Shri Prakash Mishra vs U.P.State Road Transport Corporation Lucknow & Ors.

D.K. Seth, J.

Mr. Prabodh Gaur, learned counsel for the petitioner, contends that the promotional channel available to the petitioner, as pointed out in paragraphs 14 and 17 of the counteraffidavit, is violative of Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution. According to him, the scope of future promotion is dependent purely on chance of availability of a vacancy in the order of seniority. Secondly he contends that the post of Booking Clerk/Junior Clerk being interchangeable with that of Traffic Inspector II, the latter post could not be filled up by the Junior Clerk/Booking Clerk for the purpose of future promotion in the post of Traffic InspectorI. According to him, Junior Clerk/Booking Clerk should be eligible for promotion to the post of Traffic Inspector and be so considered for such purpose. The scope of promotion, therefore, is anomalous. He contends further that according to the Rules that is being followed by the respondents, unless a person is posted as Traffic InspectorII he is not considered for promotion to the post of Traffic InspectorI. By reason thereof, the petitioner having been promoted from the post of Conductor to the post of Junior Clerk, he is stagnating without any promotion in absence of any promotional channel available to the petitioner. He has also pointed out that respondents 4,5,6 and 1 are all juniors to the petitioner but they have been allowed promotion to the post of Traffic InspectorI overlooking the seniority and eligibility of the petitioner only because of the said practice which has affected his right of seniority as enshrined in Article 14 and equal opportunity of employment as enshrined in Article 16. Referring to the facts, he contends that the petitioner''s seniority has been overlooked and his juniors in the seniority list were given promotion before he was granted promotion. He refers to the statements made in paragraph 3 of the writ petition in support of his above contention and the statement made in paragraph 19 of the counteraffidavit. While comparing the two statements, he has pointed out that even on admitted facts, the petitioner has been denied seniority and promotion and thereby he has been wronged by the respondents which should be corrected by invoking writ jurisdiction in the present case.

Mr. Samir Sharma, learned counsel for the U.P.S.R.T.C., relying on the statement made in the counteraffidavit in paragraphs 14, 17, 19 and 27 contended that the promotional channel from the Bus Conductor is open to three categories on the posts mentioned in paragraph 14 and that there are promotional channel open to Junior Clerk/Booking Clerk to the the post of Senior Clerk on the basis of seniority subject to rejection of unfit. Though the post of Traffic InspectorII and that of Booking Clerk and Junior Clerk are interchangeable, it is always open to Junior Clerk/Booking Clerk to switch over to the post of Traffic InspectorII in case of vacancy on the basis of 60% quota reserved for them. Therefore, there is no discrimination as urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner. From the facts disclosed in paragraph 19 of the counteraffidavit, he contends that even on merits, the petitioner has not been deprived of his legitimate claim.

So far as the question of stagnation in the post of Junior Clerk/Booking Clerk as raised by Mr. Gaur is concerned, in view of the statement made in paragraph 27 of the counteraffidavit which has been dealt with in paragraph 13 of the rejoinder affidavit cannot be sustained. Inasmuch as in paragraph 13 of the rejoinder affidavit, it has not been denied that there is no promotional channel of Junior Clerk/Booking Clerk to the post of Senior Clerk.

There being different channel of promotion from the post of Junior Clerk/Booking Clerk to the post of Senior Clerk, the grievance of nonavailability of promotion to Junior Clerk/Booking Clerk in the post of Traffic InspectorI cannot be sustained. Then again the promotional avenue to the post of Traffic InspectorI is also open to Junior Clerk/Booking Clerk by means of his switch over to the post of Traffic InspectorII in 60% quota to be filled from the post of Junior Clerk/Booking Clerk from the date of promotion to the post equivalent which are all interchangeable. It was a question of option of the candidate to switch over to the other post. Nowhere it has been contended by the petitioner that he had ever opted for switching over and the same was denied despite vacancy and having been within the said 60 per cent quota. No such case has been made out in the four corners of the writ petition.

There might be different streams in the administrative set up with different kind of jobs requiring different kinds of expertise and experience. It is for the administration to decide which post should have promotional avenue through which channel for the purpose of having an efficient working. This Court cannot substitute its own views to such set up being unconcerned with the business of the respondents. Then again this Court is not an expert with regard to such matters to decide the same while exercising writ jurisdiction. Since Junior Clerk/Booking Clerk had two avenues open, one to the post of Senior Clerk and the other to the post of Traffic InspectorI by means of switching over to Traffic InspectorII, it cannot be said that there was no scope or promotional avenue open to the persons holding the post of Junior Clerk/Booking Clerk.

In the above circumstances, I have not been able to persuade myself to agree with the contention of Mr. Prabodh Gaur, learned counsel for the petitioner, though argued very seriously and efficiently.

So far as the question of denial of promotion to the petitioner as raised by Mr. Guar is concerned, it appears from a comparison of the statement made in paragraph 4 of the writ petition and paragraph 19 of the counteraffidavit read with paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of the rejoinder affidavit that there are material difference between the statement made in paragraph 4 of the writ petition and those of paragraph 19 of the counteraffidavit but the said difference has not been attempted to be explained in the rejoinder affidavit so as to assume that the statement made in paragraph 4 of the writ petition should prevail upon that of paragraph 19 of the counteraffidavit. Mr. Gaur very fairly admitted that the case of Hub Lal, respondent No. 4, cannot be agitated by the petitioner by reason of his being a member of Scheduled Caste community. Therefore, he has not pressed the case of Hub Lal in order to point put discrimination meted out to the petitioner. So far as the other respondents are concerned. While dealing with the statement made in paragraph 19 of the counteraffidavit, in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the rejoinder affidavit, the statement made in the counteraffidavit has not been denied. Therefore, the said statement appears to have been admitted by the petitioner and he gives a go by to the statement made in paragraph 4 of the writ petition. It appears that Iqbal Narain Singh, respondent No. 5, was appointed on 261219^9 as shown in paragraph 19 (ii) of the counteraffidavit which has not been disputed in the rejoinderaffidavit. Mr. Gaur tried to make out a case that Iqbal Narain was given promotion to the post of Traffic InspectorII on 221985 despite his being junior to the petitioner and despite the fact that he was not allowed promotion on 1771982 though his case was considered. In the counter affidavit, it has been pointed out that Iqbal Narain Singh was promoted to the post of Traffic InspectorII on 221985 and not to the post of Traffic InspectorI as given in the chart in paragraph 4. Then again from the statement in paragraph 4 it appears that the petitioner himself had stated that the said Iqbal Narain Singh was given promotion to the post of Traffic InspectorI on 221985. This was explained as typographical error by Mr. Prabodh Gaur so far as the chart is concerned. Therefore, the case sought to be made out showing the case of Iqbal Narain Singh about the discrimination does not stand to reason. So far as the case of respondent No. 6 Sant Kumar Srivastava, though appointed on 1261957 but in the chart he was shown to have been appointed on 17th January, 1962, namely, the date on which he was made regular. Therefore, the petitioner can not also claim that Sant Kumar Srivastava was junior to him. Similarly the respondent No. 7 having been appointed on 1351958 cannot be said to be junior to the petitioner. Therefore, the case of discrimination sought to be made out also lacks material to support the same.

For all these reasons, the writ petition is dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.