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Judgment
V.B. Gupta, J.—The present petition has been filed u/s 482 Cr.P.C. seeking quashing of the FIR No. 257/04, registered against the
petitioners u/s 406 IPC at P.S. Malviya Nagar.
The crux of FIR is that the complainant/respondent no.2 purchased a three-wheeler scooter by getting it financed from the petitioners.
Thereafter, he had paid some monthly Installments. On 9th September, 2002 he had given his three-wheeler scooter to his driver for plying, when
two persons occupied the scooter from Sai-Du-la-jab as passengers and came to Saket and after reaching Saket, they told the driver that they are
from the finance company and since the Installment has not been paid, they are taking the vehicle. The complainant reached at the spot. Both the
petitioners told the complainant that, since he had not paid the Installment, they are taking the vehicle and shall return the same only after he makes
the payment. The complainant informed the police, who also told him that he can take the three-wheeler by paying the Installment. After two days,
when the complainant went to deposit the Installment, petitioner no.1 told him that they had sold the vehicle and he would not get back and nothing
is due from their side. Accordingly, on the complaint of the complainant, present case has been registered u/s 406 IPC against the petitioners.
It has been argued by learned Counsel for the petitioners that since the parties have reached a settlement and money has been paid to the
complainant, the compromise should be accepted and the FIR should be quashed.
On the other hand, it has been argued by learned Counsel for the State that the allegations made in the present case against the petitioners are
serious one since, they forcibly seized the vehicle of the complainant and as such no ground is made for quashing the F.I.R.
Recently in Smt. Satnam Kaur and Ors. v. State 2007 (1) JCC 361 a question arose before this Court with regard to compounding of offences
under IPC, which are non-compoundable and are treated as crime against society. It was held:
Section 320(1) of the Cr.P.C. provides that offences mentioned in the table there under can be compounded by the persons mentioned in the
Column No. 2 of the table. Further, Sub-section (2) provides that offences mentioned in the table could be compounded by victim with the
permission of the Court. No doubt, even in respect of non-compoundable offences, the High Court can exercise the power and quash criminal
proceedings if for the purpose of securing ends of justice, quashing of those proceedings becomes necessary. Judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme
Court in the case of B.S. Joshi and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Another, , acts as guide for the High Court to determine whether to exercise
the powers. u/s 482, Cr.P.C. in a given case or not. The Court held in that matter that there was no general proposition limiting power of quashing
the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
Therefore, if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary. Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise
of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a
power.
Thus, it is clear that while exercising the inherent power for quashing u/s 482, Cr.P.C., it is for this Court to consider whether it is expedient and in
the interest of justice to permit the prosecution to continue.
The edifice of criminal law is based on the principle that crime committed against the particular person is the crime against the society as well.
Though in that particular case, the immediate victim may be the person who is affected by the said crime. This is the genesis beyond Section 320,
Cr.P.C. which makes only trivial crimes as compoundable treating those offences as the ones which can be settled between the parties. But other
offences, which are non-compoundable, are treated as crimes against society and, Therefore, normally the consent of the victim to compound
those offences may not be of any use. Balance is sought to be maintained by the judgment of the Supreme Court in B.S. Joshi and Ors. v. State of
Haryana and Anr. (Supra) by giving the power to the High Court even in such cases but with rider that there are special features which may be
present in a particular case and may warrant in the interest of justice and as a rule of expediency to give quietus to those proceedings. Therefore, in
facts and circumstances of a given case, High Court has to come to a conclusion that whether it is expedient or in the interest of justice to quash the
proceedings in view of the settlement between the parties, notwithstanding, a general rule that it is an offence against the society.
Applying the aforesaid test in the present case, it may be mentioned that the charges levied by the complainant against the petitioners are of very
serious nature, as the petitioners forcibly took possession of three-wheeler scooter, owned by the complainant.
The Apex Court in Inspector of Police, CBI v. B. Raja Gopal and Ors. 2003 SCC (Cri.) 1238, held that merely for the reason that a
compromise has been reached between the bank officials and the accused and the accused paid the disputed amount found due to the bank, the
High Court was not justified in quashing the trial.
The relevant portion of this judgment reads as under:
Where a trial was in progress and reached almost the penultimate stage the High Court stepped in and quashed the criminal proceedings. The
aggrieved State has come up with this appeal. The case involved offences under Sections 420, 468 and 471 IPC etc., on the allegation that
Canara Bank was defrauded. One of the premises adopted by the High Court was that there was a compromise between the bank officials and
the accused and the disputed amount found due from the accused had been paid later. Even assuming that the said stand of the accused is correct,
that was not enough for quashing the criminal proceedings. Perhaps that would have been a ground for pleading mitigation at the final stage.
Keeping in view the principles of law laid down in above two decisions with regard to quashing of the F.I.R. and the fact that in the case in
hand, the act of the petitioner in illegally taking the possession of three wheeler was nothing but sheer display of muscle power which cannot be
tolerated in any civilised society and thus, it is an offence against the society. Accordingly, no ground is made out for quashing the F.I.R. in question
and the present petition is, hereby, dismissed.