the petitioner without raising any objection in the objection column. Based on such service excerpts, the respondents

had forwarded the detailed regarding his date of birth to the Headquarters for entering the same in “Non-Executive Informative System (in short

NEIS). Based upon such entry the petitioner was served with the notice of superannuation and accordingly he retired from services. It has further

been submitted that after retirement, the petitioner received all the retiral benefits without any demur and now all the issues set at rest. Hence, at this

belated stage, no relief can be granted to the petitioner.

Having heard learned counsel for the parties at length and on perusal of the records, I am of the considered view that the impugned orders do not

call for interference by this Court for the following facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements:Â

 (i).From bare perusal of Service Book, annexed as Annexure C to the counter affidavit, it appears that the date of birth of the petitioner has been

recorded as 1942, which has even duly been acknowledged by the petitioner by putting his signature, without any demur. Likewise, the petitioner has

also acknowledged the correctness of the same in Service Excerpts by putting his signature in the relevant column without raising any objection with

regard to entry relating to date of birth, as evident from Annexure D to the counter affidavit. Based on such entry, the Headquarters entered the same

in ‘Non Executive Informative System (NEIS) and in the Electronic Data Processor (EDP). But the petitioner waited for a long period and just at

the fag end of service, he approached the authorities for correction of his date of birth and also before this Court after inordinate delay of seven years.

 (ii).Though, the petitioner alleged that he submitted representations, but mere making a statement that he submitted several representation would not

save the delay in approaching this Court. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of C. Jacob Vs. Director, Director of Geology and Mining & Anr as

reported in (2008) 10 SCC 115 and catena of judgments has held that repeated representations will not save limitation. Therefore, the petitioner is

guilty of laches and acquiescence.

 (iii).The petitioner raised the issue relating to his date of  birth at the fag end of service, which cannot be adjudicated in view of the decision

rendered in the case of Burn Standard Co. Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Dinabandhu Majumdar & Anr as reported in AIR 1995 SC 1499, wherein the Hon'ble

Apex Court in unequivocal terms has enunciated that writ petition for correction of date of birth at the fag end of service with object of continuing in

service ordinarily should not be entertained.

 7. On cumulative effect of the aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements, he impugned orders do not warrant any interference by this

Court. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed being devoid of any merit.