Shri Inder Singh vs For State

Tek Chand, J.—This matter has arisen in consequence of a complaint of Gurbax Singh of village Main, Tehsil Mansa, district Bhatinda, of professional misconduct against S. Inder Singh, pleader, practising in Mansa.

The facts alleged in the complaint are that a case u/s 367/324, Indian Penal Code was registered against the son and brothers of Gurbax Singh, who had engaged S. Inder Singh, pleader, for defending them, The injured person was an old man who was removed to the hospital where he died after a few days of his admission. The death was due to a natural cause, viz., pneumonia and not in consequence of injuries received. Bat the pleader told Gurbax Singh that the injured man had succumbed to the injuries which he lad received and that, the doctor in charge would be performing autopsy and the complainant''s relatives would be charged for the offence of murder. The pleader asked the complainant that in order to get a favourable report, it was desirable to offer a sum of Rs. 1,000/- by way of bribe to the doctor. It was alleged that this was the amount demanded by the doctor. In the presence of Jora Singh and Kala Singh of his village the complainant paid Rs. 900/- to the pleader for payment of bribe to the doctor. Later on, the complainant learnt that the injured person had died a natural death and he had been cheated of Rs. 900/-by the pleader who had pocketed this amount. The complainant then approached the doctor to find out if he had received the money from his pleader but the latter denied having demanded any money or having received any. It is said that later on the pleader admitted having kept the sum of Rs. 900/- on false pretences and promised to return the money but ultimately refused to do so. The complainant on this refusal prosecuted the pleader in the Court of Magistrate at Mansa u/s 420, Indian Penal Code. After some hearings, the case was compounded on I8th of May 1960, and the Magistrate allowed permission to the parties to compound the offence and the criminal case was, therefore, not proceeded with.

The complaint of Gurbax Singh for professional misconduct against the pleader is not dated. A copy of this complaint was submitted to the District and Sessions Judge, which was received in his office on 28th of April, 1959. He forwarded it to the Registrar of this Court for necessary action and it was received in the High Court Office on 6th of July 1959. The matter was being enquired by Shri E.F. Barlow, District and Sessions Judge, Bhatinda, and he submitted a report wherein he said that the complainant Gurbax Singh was summoned for 8th of June 1960 and he stated that he had compromised with the pleader and did not want to pursue his complaint and requested the District and Sessions Judge to file the same. The District and Sessions Judge in his report said that in the circumstances it would not be possible to proceed further in the matter without his producing evidence to support his allegations and he, therefore, submitted his report without recording any evidence.

This report was considered by us in our order dated January 3, 1962, and we expressed the view that this was a case which called for-enquiry. We directed the District and Sessions Judge to institute an enquiry and to record the statements of Gurbax Singh, Jora Singh and Kala Singh and such others as he might consider necessary. The matter was enquired into by Shri Barlow''s successor Shri Sewa Singh who submitted his report dated 25th of May 1902 to this Court. It is a detailed report, and after dealing with the statements of the witnesses of the parties examined by him. and after hearing the counsel, he came to the conclusion that the complaint was well founded, and that the complainant was induced by the pleader to part with v. sum of Rs. 900/-as a bribe to the doctor. The money was not paid to the doctor, but kept with himself by the pleader. The District and Sessions Judge said that the complaint of Gurbax Singh was perfectly genuine and clearly proved, that the Respondent had been guilty of grave professional misconduct in the discharge of his duty as a lawyer. The record of evidence examined before the District and Sessions Judge has been forwarded to this Court.

On behalf of the pleader, Shri Dalip Singh Kang, Advocate, has taken us through the record and has addressed arguments contending that the complainant and his witnesses are not credible. We have also heard Shri N.L. Salooja on behalf of the State and Shri Ganga Prashad Jain on behalf of the Bar Council.

