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Judgment
9 paragraphs · 697 wordsVirender Singh, J.—The respondents herein were booked in a case FIR No. 11 of 17.2.1993, under Sections 452/323/34 IPC, registered at police station Phagwara under Sections 452/323/34 IPC. Vide judgment dated 26.3.1996 passed by the learned Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Phagwara they were convicted under Sections 452/323/34 IPC. The maximum sentence awarded was RI for one year u/s 452 IPC besides a fine of Rs.500/-. Aggrieved by the said judgment of conviction and sentence, the respondents preferred an appeal before the Court of Session, which was allowed vide judgment of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kapurthala dated 29-9-1999, thereby acquitting the respondents of all the charges. Hence, this revision by the complainant impugning the judgment of acquittal.
Admitted position is that the State of Punjab has not preferred any appeal against the impugned judgment. A certificate to this effect issued by the office of the Advocate General is there on the file.
I have heard both the sides and perused the judgments of both the courts below.
Mr. Sharma appearing for the petitioner contends that the appellate Court has not properly appreciated the evidence and has wrongly attached importance to the delay of 7 hours in lodging the FIR, whereas the same is explained by the complainant in Court, stating on oath that the injured did not go to the police station and had gone to the hospital directly on account of the injuries. The police had come to the hospital after receipt of the medico legal report sent by the doctor and thereafter the statement of the complainant was recorded. The learned counsel then contends that this has caused material prejudice to the case of the complainant.
In the same breath, the learned counsel states that the lower appellate Court has not properly appreciated the other evidence led by the complainant side and arrived at the conclusion that the occurrence was doubtful. According to the learned counsel the appellate court has not adopted a judicious approach while acquitting the respondents and, therefore, the instant petition deserves to be allowed.
Repudiating the submissions made by Mr. Sharma, counsel for the respondents while drawing my attention to the relevant observations made in the impugned judgment submits that the same does not suffer from any infirmity, which may call for interference by this Court while exercising its revisional jurisdiction as the scope of interference is very limited, that too when there is manifest illegality or glaring irregularity in the impugned judgment.
Even otherwise, the scope of revision in such type of situation is well discussed by the Hon''ble Apex Court in a judgment rendered in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh alias R.P. Singh and others v. State of Bihar (now Jharkhand) and another, 2002(4) RCR(Cri) 61 (SC), wherein their Lordships have observed that in the absence of any legal infirmity either in the procedure or in the conduct of the trial, there was no justification for the High Court to interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. It is further observed that the High Court should not re-appreciate the evidence to reach a finding different than the one arrived at by the trial Court. In the absence of manifest illegality resulting in grave miscarriage of justice, exercise of revisional jurisdiction in such cases is not warranted. It is further observed by their Lordships that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction against an order of acquittal at the instance of a private party, the Court exercises only limited jurisdiction and should not constitute itself into an appellate court which has a much wider jurisdiction to go into questions of facts and law and to convert an order of acquittal into one of conviction. It cannot be lost sight of that when a re-trial is ordered the dice is heavily loaded against the accused, and that itself must caution the Court exercising revisional jurisdiction.
Having regard to the facts of the instant case and following the ratio laid down by Hon''ble Supreme Court in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh''s case (supra), I am of the view that the impugned judgment does not call for interference by this Court while exercising its revisional jurisdiction.
Resultantly, the present petition is dismissed.
