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Judgment
3 paragraphs · 674 wordsM.L. Mehta, J.—The present revision petition has been filed u/s 25 B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act (hereinafter referred to as ''the Act'') read with Section 151 of the CPC (CPC) against the order dated 21.02.2012 passed by the learned CCJ-cum-ARC wherein the leave to defend application filed by the petitioner/tenant, being barred by limitation, was dismissed and accordingly an eviction decree was passed in favour of the respondent landlord. The factual matrix of the case in brief is that a shop in premises bearing No. WZ-B-17, Ram Dutt Enclave, Uttam Nagar, New Delhi was let out by the respondent landlord to the petitioner tenant vide agreement dated 03.03.2003 on a monthly rent of Rs.1,500/-. Thereafter, an eviction petition was filed by the respondent against the petitioner u/s 14(1)(a) of the Act and the summons were served on the latter on 16.12.2011. The leave to defend application was filed by the petitioner on 21.02.2012 i.e. beyond the prescribed limitation period of 15 days. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted before the learned CCJ-cum-ARC that the reason for such delay was that the learned Predecessor of the Court had directed him to send the advance copy of leave to defend application first and then to file it before the Court, and hence the application could not be filed by him in time. Dismissing the plea of the learned counsel for the petitioner, the learned Trial Court observed that such plea was an afterthought and as such the Court had no power to extend the period of limitation in filing the leave to defend application and passed the eviction order.
The impugned order has been challenged by the petitioner on the ground that the petitioner has not been afforded an opportunity to present his case and it is within the power of this Court that if sufficient cause is proved, the delay can be condoned in the interest of justice. It has been further stated that the affidavit filed along with the application for leave to defend was signed by the petitioner on 21.12.2011 and that he was under the impression that the application has been filed within time, but, due to default of the earlier counsel the petitioner''s leave to defend application was dismissed.
Section 25B of the Act, which provides for summary trial of applications for eviction on the ground of bonafide requirement, is a code in itself and the provisions of CPC have no applicability in proceedings instituted under the said Section. Sub-section (1) of Section 25B clearly stipulates that the application for eviction shall be strictly dealt with in accordance with the procedure specified in this Section. There is no such thing as any inherent power of court to condone delay in filing an application for leave to defend before Court/Authority concerned, unless the law warrants and permits it, since it has a tendency to alter the rights accrued to one or the other partly under the Act. In Prithipal Singh Vs. Satpal Singh (Dead) trough LRs., , the question of applicability of the provisions of CPC for condonation of delay in filing leave to defend application was raised before the Apex Court. While answering the question in negative, the Apex Court held that Section 25B was inserted by the Legislature for bonafide requirement of a certain classes of landlords, in which the entire procedure has been stipulated. Section 25B itself is a special code and therefore, Rent Controller, while dealing with an application for eviction of a tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement, has to follow strictly in compliance with Section 25B of the Act. Moreover, the pleas taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner before the Trial Court as well as this Court are flimsy and untenable. Law protects the rights of the vigilant and not those of the ignorant. In view of the above discussion, I find no illegality or perversity in the impugned judgment which could merit interference by this Court. The petition being without merit is hereby dismissed in limine.