The complainant Gurbax Singh appeared as P.W. 1 and stated, that in the criminal case, which was registered against his son Nohria Singh and others u/s 324 and 367, Indian Penal Code, for causing injuries on Kundha Singh, he had engaged the services of S. Inder Singh, pleader, and had paid him a sum of Rs. 100/- as fee for conducting the case on behalf of the accused. He later learned from his pleader that Kundha Singh had died in the Civil Hospital at Mansa. The pleader had informed Gurbax Singh, that as the injured person had died the accused might be held responsible for his murder and the accused would not be prosecuted on the charge of murder if a sum of Rs. 1,000/-was paid to Dr. Deedar Singh who was in charge of the hospital as a bribe. The complainant said that Kala Singh and Jora Singh P. Ws. were present when this talk took place between him and the pleader. He consequently paid Rs. 900/-to the pleader in the presence of these two witnesses and promised to pay a sum of Rs. 100/- later on after some time. Jaggar Singh, who is Gurbax Singh''s wife''s sister''s husband, met Garbax Singh and enquired if he had paid a bribe for the doctor to the pleader. Jaggar Singh went to make enquiries from the doctor and then told the complainant that no money had been received by the doctor as a bribe. Then, both Jaggar Singh and the complainant saw Dr. Deedar Singh and on the enquiries as to whether any money had been received by him he denied having been paid anything by the pleader. The complainant had, however, told the doctor that the Respondent had taken Rs. 900/- from him. On coming to know that nothing had been paid to the doctor, the complainant went to the pleader and asked him to refund the amount of Rs. 900/- The pleader persisted that he had paid the amount to the doctor and this resulted in second visit to the doctor who again denied having got any amount from the Respondent. The Respondent then admitted that the amount, which he had received, he had not paid to the doctor and consented to return it. At that time, P.W. Kala Singh was present, the complainant saw the pleader on several occasions and demanded the return of the money, but as the pleader did not do so, he had filed the complaint in question and also prosecuted the pleader u/s 420, Indian Penal Code. Exhibit P.C. is this criminal complaint. In cross-examination, Gurbax Singh stuck to the above version. He denied the suggestion that he had paid a sum of Rs. 700/- as fee to the pleader on that day and said that he had settled Rs. 100/- only as the fee. Kala Singh appeared as P. W. 2 and stated that the deceased was his real uncle''s son. He said that he was present when Inder Singh told Gurbax Singh that as Kundha Singh had died and the accused would be involved in a murder case, a sum of Rs. 1,000/- should be paid to the doctor to save the accused from the charge of murder and that the complainant had paid Rs. 900/- to to the pleader agreeing to pay a sum of Rs. 100/- later. Jora Singh was also present. Kala Singh had supported the criminal complaint of Gurbax Singh u/s 420, Indian Penal Code, in the Court of the Magistrate, on two occasions, when his statements were recorded vide Exhibit P. F. and Exhibit P. G. P. W. 4 is Jora Singh, real brother of the complainant. He said that the pleader had not demanded any sum of Rs. 1,000/- from Gurbax Singh for payment to the doctor as bribe. He also denied that Gurbax Singh ever asked the Respondent to refund (refund) Rs. 900/-. He knew that Gurbax Singh bad filed a criminal complaint u/s 420, Indian Penal Code, against the pleader. He denied any knowledge of the amount of fee which had been promised to be paid to the Respondent. It may be mentioned at this stage that in the criminal case u/s 420, Indian Penal Code, Jora Singh had not been cited as a witness. The criminal case had been compounded and Gurbax Singh did not wish to proceed with the enquiry which was being conducting by the District and Sessions Judge at the instance of this Court. The statements of Gurbax and Kala Singh against the Respondent had already been recorded in the Court of the Magistrate and, therefore, they could not, without risk to themselves, forswear heir previous statements and resile from them. Jora Singh had not made any such statement and he, therefore, made a statement before the District and Sessions Judge, which, without involving himself in any risk of perjury, would be such as to support the Respondent.

P. W. 5 is Avtar Singh, who was President of the Mansa Bar Association in 1959. He stated that the Respondent had been practising at Mansa for the last 10/11 years. He said that the maximum fee, that a lawyer of Mansa would charge in a Criminal Case u/s 324/ 367, Indian Penal Code, in 1959, would range from Rs. 100/- to Rs. 200/-. He had himself charged a sum of Rs. 100/- as counsel for the complainant in that very case. He also said that a complaint had been received against the conduct of the pleader by the Bar Association and at a meeting called of the members it was decided that as the complaint was addressed to the Chief Justice and the Judges of the High Court, no action by the members of the Bar Association was called for. It is not necessary to discuss the evidence of P. W. 8 Charan Dass, Ahlmad, who produced the files of certain cases ; or of P. W. 8 Nezir Singh, as Ahlmad of the Magistrate''s Court who produced certain records. P. W. 7 Jaggar Singh, supported the statement of the complainant.

