Shri S.P. Kapur and others vs The State of Haryana and another

M.M. Punchhi, J.—This petition besides a few others are fixed before us for motion hearing. In the instant one, the written statement was filed by the State in the office but some how it has not been placed on the record, though the learned counsel for the petitioners was given a copy thereof and he has timely filed a replication. Obtaining another copy of the written statement from the learned Addl. Advocate-General, Haryana, and placing it on the record, we proceed to decide the matter at the motion stage itself.

In the instant petition, there are 98 petitioners. In other petitions too, their number is equally large. The broad facts are identical. And they are these:

The State of Haryana in the year 1979 decided to regularise the services of ad hoc teachers employee by it in various schools subject to eligibility criteria mentioned in its policy decision. Now prior to that, many teachers in the State of Haryana were working on ad hoc basis for years together. The State asserting its position had been appointing the teachers on ad hoc basis on the commencement of an academic year and terminating their services before the commencement of next summer vacation or even earlier to appoint them again on ad hoc basis till the next academic year started and again terminating their services before the succeeding summer vacation. The facts vary for each petitioner regarding the years in which he or she had to suffer this treatment. The meeting point, however, is the year of 1979 as from thence onwards, on regular appointments, the teachers started getting salary for summer vacations too.

The Supreme Court in Rattanlal and others v. State of Haryana AIR 1978 S.C. 478, made a momentous decision deprecating the policy of hiring and firing by the Haryana Government. The petitioners therein were ad hoc teachers and their successful effort before that Court was to get protection of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The Court put a stop to that situation and said it could not be permitted to last any longer, emphasising at the same time, that the State was expected to function as a model employer. The ultimate decision was in the following words:

We, therefore, direct the State Government to take immediate steps to fill up in accordance with the relevant rules the vacancies in which teachers appointed on an ad hoc basis are now working and to allow all those teachers who are now holding these posts on ad hoc basis to remain in those posts till the vacancies are duly filled up. The teachers who are not working on such ad hoc basis if they have the prescribed qualifications may also apply for being appointed regularly, in those posts The State Government may also consider sympathetically the question of relaxing the qualifications of maximum age prescribed for appointment to those posts in the case of those who have been victims of this system of ''ad hoc'' appointments. If any of the petitioners in these petitions has under any existing rule acquired the right to be treated as a regularly appointed teacher, his case shall be considered by the State Government and an appropriate order may be passed in his case.

We strongly deprecate the policy of State Government under which ''ad hoc'' teachers are denied the salary and allowances for the period of summer vacation by resorting to the fictional breaks of the type referred to above. These ''ad hoc'' teachers shall be paid salary and allowances for the period of summer vacation as long as they hold the office under this order. Those who are entitled to maternity or medical leave, shall also be granted such leave in accordance with the rules.

(Emphasis supplied and re-supplied).

It is plain from the reading of the directions given by the Supreme Court, as emphasised, that ad hoc teachers were allowed to remain in the posts till the vacancies were filled up, and some con-cessions were given to the teachers in the matter of payment of salary and allowances for the period of summer vacations as long as they held the office under orders of the Court. The observations regarding salary for summer vacations, as we read it, was obviously prospective in nature till those teachers who were permitted to continue on ad hoc basis in the posts filled up the vacancies. In no case were the teachers as a class made eligible to rake up such an issue or to unsettle things which had happened decades ago. Significantly, therefore, the words "arrears of salary for summer vacations," have not been employed anywhere in the judgment by the Supreme Court.

Now here the petitioners want a direction to the State on the basis of Rattan Lal''s case (supra) that they be paid salary for the summer vacation for the yester-years prior to 1979. We can, in no event, as stated before, read anything in Rattan Lal''s case (supra), entitling the petitioners to such a claim. If any is agitable before the Civil Court, it is today barred by limitation. Way back in the year 1964, in State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Bhailal Bhai and Others, a five-member Bench of the Supreme Court took the view that the provisions of the Limitation Act do not as such apply to the granting of relief under Article 226, however, the maximum period fixed by the Legislature as the time within which the relief by a suit in a Civil Court must be brought, may ordinarily be taken to be a reasonable standard by which delay in seeking remedy under Article 226 can be measured. Further the view taken was that Court may consider the delay unreasonable ever if it is less than the period of limitation prescribed for a civil action for the remedy, but where the delay is more than this period, it will almost always be proper for the Court to hold that it is unreasonable.

Now it is plain that for a money suit three Years is the period of limitation. After 1979, the period of limitation expired, say in the year (sic). There is almost six years unexplained delay in filing of the petition. Not only on account of delay in filing of the petition but on merits also we are not satisfied with the claim of the petitioners.

The learned counsel for the petitioners says that when the Government denied the petitioners the right to arrears of salary in the year 1987, period of limitation started. We are not aware of any principle that from the date of denial does the period of limitation start in a case like the present one when there is no admission by the State or an acknowledgement in favour of the petitioners.

For the aforesaid reasons, we dismiss this petition at the motion stage in limine. In the circumstances, however, we would not bear the petitioners with costs.