Shrimati Lila Tully and Another vs S. Gopal Singh

Shamsher Bahadur, J.—This is a rule directed against the appellate order of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Delhi, setting aside the decree for ejectment passed in favour of the petitioners by the Court of first instance.

The first and second petitioners are Shrimati Lila Tully and her husband Shri Ram Parkash who brought a suit for ejectment against the respondent, Gopal Singh, from Block No. 9-A in Karol Bagh, New Delhi. The respondent-tenant had been in occupation of a portion of the premises since 1946 when the property belonged to Wadhu Mal Tillu Mal. The house was subsequently acquired by the first petitioner by purchase from Wadhu Mal and the tenant then attorned in favour of the second petitioner who used to collect rents on behalf of his wife. The suit giving rise to this petition for revision was instituted by the petitioners on 17th of August, 1957, and ejectment was sought principally on the ground of bona fide requirements of the owner. The accommodation with the petitioners consists of one fairly large sitting room, one store room and one living room. The respondent-tenant is also in occupation of about the same space area in the house and it has been the case of the petitioners that for their family consisting of themselves and six children, the eldest of whom at the time of the institution of the suit was 16, the accommodation with them is wholly insufficient for their bona fide requirements. The property was purchased by the first petitioner for a sum of Rs. 30,000/-.

The pleas of the defendant-tenant are that the premises in his occupation are not required bona fide by the petitioners and the proceedings have been initiated as a handle for enhancement of rent from Rs. 90/- to Rs. 150/- per month. The trial Court considered that the accommodation in possession of the petitioners was insufficient for their requirements and accordingly passed a decree for ejectment. The Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge in appeal took a different view of the matter and considered that the accommodation was not required bona fide. At first sight this finding appears to be one of fact but on a closer examination I am inclined to agree with the counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Gurbachan Singh, that the lower appellate Court has not considered the problem before it in its true legal perspective. u/s 25 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952, which governs these ejectment proceedings, the High Court may, at any time, revise an order passed under the Act if it is not "according to law". Under clause (e) of sub-section (1) of section 13 of the Act an order for recovery of possession at the instance of the landlord may be made if the premises are required bona fide for the requirements of the owner and his family. The Lower appellate Court has described the requirement of the owner as "a capricious desire and fanciful need." There is no proof of any kind, apart from the bare statement of the tenant, that ejectment has been motivated by the desire of the petitioners to raise the rent from Rs. 90/- to 150/- per month. The lower appellate Court has further suggested that the largest room could be made into two independent rooms of fairly good size by the process of partitioning. It is, however, to be observed that this improvisation cannot create more space area for the owner.

In considering the question of requirements all that has to be seen is that the owner intends bona fide to occupy the premises of which he claims possession. We cannot construe the word "requirement" as anything more or less than what it means. As Falshaw J., the learned Chief Justice in Maharaj Jagat Bahadur Singh v. Badri Parshad Seth (1954) 56 P.L.R. 549, had occasion to consider this question in construing section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act by virtue of which a landlord could recover possession of the premises in occupation of a tenant if he required them for his own use. It was observed at page 553:

I think the view of the English Court of Appeal must be accepted that where the word selected is ''requires'' it means something less than ''needs'' or ''reasonably requires'' and that all that the landlord has to show is that he bona fide intends to occupy the premises and carry on the business there for which he claims possession.

A similar expression of opinion is to be found in a, Calcutta High Court Judgment of P.N. Mookerjee, J., in Sumatibala Sen v. Heramba Kumar Roy 60 C.W.N. 783. It was observed in that judgment that "a person may be compelled to be content with a limited accommodation under certain circumstances. That does not necessarily mean that he cannot have reasonable requirement for additional accommodation," It was said by the learned Judge that should the owner find the accommodation in his possession to be inadequate he can ask for the additional accommodation if the size of his family and the needs entitle him to do so. There are two other unreported judgments of this Court to which reference may be made, both delivered by Chief Justice Khosla. In Gauri Shankar v. Pribhu Dayal Civil Revision No. 177-D of 1954, decided by him as Khosla J. on the 26th of April, 1954, it was found that the accommodation in possession of the owner was somewhat inadequate and it was held that a landlord is not debarred from making himself more comfortable in premises owned by him if he can show that he has a bona fide intention of occupying them. In the present instance nothing has been said in evidence to enable one to infer that the petitioners are not intending to occupy the premises from which they seek to eject the tenant. Indeed there are adequate provisions in the Act to prevent a landlord from abusing the privilege granted to him under the Act of seeking ejectment on the grounds of bona fide requirements. Recently, on 2nd November, 1961, Chief Justice Khosla observed in Ram Piara v. Baboo Ram Civil Revision No. 35-D of 1959, that "''bona fide requirement'' does not mean that the landlord has an absolute necessity for the accommodation in respect of which he seeks ejectment of his tenant." All that is necessary is that the owner must come with an honest intention to occupy the premises in question.

Considering that the petitioners are in occupation of only three rooms and they have a family of six children ranging between ages of 18 and 8, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the owners will certainly live less uncomfortably if they were put in possession of the accommodation which is now with the tenant.

It remains to make mention of two other arguments which have been addressed by Mr. Narula on behalf of the tenant. It has been contended by him that the suit was incompetent at the instance of Lila Tully, who is the owner of the property, because it was her husband who had been collecting rents and in whose favour the tenant had attorned after the premises had been sold by the original landlord. It is quite clear that the second petitioner had been acting as an attorney of his wife and it seems to me that there is no force in this contention. It is the first petitioner who is the owner of the property and has asked for ejectment. The second petitioner has been acting merely as an attorney of his wife and the legal rights of the first petitioner to bring this suit are not thereby affected. It has further been urged by Mr. Narula that the question being essentially one of fact no interference in revision is called for by this Court. As I have said before the lower appellate Court seems to have misconceived the legal position and the judgment being contrary to law it can be revised u/s 35 of the Act.

In this view of the matter this petition must be allowed. The rule is made absolute. I would, however, make no order as to costs. At the request of the counsel for the respondent, I allow the tenant time uptill 2nd of April, 1962, to vacate the premises.