The Respondent''s first witness is R. W. 1 Chet Ram, a petition-writer, who said that he had scribed application (Exhibit D.B.) filed in the Court of the Magistrate for permission to compound the offence u/s 420, Indian Penal Code. He said that he had done so at the instance of Gurbax Singh. R. W. 2 Piara Lal produced records of Civil and criminal cases. R. W. 3 Gurdit Singh stated that he had brought about the settlement between the parties. The terms of this compromise were that the Respondent had agreed to give up his claim of Rs. 400/- which were due to him from Gurbax Singh. He said that Gurbax Singh had told him that he had already paid Rs. 700/- to the Respondent who was demanding Rs. 400/- more. According to this witness, the fee settled was Rs. 1100/- inclusive of Munshiana. In cross-examination, he admitted that the application for compromise was not attested by him. He also stated that it was recorded in the compromise deed that the Respondent had given up his clain of Rs. 400/- against Gurbax Singh and that Gurbax Singh had stated in the compromise deed that he was giving up his claim for return of the amount paid by him to the Respondent. The statement of Gurdit Singh cannot be relied upon because no such compromise deed containing the terms, as alleged above, has been produced. In the application made for compounding the offence what was stated was that the parties desired to compound the offence and no other reasons, are disclosed on the file. R. W. 4 Sajjan Singh had made a similar statement as the previous witness. R. W. 5 is Ved Parkash who was employed as clerk by the Respondent. In his statement, he said that Gurbax Singh had paid only Rs. 700/- and that he had kept a note about fees in the envelope of the case (Exhibit D.D.). He said that the fees of Rs. 1100/-, inclusive of Munshiana, had been settled for conducting the case in two Courts, the Committing Courts and the Sessions Court. In cross-examination, he admitted that in the Vakalat Nama filed on behalf of the pleader (Exhibit D. C.) it was not mentioned that the fee of Rs. 1,000/- was agreed for two Courts. This fact was not even mentioned in the entry in the envelop (Exhibit D.D.)

S. Inder Singh made his statement as R. W. 6. His case is that Rs. 1,000/- were settled as his fee in addition to Rs. 100/- for his clerk for conducting the case in the Committing Court and also in the Sessions Court and that he had received Rs. 700/-, leaving a balance of Rs. 400/-which was still recoverable from the client. The note in the envelop is as under:-

Fee received Rs. 500/-.

Balance Rs. 30O/-.

Munshiana Rs. 100/-.

This entry is made inside the envelop. It is not made in the front or on the back of the envelop but inside it. This is an odd place for such an entry and it will be extremely difficult to write anything inside if the envelope is not torn. It seems that the entry has been made later on. In the present condition of the "envelop, which is now torn, such an entry can easily be made but it would be extremely difficult if the envelope was without a tear, when first used.

The pleader said that Gurbax Singh resented the demands for the balance of Rs. 400/ and this led him to file a complaint u/s 420. Indian Penal Code, He said that on the intercession of Gurdit Singh (R W. 3) and Sajjan Singh (R. W. 4) and one Dulla Singh the compromise was brought about. The basis of the compromise was that as he had not attended the Sessions Court, he did not insist on payment of the balance of Rs. 400/-.

In his cross-examination, he said that his average annual income in the year 1957 ranged from Rs. 5,000/- to Rs. 6,000/- and in 1958 it was from Rs. 7,000/- to Rs. 8,000/- and in 1959 it was between Rs. 8,000/- and Rs. 10,000/-. In the year 1960, his income was only Rs. 2,000/- or Rs. 2,500/- and in 1961 it was no better. He said that he had not paid any income tax on his income in the past and had not kept any account books regarding his fees. He said that it was in 5 to 10 per cent of his cases that the fee settled and the fee realized used to be maintained in the Vakalat Namas executed by his clients in his favour. All that the compromise (Exhibit DA.) states is that the parties have compromised the dispute regarding which case is pending in the Court and request that the case be riled. This compromise deed has not been attested by anybody. Its terms are not known and it is said to have been brought about by the Panchayat. He denied that the compromise had been effected after he had returned the sum of Rs. 900/-.

It may be mentioned that besides the statement of the Respondent, statement of Dr. Deedar Singh had also been recorded by the District and Sessions Judge but both the statements are missing from the record and it is not known and cannot be found out under what circumstances these two statements were removed from the record. Statement of the Respondent has been re-constructed from a carbon copy furnished by him. The statement of Dr. Deedar Singh could not be reconstructed. In paragraph 8 of his written reply, dated 4th of November 1961, the Respondent pleader said that Gurbax Singh had filed a complaint against him u/s 420 Indian Penal Code, but realizing that the story was not true and was bound to be proved to be untrue, he approached him with an apology and with a request to drop the matter. As his apology had satisfied the pleader, the compromise was filed. It may be mentioned that the evidence of R. Ws. (Respondent''s witnesses) are silent as to any apology having been tendered by Gurbax Singh to the pleader which led to the compromise. It is not understood how the pleader who was an accused person could drop the matter on receiving apology from the complainant. The criminal prosecution could only come to an end in case the Magistrate granted permission to the complainant to compound the offence.

