Shri Sunder Ram vs M/s J.P. Industries

Dev Darshan Sud, J.—Both these writ petitions are being disposed of by a common order as they involve the same question of law and facts. The petitioners challenge the order passed by the learned Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court), Solan dismissing the application u/s 151 of the CPC (hereinafter referred to as ''CPC'') for consolidating the land reference and all other references pending before him under the same notification issued u/s 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. The learned Court by its order dated 28.7.2011 dismissed the application holding that it would not be convenient to try all the petitions together for the reason that the case in which the petitioners have filed the application certain disputed facts require separate adjudication. The learned Court holds that the land of the petitioners was acquired vide Award No. 1/2009 dated 10.1.2008. Notification u/s 4 of the Act was issued on 12.8.2005 for acquisition of land in Baga, Bhalag, Shamtiyari and Sehnali villages. The order then proceeds that in this case six issues have been framed beside issue of relief. The respondents have pleaded that the petitioners have executed an agreement for receiving "almost the double amount of compensation which has been awarded by the Land Acquisition Collector, Arki" and in these circumstances, they are estopped from filing the reference petition. It is only one issue which is required to be proved by the petitioner and rest are to be proved by the respondents. The evidence shall be different in all petitions.

There is no separate power of consolidation of the proceedings provided under the law. However, the law is now well settled that u/s 151 of CPC, the Court/Tribunal has power to consolidate the proceedings.

In M/s Sohal Engineering Works Bhandup, Bombay vs. Rustam Jehangir Vakil Mills Co, Ltd. AIR 1981 Gujarat 110 the High Court of Gujarat holds:

Mr. Trivedi, the learned advocate for the opponent-plaintiff invited my attention to the observations of the Supreme Court in paragraph 39 of the judgment in Manohar Lal Chopra Vs. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal, wherein their Lordships have observed:-

Further, Section 22 of the Code provides for the transfer of a suit to another Court when a suit which could be instituted in any one of two or more Courts is instituted in one of such Courts. In view of the provisions of the Section, it was open to the respondents to apply for the transfer of the suit at Asansol to the Indore Court and, if the suit had been transferred to the Indore Court, the two suits could have been tried together.

From these observations made by the Supreme Court it was urged by Mr. Trivedi that even in cases where the two suits are not pending in the very same Court, by invoking the provisions of Section 22 of the Code one of them could be got transferred to the other Court having concurrent jurisdiction and the two suits could thereafter be tried together. According to Mr. Trivedi, the observations of the Supreme Court reproduced earlier clearly go to show that if both the suits are pending in the same Court, it is open to the Court to direct that they be tried together. A similar submission was made before Divan, J., as he then was, in Civil Revn. Appln. No. 504 of 1963, decided on 20th August, 1963. After referring to the observations of the Supreme Court reproduced earlier, the learned Judge confirmed the order passed by the trial Court directing consolidation of the suit instead of staying the subsequently instituted suit u/s 10 of the Code. There can be no doubt that the observations of the Supreme Court clearly indicate that the Court has the power to direct two suits between the same parties where common questions are likely to arise to be tried together. That power could only be traced to Section 151 of the Code. (at p.116)

In M/s Bokaro & Ramgur Ltd. vs. The State of Bihar and others AIR 1973 Patna 340 the Court holds:

There are a large number of decisions of different High Courts which have well settled the proposition that a Court has inherent right to order consolidation of suits in appropriate cases. To refer to the decisions of this Court alone the earliest one is the one reported in Dargahi Mian and another Vs. Mt. Mango Kuer The learned Judges of this Court relied on this very principle and reference was made to the case of Kalicharan Dutt v. Surja Kumar Mondal ( (1913) 17 Cal WN 526). The point which has been raised in the instant case before me was the very point raised before the learned Judges, namely, that the jurisdiction cannot be exercised without the consent of the parties. The argument was repelled and Coutts. J. with whom Das. J. agreed, observed that if the Court has jurisdiction to consolidate u/s 151 of the CPC it must have that jurisdiction without the consent of the parties for, if this were not so, it would not have inherent jurisdiction to consolidate at all for consent of the parties cannot confer a jurisdiction that does not exist. In another case Ramavtar Prasad Verma Vs. Satdeo Lal and Others, a learned Single Judge of this Court held that in deciding whether two suits should be consolidated or not, the whole question is whether or not in the long run it will be expeditious and advantageous to all concerned to have the suits tried together as analogous cases. It was also observed that where it appears that there is sufficient unity or similarity in the matter in issue in the two suits to warrant their consolidation, it is a fit case for such consolidation. The learned Judge further held that if in such circumstances the trial Court refuses consolidation then it is a fit case in which the High Court can interfere in its revisional jurisdiction. Reliance was placed on the decision in the case of H. Hamid and Another Vs. (Maulvi) Abdul Ghani and Another, ). In Harinarain Choudhary and Others Vs. Ram Asish Singh and Others, ) another learned Judge of this Court held that the Court has inherent power ex debito justitiae to consolidate suits where it is in the ends of justice to do so to avoid needless expense and inconvenience to parties. The learned Judge adopted and reiterated the principles laid down in the earlier cases that in deciding whether two or more suits are to be consolidated or not the whole question is whether or not in the long run it will be expeditious and advantageous to all concerned to have the two suits tried together as analogous cases and where it appears that there is sufficient unity or similarity in the matter in issue in the suits or that the determination of the suits rests mainly on a common question it is convenient to have them tried as analogous cases. Reliance was placed on the earlier two cases of Dargahi Mian and another Vs. Mt. Mango Kuer and Ramavtar Prasad Verma AIR 1935 Pat 30 (supra). I respectfully concur in the view expressed by the learned Judge and I would like to add further that the question to be considered should also be as to whether or not the non-consolidation of the two or more suits is likely to lead apart from multiplicity of suits to leaving the door open for conflicting decisions on the same issue which may be common to the two or more suits sought to be consolidated. In my view, the convenience of the parties and the expenses in the two suits are subsidiary to the more important consideration namely whether it will avoid multiplicity of suits and eliminate chances of conflicting decisions on the same point.

(at p. 342)

I need not multiply precedent any further. It is for the Court to consider the circumstances under which consolidation can be ordered. In the present case, what I find is that one of the factors considered by the Court for declining consolidation is the variance in issues in the petitions. In these circumstances, I do not find any illegality in the order passed by the learned Court below. Revision petitions stand dismissed. Of course, there can be no bar to the Court to consolidate the proceedings only for the purpose of recording evidence on common issues if the circumstances so warrant in order to save the time and expenses. Petitions stand disposed of.