High CourtsDivision Bench

Silajit Guha vs Sikkim University And Ors

Sikkim High Court · Decided on 3 July 2021 · Citation: (2021) 07 SIK CK 0008

HON’BLE JUDGES
Jitendra Kumar Maheshwari, CJ · Meenakshi Madan Rai, J
RESULT
Partly Allowed
CASE NUMBER
Writ Appeal No. 01 Of 2021

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Judgment

46 paragraphs · 952 words

J.K Maheshwari, CJ

1.

Challenging the Judgment dated 08.12.2020 passed in WP(C) No.30 of 2019( Silajit Guha vs. Sikkim University &Ors.)by learned Single Bench,

partly dismissing the petition deciding the issue of jurisdiction with certain observations this intra Court appeal has been preferred under Section 148 of

the Sikkim High Court (Practice & Procedure) Rules, 2011.

2.

The appellant who was a Professor in the department of respondent no.1, Sikkim University (hereinafter referred as the University). The

respondent no.5, a student of the department made a complaint of sexual harassment against the appellant to the Internal Complaint Committee (in

short ICC). The ICC conducted an inquiry and the report dated 08.06.2019 was submitted to the Executive Council of the University i.e. respondent

no.3. The appellant was served with show cause notice dated 10.06.2019 enclosing report of inquiry which was replied by him.

3.

The Registrar of the University issued the office order bearing no.201/2019 dated 28.06.2019, terminating the services as per the 33rd Meeting of

the Executive Council. Relying upon the inquiry report and while considering the representation of the petitioner under clause 8(6) of the University

Grant Commission (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal of Sexual Harassment of Women Employees and Students in Higher Educational

Institutions) Regulation, 2015 (hereinafter in short referred as UGC regulations) Council was of the opinion that the appellant is not fit to be retained in

the service of the University, however, terminated his service with immediate effect. The petitioner preferred a statutory appeal on 01.07.2019 which

was pending. In the meantime, the Writ petition seeking quashment of show cause notice dated 10.06.2019, the inquiry report dated 08.06.2019 and

the order of termination dated 28.06.2019 and various other consequential reliefs was filed.

4.

Learned single Judge observed and proceeded to decide the question of jurisdiction of ICC looking to the definition of ‘workplace’ specified

in Section 2(o) of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (hereinafter to be referred as

the Act). While deciding the said issue the Court proceeded to see the allegations made in the complaint statement of the complainant dated

12.05.2019 and also of the student before the ICC and observed that the definition of the ‘workplace’ is inclusive one. Therefore, looking to the

nature of the allegations came in the statement prima facie ICC has jurisdiction. It is further observed in the same paragraph that the Executive

Authority before whom the appeal is pending may examine the issue of sexual harassment at ‘workplace’ looking to the definition of the

‘workplace’, in view of the Section (9) of the Act, Therefore, looking to the said contradictory observation appellant came before this Court

assailing the same.

5.

Learned Counsel for the appellant contends that at one place learned Single Judge proceeded to decide the scope of the definition of the

‘workplace’ observing that it is inclusive definition but simultaneously the same question was left open to decide by the Executive Authority in

terms of Section 9 of the Act, which cannot be decided exceeding to the observations of the Court.

6.

It is further urged that the premises on which observation has been made by the Court is the statement of the Complainant as well as the co-

students. If it has been dealt with by the Court now on this count nothing remain to be decided by the Executive Authority, therefore, the decision

taken by the Court on the point of the jurisdiction explaining the ambit and scope of workplace is not justifiable, more so the said question cannot be

left open for decision by the Executive Authority.

7.

After having heard learned Counsel for the appellant as well as learned Counsel for the respondent, we find much substance in the argument of the

learned Counsel for the appellant. It is to observe that in the facts of the case the ambit and scope of workplace as specified in the Section 2(o) of the

Act can be decided after appreciation of the evidence brought before ICC, as considered by learned Single Bench. In Case, the ambit and scope is

decided by the Court then nothing remain to adjudicate for the Executive Authority in an appeal. In the said context, in our considered opinion,

observation of the learned Single Judge referring section 2(o) of the Act i.e. workplace’ its ambit and scope is not proper in particularly when the

same question is permitted to be decided by the Executive Authority. Therefore, the finding on the point of jurisdiction explaining the definition of

‘workplace’ is inclusive one, stands set aside to such extent and the liberty is granted to the appellant to raise the said question before the

Executive Authority who shall decide the same in accordance with law.

8.

Learned Single Judge has further proceeded to refer UGC Regulations no.8 and held that because the appeal is pending before the Executive

Authority, therefore, order of termination would be kept in abeyance and appeal shall be decided by the Authority on all issues and the questions, as

raised. The said finding of learned single Judge would remain intact and it does not warrant any interference.

9.

Accordingly, this appeal is hereby allowed in part, in view of the foregoing observation. It is directed that the Executive Authority shall decide the

appeal as observed by the learned Single Judge without influencing with the observation recorded in the Judgment on the point of jurisdiction or on the

point of ambit and scope on the definition of ‘workplace’. The said issue be decided by the Executive Authority independently. The remaining

part of the impugned order would continue to operate. The Executive Authority shall decide the appeal as expeditiously as possible not later than three

months.