It may be stated here that the accused had been acquitted on 13th of July 1959 by the Additional Sessions Judge, Bhatinda, in the case under Sections 324/367, Indian Penal Code. The Criminal complaint u/s 420, Indian Penal Code, was filed in the Court of the Magistrate on 8th of May 1959 and this case was compounded on 18th of May 1960.

The report of the District and Sessions Judge contains the summary of the statement of Dr. Deedar Singh as P.W. 3. It is mentioned in the report that Dr. Deedar Singh said that he had examined Kundha Singh, the injured person, on 19th of February, 1959 when he was admitted in the hospital and that he had died on 12th of March 1959 of pneumonia One hour later, the pleader came to him in the hospital and calling him in the verandah, said that he was himself suffering from stomach-ache. The doctor advised him to take light food and that he would be all right. The Respondent then asked him regarding the death of Kundha Singh and enquired of him if he was going to perform post mortem examination on the body. The doctor told the Respondent that Kundha Singh had died of pneumonia and not on account of the injuries and, therefore, no post mortem examination would be performed. On this, the lawyer went away but came again the same day in the evening, at his residence and made further enquiries about the post mortem examination of Kundha Singh. The doctor then enquired of the Respondent as to what connection he had with Kundha Singh and why he was asking the doctor again and again regarding the post mortem examination. The Respondent gave him no reply and went away. It seems that the pleader went to see Dr. Deedar Singh not for getting himself treated, but to ferret out information as to the cause of Kundha Singh''s death and the likelihood of autopsy on his body.

