High CourtsSingle Bench

Shri Hiraman Vyankati Churad vs Shri Rajesh Shahu

Bombay High Court · Decided on 27 July 2010 · Citation: (2011) 3 BomCR 367 : (2011) 8 RCR(Civil) 2777

HON’BLE JUDGES
A.P. Bhangale, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Section 100 · Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 — Section 91
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Second Appeal No. 29 of 2006
Ask AI about this case

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

No AI summary yet

Generate an eight-section analysis of this judgment — facts, issues, reasoning, ratio and a plain-language gist.

Judgment

22 paragraphs · 1,424 words

A.P. Bhangale, J.—This Second Appeal has been filed at the instance of original defendant against whom decree has been passed by the Courts below. Parties are referred to as ''plaintiff'' and ''defendant'' as in the cause title of the suit.

2.

Facts briefly are:

That the plaintiff had instituted Regular Civil Suit No. 1778/ 1993 in the Court of learned Civil Judge Jr. Dn. at Nagpur for possession of suit plot i.e. Plot No. 88 at Khasra No. 4/5 Gat No. 78 Patwari Halka No. 39 in Revenue Circle Pardi admeasuring 80 '' x 50'' = 4000 sq.ft. It is the case of the plaintiff that his father had purchased the suit plot from "Sanmarg Griha Nirman Sanstha Limited" (in short "the Sanstha") by a registered sale deed dated 8.3.1968 for a consideration of Rs. 2,480/-. It was bequeathed in favour of the plaintiff by his father under registered Will dated 3.04.1991. When the plaintiff visited the suit plot in the year 1992 after he became owner, he found that defendant had unlawfully taken possession of the suit plot. The plaintiff sent notice to the defendant on 27.2.1992 (Exh. 123) calling upon defendant to vacate it. The defendant by reply dated 10.3.1992 (Exh.118) refused to vacate and hand over possession of the plaintiff claiming that the defendant purchased the suit plot on 31.10.1977 from the Sanstha and built a house. The defendant resisted the suit on the ground that he became owner of suit plot by adverse possession and also challenged jurisdiction of Civil Court to hear the suit by pleading bar of Section 91 of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960.

3.

The trial Court upon evidence led by the parties, found that the plaintiff is owner of the suit plot and the defendant had unlawfully encroached upon it. The plea of adverse possession was negatived and the suit was decreed and the defendant was directed to hand over possession of the suit plot to the plaintiff and restrained form disturbing possession of the plaintiff over the suit plot.

4.

The defendant had challenged the decree by Regular Civil Appeal No.382/2002 which was dismissed by learned 6th Ad-hoc Additional District Judge, Nagpur. Thus, the decree was confirmed.

5.

The Second Appeal was admitted on 13.3.2008 on substantial questions of law enumerated herein-below:

(i) Whether the limitation against the plaintiff began to run from the date criminal case was filed or from the date of execution of Will in favour of the plaintiff by plaintiff''s father?

(ii) Whether the Courts below have failed to take into consideration the evidence and pleadings on record with regard to adverse possession and, as such, findings to that effect are perverse?

Answers: (i) From the date and time of his knowledge.

(ii) No

6.

I have heard submissions advanced at the Bar.

7.

It appears from the evidence that suit plot was purchased by father of the plaintiff under registered sale deed (Exh.67) dated 8.3.1968, the executant being Secretary of Sanmarg Griha Nirman Sanstha, Hanuman Nagar. The same property appears the subject-matter of the sale deed (Exh.103) dated 31.10.1977 executed in favour of the defendant by the Sanstha for Rs. 3000/-. The Society could not have sold the same suit plot/property which was earlier sold in favour of the father of the plaintiff (from whom the plaintiff succeeded under registered Will). On behalf of the defendant (appellant) it is contended that the suit filed by the plaintiff was barred by limitation. This contention has no force because the defendant was prosecuted in a criminal case and after the plaintiff succeeded to his father on the basis of registered Will (Exh.29), he issued notice to the defendant soon after he found the defendant in unlawful possession of the suit plot. The limitation of the suit began to run when the plaintiff after he succeeded to his father on 2.4.1991 visited suit plot and found defendant in possession of the suit plot and then by notice dated 27.2.1992 called upon the defendant to vacate and handover possession of the suit plot to the plaintiff. Suit filed on 4.9.1993 was well within limitation considering the cause of action accrued in favour of the plaintiff as above. Substantial question of law (i) is answered accordingly.

