Shyam vs State of MP

Petitioners/original judgment-debtors have filed this civil revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure against an order dated 29.01.2016 passed by the Second Civil Judge, Class-I, Hoshangabad in Execution Case No.26A/2009, whereby the objections raised by the judgment debtors regarding execution of the eviction decree passed against the tenant have been challenged. The petitioners have filed this revision petition in relation to two orders dated 20.10.2015 and 29.01.2016 respectively passed by the executing Court (Second Civil Judge, Class-I, Hoshangabad), but by an order passed on 03.08.2016 by this Court in this civil revision, the revision has been admitted only in reference to the order dated 29.01.2016. Thus, the facts relating to order passed by the executing Court on 20.10.2015 are not being stated hereinafter.

Undisputedly, late Kaniram in his lifetime has filed a suit bearing Civil Suit No.26A/2009 against the present petitioners for getting possession of the suit-accommodation (disputed shop), arrears of rent and mesne profit. It was pleaded by the plaintiff Kaniram that he bonafidely required the disputed shop for starting the business of selling of bangles and a general store and he is not having any other his own alternative suitable shop in the city Hoshangabad. It was also pleaded that defendant No.1 Smt. Manju Navlani and defendant No.3 Dinesh Navlani had sub-let the disputed shop to defendant No.2 Ganesh Kumar and the defendant did not pay the arrears of rent after receiving the notice sent to them prior to filing of the suit. Eviction was sought on three grounds envisaged under Section 12(1)(a),(b) and (f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act. The trial Court decreed the eviction suit only on the ground envisaged under Section 12(1)(f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act. It appears that against the decree passed by the trial Court an appeal by the present petitioners was filed before the District Judge bearing Civil Appeal No.19A/2010, in which a judgment and decree dated 29.03.2011 was passed on the basis of the compromise petition filed by both of the parties of the appeal. According to the terms of the decree, appellants/present petitioners have agreed to vacate the suit accommodation (disputed shop) till 01.09.2015 and its vacant possession be delivered to plaintiff Kaniram and it was also in terms of the compromise that at the time of vacating the disputed shop, security deposit made by the tenant of Rs.4,25,000/- be refunded to the present petitioners by the original plaintiff and mesne profit at the rate of Rs.35 be paid by the appellants to the plaintiff till delivery of possession.

Present petitioners as judgment-debtors filed objections before the executing Court that as the suit was filed only on the alleged bonafide need of Kaniram only, Kaniram had expired, thus the pleaded need of Kaniram has ended and thus the decree of eviction could not be executed against them. The above-mentioned objections raised by the present petitioners have been rejected by the executing Court by abovementioned impugned order.

The learned counsel for the petitioners placing reliance on a case of Smt. Nai Bahu Vs. Lala Ramnarayan & others [AIR 1978 SC 22] contended that the appellate decree passed on compromise does not indicate that appellate Court was satisfied about existence of any ground of eviction available under M.P. Accommodation Control Act in favour of the plaintiff and thus the compromise decree passed by the appellate Court is not in accordance with law and it could not be executed against the judgment debtors.

Though, it is clear that the appellate decree does not mention any admission by the appellants of any ground of eviction in favour of the plaintiff, but before this Court, copy of the compromise application filed before the appellate Court under Order 23 Rule 3 of the CPC dated 21.03.2011 has been filed by the petitioners themselves as AnnexureA/2 and in para No.2 of the compromise petition, it is clearly mentioned that the appellants of the civil appeal i.e. present petitioners admit that the plaintiff Kaniram/respondent is having bonafide and actual need of the disputed shop for starting his business and thus it is clear from the compromise petition that the present petitioners have clearly admitted bonafide need of the plaintiff for suit accommodation (shop) for starting his business. Thus, it is clear that the ground of Section 12(1)(f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 was admitted by the appellants and the appellate Court had recorded its finding in para No.2 of its judgment dated 29.03.2011 that the compromise filed by the parties is in accordance with law and thus it was allowed after its verification decree was passed, thus, it could not be inferred that the appellate Court had granted compromise decree in absence of any ground of eviction of tenant envisaged under Section 12 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act. Thus, in the present case, petitioners are not entitled to get any benefit of the above-mentioned citation.

It has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that as the suit was decreed by the trial Court only in relation to the ground envisaged under Section 12(1)(f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act regarding the alleged need of original plaintiff Kaniram himself for starting business of selling of bangles and general store and as Kaniram had expired, thus the alleged need has vanished, thus it is prayed that the compromise decree passed by the appellate Court had become unexecutable and thus it could not be executed against the petitioners. In the case of Motilal Vs. Kailash Narain [1960 MPLJ 87] it has been held by this Court that in the personal need of the landlord/owner, the need of his family is included and after the death of the decree holder, his LR could execute the decree.

Respondent''s counsel placing reliance on a case of Vashudev Dhanjibhai Modi Vs. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman & others [AIR 1970 SC 1475] contended that the executing Court cannot go beyond the decree passed between the parties or their representatives and cannot entertained any objection that the decree was incorrect in law or on facts, until it is set-aside by an appropriate proceedings in appeal or revision, a decree even it be erroneous is still binding on the parties.

In the light of above-mentioned citation of the Supreme Court, it is clear that the objections raised by the judgment-debtors could not be accepted by the executing Court as the compromise decree passed in appeal filed by the present petitioners dated 29.03.2011 became final against the present petitioners and its validity could not be questioned in execution proceedings. In the light of citation of Shyam Charans Vs. Sheoji Bhai [AIR 1977 SC 2270] it is clear that after passing of the eviction decree by the Court, the possession of the tenant became unlawful. It appears from the impugned order that the decree holder had deposited the security amount of Rs.4,25,000/- in the Court, thus it is clear that the terms of the decree have been complied with by the decree holder. Thus, in light of the above-mentioned citations, it appears that the learned executing Court had not committed any error or irregularity in passing the impugned order dated 29.01.2016.

Thus, this civil revision appears to be devoid of merits and it is dismissed. No order as to costs.