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Judgment
A.N. Venugopala Gowda, J.—Petitioner had joined service of the 1st respondent as a Helper. He was dismissed from the service on 26.12.1996. The order of dismissal become the subject matter in I.D. No. 11/1997 on the file of the Labour Court, Bangalore. On 30.10.2003 a Memo having been filed for withdrawal of the dispute and to approach the competent forum for the relief, the dispute was closed. Petitioner filed a dispute on 23.03.2011, before the 2nd respondent, under S. 70 of the Karnataka Cooperative Societies Act, 1959 (for short ''the Act''). An application was filed seeking condonation of delay of 508 days in filing the dispute. The 1st respondent having filed objections to the said application, the 2nd respondent passed an order on 30.01.2012 and allowed the application seeking condonation of delay. The 1st respondent assailed the said order in R.P. No. 43/2012 before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal (for short ''the Tribunal). The Tribunal by an order dated 05.03.2013 allowed the revision petition and set aside the order passed by the 2nd respondent on 30.01.2012. Assailing the said order, this writ petition has been filed.
Sri Pradeep Kumar Bharadwaj, learned advocate for the petitioner contended that the Tribunal has acted arbitrarily and illegally in interfering with the order passed by the Arbitrator-2nd respondent on 30.01.2012 and hence, interference in the matter is warranted.
Sri D. Ramachandar, learned advocate for the 1st respondent on the other hand submitted that the 2nd respondent had acted arbitrarily and illegally in allowing the application filed by the petitioner seeking condonation of delay and that the order passed on 30.01.2012 being without any material support was rightly set aside by the Tribunal on 29.05.2013. Learned counsel made submissions in support of the findings recorded in the order passed by the Tribunal and sought its upholding.
Sri K.A. Ariga, learned AGA, appearing for the 2nd respondent submitted that the record of the case may be examined and an appropriate order may be passed.
Perused the writ record. The point for consideration is ''whether the order passed by the Tribunal on 29.05.2013 and the order passed by the 2nd respondent on 30.01.2012 warrant any interference?'' Petitioner was dismissed from the service on 26.12.1996. As against the said order of dismissal, an Industrial Dispute under S. 10(4-A) of the Industrial Disputes (Karnataka Amendment) Act 1946 was instituted. The said dispute was withdrawn in view of the amendment to S. 70 of the Act and also the decision reported in ILR 2003 KAR 2531. A dispute under S. 70 of the Act was filed ''before the 2nd respondent on 23.03.2011, questioning the order of dismissal dated 26.12.1996. There being a delay of 508 days in filing the dispute, a separate application seeking condonation of delay was filed. The 1st respondent-employer having filed statement of objections, the 2nd respondent ought to have granted the opportunity to both the parties to adduce evidence on the prayer made in the application. S. 70-A(2) of the Act, makes it clear that notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-Section (1), the Registrar can entertain the dispute filed after the period specified in Sub-Section (1), if he is satisfied that the person filing the dispute had sufficient cause for not filing the dispute within the stipulated period from the date the order was passed. The proviso to Sub-Section (2) was inserted by Act 6 of 2010 with effect from 30.10.2010. The cause of action for the dispute is the order of dismissal dated 26.12.1996 and the closure of the dispute by the Labour Court on account of the availability of remedy under the provisions of the Act. The application filed by the petitioner was allowed by the Arbitrator, by merely hearing learned advocates for the parties and without conducting any enquiry. When statement of objections has been filed to the application, the 2nd respondent ought to have granted opportunity to both the parties to adduce evidence in support of their respective pleadings. By not doing so and in allowing the application on 30.01.2012, the 2nd respondent has committed an arbitrary act. Thus, the Tribunal is justified in interfering with the said order. However, the Tribunal ought to have remanded the matter to the 2nd respondent for reconsideration by directing the parties to adduce evidence. The same having not been done, the order passed by the Tribunal on 29.05.2013 being vitiated is unsustainable.
In the result, writ petition is allowed and the impugned order is quashed. The order passed by the 2nd respondent having been set aside by the Tribunal on 30.01.2012, the matter is remanded to the 2nd respondent for consideration and decision by keeping in view the observations made supra. The 2nd respondent is directed to grant an opportunity to both the parties to adduce evidence and then decide the application filed for condonation of delay. Both the parties are directed to appear before the 2nd respondent on 29.07.2013 and receive further orders. The 2nd respondent is directed to decide the application before 31.10.2013.
No costs.