Six or seven days later, P. W. 7 Jaggar Singh accompanied by P. W. 1 Gurbax Singh met the doctor at his residence and enquired of him if Inder Singh Respondent had paid a sum of Rs. 900/- or not as consideration for not performing, post mortem examination on the body. The doctor told them that no such amount had been paid to him and advised him to get this amount back from Inder Singh. The doctor was also examined by Gurbax Singh in his complaint case u/s 420, Indian Penal Code, in which he had prosecuted the Respondent. The story of Gurbax Singh as to this incident is amply corroborated by Dr. Deedar Singh. It also shows that the pleader was interested in knowing whether there was going to be autopsy on the body of the deceased. On being satisfied that the doctor was not going to perform any autopsy as Kundha Singh had died of natural cause (pneumonia), the pleader felt emboldened to utilize this occasion for getting a large sum of money from the complainant on the pretext that the complainant''s son and the other accused ran the risk of being prosecuted of murder and he would get the matter hushed up by squaring the doctor with a bribe. The statement of Gurbax Singh (P. W. 1), Kala Singh (P. W. 2), Jaggar Singh (P. W. 7) and of Dr. Deedar Singh as summarized in the report prove the allegations against the Respondent. The institution of the criminal complaint also lends some support to Gurbax Singh''s complaint of professional misconduct. The statement of P. W. 5 Avtar Singh, the President of Mansa Bar Association, also shows that for a case like the one u/s 324/367, Indian Penal Code, the maximum fee of counsel ranges between Rs. 100/- and Rs. 200/-. The status of the Respondent at the Bar is not such that he can demand the maximum fee as he is little above the average rank of lawyers in Mansa according to P. W. 5. From the statement of Inder Singh, Pleader, as R. W. 6, it is clear that he never maintained any accounts and never paid any income tax although his annual income was taxable. If he was getting the income as claimed by him, he would have maintained accounts and paid income tax, I do not think that he received more than Rs. 100/- as his fee for defending the accused in the case under Sections 324/367, Indian Penal Code. I fully accept the version of Gurbax Singh that Rs. 900/- had been demanded by the pleader on the pretext of paying the amount as bribe to the doctor as Kundha Singh had died. One of the accused in that case was son of Gurbax Singh and the others were his brothers and the pleader first scared him of the dangerous consequences that might follow if the accused had to face a charge of murder and thus by first frightening Gurbax Singh and then by playing upon his fears he succeeded in extorting Rs. 900/-. He also felt safe in doing so because no autopsy was performed on the body by reason of Kundha Singh having died a natural death. In these circumstances the pleader felt that he could safely keep Rs. 900/- as Gurbax Singh would feel satisfied as there would be no autopsy on the body of Kundha Singh. The pleader must have thought that it was extremely unlikely that the complainant would know the real cause of why there was no post mortem examination on the body of Kundha Singh Had it not been for the circumstances that Jaggar Singh P. W. 7, who is a relation of the complainant, had known Dr. Deedar Singh who belonged to his village Mansa, the real fact of no money having been paid to Dr. Deedar Singh might not have become known to the complainant. It was after learning first through Jaggar Singh and then directly after a talk with Dr. Deedar Singh, that no money had been paid to him and that a sum of Rs. 900/- had been retained by the pleader himself, that the complainant started making demands on the pleader for the repayment of the amount. As the pleader could not or did not refund the amount, Gurbax Singh filed the Criminal complaint u/s 420, Indian Penal Code, followed by an application for professional misconduct in the High Court I cannot believe the story of the Respondent that a fee of Rs. 1100/- inclusive of Munshiana had been settled for the criminal case and the compromise was on the basis that the balance of Rs. 400/-would not be claimed by him and that Gurbax Singh had agreed to let the pleader retain Rs. 700/-. The Additional Sessions Judge had acquitted the accused in the case u/s 324/367, Indian Penal Code, on 13th of July 1969. The complaint u/s 420, Indian Penal Code, was filed against the pleader on 8th of May 1969. If Rs. 400/-were still due to the Respondent as the balance of the fee, he would have demanded it from the complainant by a written notice. He made no such demand. It is also curious that the compromise is completely silent as to the terms of the settlement between the parties. There is no indication on the record that the consideration for the compromise was the giving up of Rs. 400/- as the balance of fee by the pleader. I attach no significance to the entry in the Vakalat Nama of a sum of Rs. 2,000/-and Rs. 700/- in digits particularly when according to the statement of Inder Singh himself it is only in 5 or 10 per cent cases that fee is entered in Vakalat Nama. I still believe the suggestion that these entries were inserted later on after the Vakalat Nama had been filed. The entry of fee inside the envelope also suggests that it had been made later on. The envelope was throughout in the possession of the Respondent and it was produced only on the last date of hearing, i.e. on 16th of May 1962. I agree with the conclusion of the District and Sessions Judge that the blanks in the Vakalat Nama (Exhibit D. C.) were filled in while the document was in the custody of the Court. The falsity of the statement of R. W. 1 Chet Ram that the compromise was for the reason that further fee would not be demanded by the Respondent is obvious from the fact that he did not chose to incorporate this term in the petition scribed by him. R. W. 3 Gurdit Singh made a false statement when he said that it was recorded in the compromise deed that the Respondent had given up his claim for Rs. 400/- against Gurbax Singh and that Gurbax Singh had stated in the compromise deed that he was not to get any refund from the Respondent He is a false witness and has come to help the Respondent with scant regard to truth. He did not attest the compromise and has tried to help the Respondent by making a false statement. For the same reason, I cannot accept the statement of R. W. 3 Gurdit Singh and R. W. 4 Sajjan Singh that they had brought about the compromise between the parties on the basis of the Respondent agreeing not to claim the balance of Rs. 400/-. This could not be an inducement for Gurbax Singh to drop criminal proceedings in the total absence of even a title of proof on the strength of which the pleader could successfully claim Rs. 1100/- from the complainant. Moreover, it does not appear to me to be in consonance with reason that Gurbax Singh would have filed a false complaint u/s 4 0, Indian Penal Code, against the Respondent after the accused in the criminal case u/s 324/367, Indian Penal Code, had been acquitted. No pressure had been brought upon him by the Respondent regarding the demand of Rs. 400/- and no notice had admittedly been sent to mm. I cannot conceive that in the circumstances a false complaint u/s 420, Indian Penal Code, followed by a complaint for professional misconduct to the High Court, would have been made by Gurbax Singh merely as a counter blast to the oral demand of Rs. 400/-said to have been made by the Respondent. I find myself in complete agreement with the reasoning and the conclusion of the learned District and Sessions Judge, and I am satisfied that it was as a result of fear of a criminal prosecution u/s 302, Indian Penal Code deliberately created for ulterior purpose by the Respondent that he succeeded in extorting Rs. 900/- from the complainant after satisfying himself from Dr. Deedar Singh that there was going to be no post mortem examination on the body of Kundha Singh.