8.

The Courts below have recorded concurrent findings that the defendant has not perfected his title by means of adverse possession. Learned Counsel for the appellant referred to the ruling in Velliyottummel Sooppi and Others Vs. Nadukandy Moossa and Others, to to argue that the plea of adverse possession is mixed question of fact and law and if findings of the Courts below is erroneous, it may be interfered with in the second Appeal. He also referred to ruling of single Judge in Dadabhau Shankar Ghodke and Others Vs. Mohanlal Kanhyalal Agrawal and Another, to argue that even inconsistent pleas are not prohibited by law and a party may abandon one for the success in the alternate one. It cannot be disputed that a party drafting the plea has freedom to avail of all defences to an action. It is for the court to appreciate the merits of the pleas put forward and decide the case according to law. Reference is also made to the ruling in Kashmir Singh Vs. Harnam Singh and Another, in which in view of Section 100 of the CPC explained the parameters for constituting the substantial questions of law and as to in which exceptional situations the High Court may interfere with the concurrent findings by the Courts below. Learned Counsel for the appellant also made reference to following rulings:

Satyabhamabai Dhanjode and Others Vs. Chhatrapati Dhanjode and Others,

Narendra Vaicunt v. Amaral Pareira 2007 (30) Mh.L.J. 252

Tejnarayan Anr. v. Shanti Swaroop AIR 2003 SC 5113

Vasantiben Prahladji Nayak and Others Vs. Somnath Muljibhai Nayak and Others,

Padmini Bai Vs. Tangavva and Others,

9.

I have perused these rulings, but none of them, in my opinion, can come to the rescue of the appellant.

10.

It is well settled legal position that in order to succeed on a plea of adverse possession the defendant must raise specific pleading necessarily as to when he came into possession of suit plot and the nature of his possession as to whether the fact of adverse possession was known to the real owner and for what period. To succeed on the plea of adverse possession, it has to be for as long as 12 years or more and has to be with hostile animus; uninterrupted, by exercise of ownership to the knowledge of the true owner, adequate in continuity; and in publicity. The pleading must indicate as to when possession became adverse to the true owner to find out a exact starting time of the limitation. The defendant having came into possession ought to have been established as to when his possession became adverse. The defendant claimed title as owner in possession of the suit plot on the ground that he purchased it on 31.10.1997. While the plaintiff''s father had purchased the suit plot earlier on 8.3.1968. Thus, alternative plea of the defendant could not have been allowed as the claim by defendant was referable to a lawful agreement. The plaintiff as owner of suit plot based on title prior in time is deemed to be in lawful possession so long as there is no intrusion. Non-use of property for long time, by itself, cannot affect the title of the plaintiff when there are mutually inconsistent pleas - one based on title and another based upon adverse possession. Later cannot operate unless former plea is renounced. The substantial questions of law stated are answered accordingly as above.

11.

When both the Courts below have appreciated pleadings and evidence in speaking judgments answering questions of law raised giving sound reasons and reaching conclusion based upon admissible evidence, there would be no justification for the High Court to set aside/disturb the concurrent findings of facts unless the findings are perverse or based on no evidence. In the present case, the trial Court and the lower Appellate Court had considered the evidence thoroughly to base their concurrent findings of facts on evidence. No ground is made out for interference. Hence the Appeal is dismissed.

12.

After pronouncement of the judgment, Mr. R.R. Shrivastava learned Counsel for the appellant, prays for continuation of status quo which was in operation, for some weeks. The request was objected to vociferously at the instance of learned Counsel for the respondent. Status quo to continue for another period of six weeks from today.