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Judgment
Satish K. Agnihotri, J.—Challenge in this petition is to the notification dated 26th July, 2005 (Annexure P-1) under provisions of Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short ''the Act, 1894''), and the notification dated 16th November, 2005 (Annexure P-2) under provisions of Section 6 of the Act, 1894.
The facts, in nutshell, are that the respondent No. 2, i.e., the Collector, Jagdalpur, in exercise of his power as Deputy Secretary to the Government, caused a notification under provisions of Section 4(1) of the Act, 1894, published in the Official Gazette on 26th July, 2005 for proposed acquisition of 20.29 acres of land in Village Hatkachora, Patari Halka No. 60(A), Jagdalpur, District Bastar, wherein the petition scheduled land, owned by the petitioners is situated. Thereafter, a notification under provisions of Section 6 of the Act, 1894 was issued on 16th November, 2005. Thereafter, a notice u/s 9 of the Act, 1894 was issued.
The petitioners challenge the above notifications by filing this petition on 6th May, 2009 on the grounds, inter alia, that the notification u/s 4(1) of the Act, 1894 is vague and does not disclose detail survey numbers or khasra numbers of the land proposed to be acquired by the Government. Secondly, the respondent No. 4 cannot be appointed as Prescribed Authority u/s 4(2) of the Act, 1894. Further, the response of the petitioner to the notice u/s 9 of the Act, 1894 was not considered properly. The acquisition proceedings has been initiated without sanction or approval from the Municipal Corporation, Jagdalpur.
The respondent No. 4, in its return dated 2nd July, 2009 submits that the award was passed on 21st of November, 2006 (Annexure P-5) before filing of the present writ petition. Compensation has also been determined and the land owners have taken/received their respective compensation. Thus, after passing of the award, the land vests in the State and as such, this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not maintainable.
Having heard learned Counsel appearing for the parties, perused the pleadings and documents appended thereto, it is evident that the notification u/s 4(1) of the Act, 1894 (Annexure P-1) was published on 26th July, 2005, notification u/s 6 of the Act, 1894 was issued on 16th November, 2005 (Annexure P-2), and thereafter, notice u/s 9 of the Act, 1894 was issued. The petitioners have filed their responses, compensation was determined and the award was passed on 21st November, 2006 (Annexure P-5). The petitioners have not taken any steps to challenge the legality and validity of the notifications dated 26th July, 2005 (Annexure P-1) u/s 4(1) and 16th November, 2005 (Annexure P-2) u/s 6 of the Act, 1894, in time. Even the award was passed on 21st November, 2006 (Annexure P-5) but no steps were taken immediately thereafter.
Law is well settled that once the award has been passed possession of the land vests absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. Even u/s 48 of the Act, 1894, the State Authority cannot withdraw from acquisition after possession has been taken over.
In the matter of Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay Vs. The Industrial Development Investment Co. Pvt Ltd., and others, , the Supreme Court held as under:
It is thus well settled law that when there is inordinate delay in filing the writ petition and when all steps taken in the acquisition proceedings have become final, the Court should be loath to quash the notifications. The High Court has, no doubt, discretionary, powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the notification u/s 4(1) and declaration u/s 6. But it should be exercised taking all relevant factors into pragmatic consideration. When the award was passed and possession was taken, the Court should not have exercised its power to quash the award which is a material factor to be taken into consideration before exercising the power under Article 226. The fact that no third party rights were created in the case is hardly a ground for interference. The Division Bench of the High Court was not right in interfering with the discretion exercised by the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition on the grounds of laches.
In State of Rajasthan and Others Vs. D.R. Laxmi and Others, , it was held as under:
...When the award was passed and possession was taken, the Court should not have exercised its power to quash the award which is a material factor to be taken into consideration before exercising the power under Article 226. The fact that no third party rights were created in the case, is hardly a ground for interference....
In The Municipal Council, Ahmednagar and Another Vs. Shah Hyder Beig and Others, , it was held as under:
In any event, after the award is passed, no writ petition can be filed challenging the acquisition notice or against any proceeding thereunder. This has been the consistent view taken by this Court and in one of the recent cases (C. Padma v. Dy. Secy, to the Govt, of T.N.)....
Recently, in Swaika Properties Pvt. Ltd. and Another Vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, , the Supreme Court held that a writ petition having been filed after taking over the possession and the award having become final, the same deserves to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches.
Applying the above well-settled principles of law to the facts of the present case, this petition is dismissed as not maintainable as no extra-ordinary or exceptional ground exist. No order as to costs.