I may now refer to a matter which came to light only incidentally and was not mentioned either by the Petitioner''s counsel or by the representatives for the State and for the Bar Council. The Respondent in his statement as R. W. 6 dated the 16th May, 1962, had stated to the District Judge that he had now been registered as an Advocate under Advocates Act with the Bar Council. We sent for the file of the Bar Council which shows that on 12th February 1962 he had made an application for enrolement u/s 25 of the Advocates Act 1961. This application is accompanied with two certificates given by advocates inform No. 2. Shri Kulwant Rai Gupta Advocate of Mansa certified on 12th February 1962 that he had known the pleader personally for about 11. years and he believed him to be a person of good character and conduct and fit to be admitted as an advocate on the roll of the Bar Council of Punjab. A similar certificate was given by Shri Des Raj, Advocate, Mansa, dated the 14th February, 1962 Shri Sewa Singh, District Judge, certified on 14th February, 1962, that Shri Inder Singh Jeet is a pleader practising in the Courts within his District Division. There is nothing to render him unfit to be enrolled as an Advocate. On the 16th February 1962 the application of Shri Inder Singh Jeet pleader was presented to the Bar Council by Shri Daljit Singh Chahal Advocate, The order of the enrolment committee was also passed on the same date that the applicant be enrolled as an advocate. On the 22nd February, 1962, the pleader was enrolled as an Advocate and a certificate of enrolment as advocate was signed by the Chairman of the Bar Council of Punjab.

At the time when the pleader had made an application for enrolment as an Advocate on 12th February 1962 the matter was pending in this Court. On January 3, 1962, this Bench had directed the District Judge to institute an enquiry and to record the statements of Gurbax Singh, Jora Singh, Killa Singh and such others as he might consider necessary. The District Attorney was directed to conduct the enquiry before the District Judge. The report was to be submitted to this Court within two months. On the 16th November. 1962, this matter came up again before as and had to be adjourned as Shri Niranjan Singh Bhatia who appeared for Shri Dara Singh Advocate who had been engaged by the Pleader made a statement that the papers had been taken away by Shri Inder Singh Jeet two months ago. He also stated that a telegram was sent to Shri Inder Singh Jeet on the 14th November, 1962, but no instructions had been received. In view of this statement, we directed that an actual date notice be sent by the office to the pleader concerned. It seems that the pleader came to know soon after January 3, 1962, from our order that we were unwilling to accept the report of the District Judge, Shri E.F. Barlow wherein be had mentioned that the complainant was no longer willing to pursue the matter and that it would not be possible to proceed further in the matter without his producing evidence to support his allegations. Mr. Barlow had expressed the view that under the circumstances it would appear that nothing further could be done by him. The pleader either thought or was advised to become an Advocate under the Advocates Act. 1961, and on his enrolment he would no longer be amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court for professional misconduct. In these circumstances, an application was made by Shri Inder Singh Jeet for enrolment as an advocate without mentioning the fact that his professional conduct as a pleader was the subject-matter of an enquiry by this Court and pending the enquiry he applied for enrolment as an advocate. Probably he took shelter behind the fact that in the application form he was not required to state under question No. 12 that an enquiry was pending against the applicant for professional misconduct. 1 hat question is confined to finding out whether he has been convicted by a criminal Court or dismissed from government service or from the service of any local body or other statutory authority. This application for enrolment was presensed on 16th February, 1962, and the enrolment committee ordered that the applicant be enrolled. It appears that the members of the enrolment committee were not aware of the proceedings going on in this Court as to the unethical conduct of the pleader. It is presumed that they would not have enrolled him till the disposal of the matter by this Court as to his alleged misconduct. It is inconceivable that these two Advocates, on whose certificates the Bar Council of Punjab placed reliance, were not aware of the proceedings u/s 420, Indian Penal Code, or of the application of Gurbax Singh against the Respondent to the High Court for professional misconduct. It is char that from the statement of P.W. 5, Shri Avtar Singh, the President of the Bar Association that a copy of the complaint was also sent to the Bar Association Mansa against the Respondent and it was considered at a meeting of the Bar Association at which the members of the Bar decided that as the complaint was addressed to the Chief Justice and the Judges of the High Court, no action could be taken by the members of the Association. I cannot believe that the two Advocates, were not aware of proceedings for professional misconduct against the Respondent. It is also extraordinary that Shri Sewa Singh, District and Sessions Judge, certified on i4th of February, 1962, that nothing has come to his notice which could be said to render Shri Inder Singh Jeet unfit to be enrolled as an Advocate on the roll of the Bar Council of Punjab. It is possible that the order passed by this Court on January 3, 1962, directing the District & Sessions Judge to institute enquiry as to the unethical conduct of the Respondent might not have been Drought: to the notice of the District & Sessions Judge when he gave his certificate on 14th February, 1962. The fact, however, is that his predecessor Shri Barlow had been deputed to make enquiry on the allegations of the complainant against Shri Inder Singh. Before Shri Barlow, the complainant had expressed his unwillingness to pursue the matter and he had submitted a report to the High Court to that effect, but that would not show that there was no enquiry pending against the pleader. He too submitted an application for being enrolled as an Advocate without, disclosing that an enquiry for professional misconduct was pending done60 against him, and managed to secure two Advocates of Mansa, besides obtaining a certificate from the District & Sessions Judge, that he knew of nothing to the discredit of the Respondent. A certificate by its very nature, is a certain and solemn assurance of the truth of what is stated therein. In this case the assurance contained in the certificates of the two Advocates has been sadly belied. This is a case which furnishes an instance that certificates by Advocates are no guarantee that their belief in the good character and conduct and fitness of the applicant as an Advocate is well founded. If certificates of good character can be given in the circumstances of this case, even if they be not false to the knowledge of the Advocate giving the certificate, they are apt to mislead and deceive and are entirely useless.

