Shri Harvinder Singh vs Shri Inder Deo Singh Thakur

Indermeet Kaur, J.—Order impugned is the order dated 01.10.1997 which was an order passed by the Additional Rent Control Tribunal (ARCT) endorsing the finding of the Additional Rent Controller (ARC) dated 20.5.1995 wherein the eviction petition filed by the landlord Harvinder Singh Gulati u/s 14(1)(b) of the Delhi Rent Control Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) had been dismissed.

Record shows that the landlord Harvinder Singh Gulati had filed an eviction petition u/s 14(1)(b) of the DRCA i.e. the E.P. No.248/1983 against Purshotam Jorabhai & Company which was a partnership firm (hereinafter referred to as the tenant). Contention was that the tenant was in tenancy of the premises bearing No.2744, First Floor, Qutab Road, Delhi; this was a petition initially filed u/s 14(1)(a) and 14(1)(b) of the DRCA; ex parte decree u/s 14(1)(b) of the DRCA had been obtained by the landlord on 04.11.1985. Thereafter on an application filed by one Inder Deo Thakur purported to be a Receiver appointed of the aforenoted partnership firm in Suit No. 2A/81 titled as Chandrakant & Others Vs. Jayandra Bhai vide order of the Civil Judge Sagar (M.P.) dated 26.6.1981 and being a custodian of the court he had taken possession of all the properties of the said partnership firm both movable and immovable including the tenanted premises; contention being that he had appointed a chowkidar namely Bala Dutt in the aforenoted premises to look after the said premises; the chowkidar had left the premises without any intimation and it was in these circumstances that the ex parte decree had been obtained by the landlord; ex parte decree dated 04.11.1985 was set aside. The judgment of the Civil Judge, Sagar (MP) appointing Inder Deo Singh Thakur as a Receiver had been proved as Ex.OW-1/1; this judgment had evidenced the fact that the tenant firm M/s Purshottam Jorbhai & Co had been dissolved and Inder Deo Singh Thakur has been appointed as a Receiver. Record further evidenced that vide Ex.OW-1/4 to Ex.OW-1/6, registered A.D. letters were duly sent to the landlord informing him about the appointment of the Receiver which notice was also duly published; it had also come on record that Bala Dutt was appointed as chowkidar in the said premises. In these circumstances the eviction petition filed by the landlord against a tenant firm which had since stood dissolved and this fact having well been informed to the landlord and he having also been notified of the fact that the Receiver had been appointed of the firm and he having filed the eviction petition without taking necessary permission from the court was an illegality and in these circumstances the eviction petition has been dismissed by the impugned order i.e. by the court of the ARCT.

In Everest Coal Company (P) Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar and Others, the Apex Court had noted that in such eventuality where a Court Receiver has been appointed to take charge of the properties of the respondent, it is incumbent upon the person suing to take permission of the court; the Receiver being an officer/agent of the court and failure to do so may make the lis fatal. Relevant extract of the said judgment reads herein below as under:

When a court puts a Receiver in possession of property, the property comes under court custody, the Receiver being merely an officer or agent of the court. Any obstruction or interference with the court''s possession sounds in contempt of that court. Any legal action in respect of that property is in a sense such an interference and invites the contempt penalty of likely invalidation of the suit or other proceedings. But, if either be ore starting the action or during its continuance, the party takes the leave of the court, the sin is absolved and the proceeding may continue to a conclusion on the merits. In the ordinary course, no court is so prestige-conscious that it will stand in the way of a legitimate legal proceeding for redressal or relief against its receiver unless the action is totally meritocrat, frivolous or vexatious or otherwise vitiated by any sinister factor. Grant of leave is the rule, refusal the exception. After all, the court is not, in the usual run of cases, affected by a litigation which settles the rights of parties and the Receiver represents neither party, being an officer of the court. For this reason, ordinarily the court accords permission to sue, or to continue. The jurisdiction to grant leave is undoubted and inherent, but not based on black letter, law in the sense of enacted law. Any litigative disturbance of the court''s possession without its permission amounts to contempt of its authority; and the wages of contempt of court in this jurisdiction may well be voidability of the whole proceeding. Equally clearly, prior permission of the court appointing the Receiver is not a condition precedent to the enforcement of the cause of action. Nor is it so grave a vice that later leave sought and got before the decree has been passed will not purge it. If, before the suit terminates, the relevant court is moved and permission to sue or to prosecute further is granted, the requirement of law is fulfilled. Of course failure to secure such leave till the end of the lis may prove fatal.

In this factual context the impugned order dismissing the eviction petition suffers from no infirmity. Dismissed.