The certificate of the District and Sessions Judge in the language in which it is given is of a negative character and merely furnishes proof of his want of knowledge. He is required to certify in the following words:

Nothing has come to my notice which can be said to render him unfit to be enrolled as an Advocate on the roll of the Bar Council of the Punjab.

This form puts a premium on unawareness and for this reason, is of questionable utility. A person with the antecedents of Shri Inder Singh Jeet can secure such a certificate if the District and Sessions Judge remains in the dark as to his previous conduct even if it might have been the subject of enquiry by his predecessor a short time earlier. On the basis of such certificates, a pleader is enrolled as an Advocate and becomes a member of an honourable profession which entitles him to practise at the Bar and the litigant public is thenceforward invited to repose confidence in him in all matters which require most perfect good faith uberrimae fides. These certificates, which are a passport to a high social status, and enable a person to enter a highly esteemed profession entitling him to practise in the highest Court in the State, were given in this case to a person who was least deserving and at a time when enquiry was pending against him on a very grave charge, which later on the same District and Sessions Judge found to be fully established. I presume that the District and Sessions Judge when he is required to certify that he is uninformed about the unsavoury antecedents of a pleader is expected to make some enquiry in order to find the fitness or suitability of the applicant before signing the required certificate. It is not known on this record as to what efforts if any were made in this connection.

The conduct of the Respondent cannot be too severly censured. He was engaged to defend the accused of the charge u/s 324/367, Indian Penal Code, and the circumstances of the death of Kundha Singh, the injured person, was utilized by the counsel to strike terror in the mind of Gurbax Singh in order that he should extort Rs. 900/- ostensibly as a bribe for the doctor but with the real purpose of keeping that money for himself. This conduct of his is not merely unprofessional but is criminal. He resorted to extortion in order to enrich himself by frightening his client. He achieved this object in a calculated way, first by heightening the nervous tension of Gurbax Singh by telling him that his sons and brothers in all likelihood would have to face a trial on a murder charge, and then by capitilizing on his state of alarm, by extorting Rs. 900/- on the false pretence that by bribing the doctor he would avert the impending calamity.

The retention of the name of the Respondent with such criminal propensities and conduct on the roll of pleaders will not only be a stigma on the profession but will gravely imperil the interests of the clients who might have the misfortune of having him as their lawyer. Such persons have no place, whatsoever, in the legal profession and by their dishonourable conduct would discredit the profession. A person like the Respondent is nothing short of a menace to the litigants whose interests he might be called upon to espouse, as he is quite capable of betraying them. Such a person should choose a vocation in which standard of integrity is less exacting Throughout, during the course of the presentation of arguments, the matter was being examined on the basis that the applicant was only a pleader and therefore the jurisdiction vested in this Court. If the matter had rested there, we would have had no hesitation in ordering that his name should be struck off the roll of pleaders and he should be disbarred. The same result would have followed if at the time of the enquiry he had already become an Advocate. A new complexity has been introduced as pending the enquiry he has got himself enrolled as an Advocate under the Advocates Act, 1961 and it is now for the Bar Council to punish an advocate for misconduct under Chapter v. of the Act. It will not be correct for this Court to disbar him. as pleader on account of his professional misconduct as pleader and nevertheless, he may continue to practice as an advocate. We would in the circumstances, while expressing our views as to the guilt of. the legal practitioner, refer the matter to the Bar Council, Punjab, for the taking of such steps as may be considered appropriate.

Dua, J.

I have had the privilege of perusing the exhaustive and detailed judgment prepared by my learned brother Tek Chand J. with which I agree. In view, however, of the importance of the question raised to the profession of law, I should like to add a few words.

22 The lawyer is indisputably an integral part of our legal system, including inter alia, the Courts (in which I include the Bar Associations and the Bar Councils) and Legislatures (in which I include the statutory draftsman) the Police, the penal institutions and the law colleges. Our legal system in turn forms part of our larger society and is the product of our social, moral and intellectual experience. Its core has mainly been derived from and inspired by the British legal system. The history, atmosphere and traditions of the British Bar have, therefore, shaped the development not only of the British Indian Bar during the British rule in this country in the past, but it has also largely influenced our determinations and sense of what the present Indian Republican Bar is in and should be. The various features of the struggle for constitutional liberty in Britain and the part played in that country by the lawyer has always inspired lawyers in this country and even today it inspires the Indian Republican thinking quite as deeply as it perhaps does the British mind.

The Indian lawyer, as the history of our fight for independence discloses, was the dominant spirit in the forefront in the long years of struggle to win freedom from the foreign yoke and after freedom he has striven hard in framing our Republican Constitution, in which justice and rule of law stand out prominently, and thereafter in making the Constitution work. It is accordingly the lawyer''s burden, as also his privilege, to uphold the law and preserve the administration of justice ; this is all the more so in the case of the professional lawyer, for, he, in addition, lives by the law. When the professional lawyer, therefore, begins to commit breaches of law he ceases to deserve to belong to this great profession. The position becomes worse when a lawyer participates in or abets and encourages bribery or professes to do so for interfering with the administration of justice, for, the lawyer is more closely linked to the Court and to the cause of justice than even to his client because he defends his client and enforces justice in accordance with law and not in violation of law or by committing breaches of law ; and when in the course of his professional activities he betrays the trust reposed in him by his client, the position becomes wholly inexcusable. There are, if I may so put it, few of the business relations of life involving a higher trust and confidence or governed by sterner principles of morality and justice than that of a lawyer and his client ; speaking generally there are few instances of trust and confidence more honourably and faithfully discharged and also more anxiously guarded by the law than the lawyer-client relationship. The profession of law has accordingly, at all times, been regarded as one of great honour, fair dealing and. usefulness, and for that reason obviously calling for most scrupulous fidelity on the part of the lawyer towards his client, so that he may not trade on his client''s credulity and fears to the latter''s detriment or prejudice. Again, the professional lawyer represents the law as an officer of the Court with the result that be is expected to preserve the administration of justice as a first priority, and indeed even in spheres outside and removed from the Court, being suitably equipped with the necessary education and experience it is the lawyer''s special social responsibility to enlighten the laity on the fundamental concepts of our legal processes. Considering the position in this background, it is the duty of the Court, so far as it lies within its jurisdiction, to administer the principles governing the lawyer-client relationship in a corresponding spirit, for, in case of failure of our process of law in this fundamental respect there would be a serious risk of jeopardising the entire legal system, which, in turn, may endanger and put into jeopardy our entire social and constitutional structure, for, one weak link in a chain must necessarily weaken the whole unit. A lawyer who cheats his client or attempts to do so, in my view, brings into disrepute the entire profession of law, and justly forfeits his right to belong to the guild.

It is true that in the case before us two Advocates gave certificates of fitness to the lawyer concerned, but if they have done so with the full knowledge of the complaint against him then, they too seem to me not only to have failed to uphold the honour of the profession of law but also to have done something which was clearly calculated to mislead the Bar Council. If, however, they can be shown to have been completely unaware of the complaint then they would appear to have acted carelessly and negligently and without due care and caution in giving the requisite certificates without making proper enquires. It is not easy to hold that in a small place like Mansa the members of the Bar could, on the facts and circumstances of this case, be so completely unaware of the complaint in question. The learned District and Sessions Judge would also seem to have failed to attach to the matter of giving the requisite certificate the importance it deserves, for, he appears to have given the certificate casually without making any enquiry. The complaint against the lawyer concerned had clearly not been finally disposed of at the time when the certificate was given, and I do not find it easy to persuade myself to believe that a reasonable probe into the Court records or an enquiry from his predecessor-if he himself was new to the District-would not have disclosed the existence of the complaint to the-learned Judge.

It may here be pointed out that the enrolment of the lawyer concerned as an Advocate of this Court during the pendency of the present proceedings without disclosing the same to us, even during the final arguments, has created an impression which is far from happy. But it is unnecessary for me to say anything more on this point.

With the foregoing observations, I entirely agree with the order proposed by my learned brother.