Silpa Mol vs State Of Kerala

C.S.Sudha, J.

Ext.P7 detention order dated 02/09/2022 issued under Section 3(1) of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 (KAAPA) by the second respondent (R2) against the detenu, the husband of the petitioner, is under challenge in this writ petition. Ext.P7 detention order has been confirmed under Section 10(4) KAAPA by the first respondent (R1) by Ext.P13 order dated 14/11/2022.

Heard Sri.S.Mohammad Al Rafi, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri.K.A.Anas, the learned Government Pleader for the respondent.

Following are the grounds on which Ext.P7 order is challenged-(i) non compliance of Section 3(3) of KAAPA. (ii) non application of mind by the detaining authority and (iii) the detenu does not fall within the contours of Section 13(2)(i) of KAAPA.

Section 3(3) says that when any order is made under this section by the authorised officer under sub-section (2), he shall forthwith report the fact to the Government and the Director General of Police, Kerala, together with a copy of the order and supporting records which, in his opinion, have a bearing on the matter and no such order shall remain in force for more than 12 days, excluding public holidays, from the date of detention of such Known Goonda or Known Rowdy, unless, in the meantime, it has been approved by the Government or by the Secretary, Home Department if generally so authorised in this regard by the Government. Therefore, the approval of the order by the Government must be within 12 days (which is excluding holidays) from the date of detention. When Ext.P7 order dated 02/09/2022 was issued, the detenu was in judicial custody in another crime. Ext.P10 memo for executing the order of detention and Ext.P11 jail admission authorisation were issued by R2 on 02/09/2022. On the same day itself the detenu was detained. The said detention was not approved within 12 days from the date of detention as mandated under Section 3(3) of the Act. On the other hand Ext.P9 order of approval was issued by the Government only on 24/09/2022, which is beyond the period of 12 days. Hence Ext.P7 order is bad for non compliance of Section 3(3) of KAAPA, alleges the petitioner.

Per contra it was submitted by the learned GP that the detenu was not detained on 02/09/2022 as alleged by the petitioner, but on 07/09/2022. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of R1 it is contended that, as the detenu was in judicial custody, permission had to be sought from the court concerned under whose order he was in judicial custody to execute Ext.P7 order. The request was given to the Court of Session, Alappuzha and the said request was allowed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-I as per order dated 05/09/2022. Pursuant to the said order, the detenu was arrested only on 07/09/2022. Hence Ext.P9 order dated 24/09/2022 is well within the period of 12 days, contend the respondents.

During the course of arguments, the learned GP handed over to us the original file relating to the case for perusal. On verification, we find that Ext.P7 order was executed on 07/09/2022. Therefore, the period of 12 days excluding holidays as contemplated under Section 3(3) has to be calculated from the date of detention. Seven days holidays intervened, which are, 07/09/2022, 08/09/2022, 09/09/2022, 10/09/2022 and 21/09/2022. 11/09/2022 and 18/09/2022 were Sundays. Therefore, if these seven days are excluded, it can be seen that the approval of Ext.P7 order by Ext.P9 order on 24/09/2022 is on the 12th day and therefore within the period of 12 days contemplated in Section 3(3) of the KAAPA. That being the position, the first ground of challenge will have to fail.

According to the petitioner, the last prejudicial activity alleged to have been committed on 14/06/2022 by the detenu is Crime 396/2022, Mannancheri Police Station, alleging commission of the offences punishable under Sections 20(b)(ii)(B); 22(c); 29 of the NDPS Act and Section 27 of the Arms Act. When commercial quantity of drugs is involved, the statutory rigour contained under Section 37 (i)(b) of the NDPS Act would be attracted. Therefore, there was no possibility of the detenu getting bail and hence it was absolutely unnecessary for the detaining authority to pass Ext.P7 order as the detenu was already in judicial custody. This aspect has not been taken note of by the detaining authority and hence this is a case of clear non application of mind by the detaining authority, argues the petitioner. On the other hand, it was submitted by the learned Public Prosecutor that para 5 of Ext.P7 order would show that the detaining authority was well aware of the fact that the detenu was in judicial custody. He has also given reasons for passing Ext.P7 order. It was pointed out that the satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority that though the detenu is already in judicial custody, he is likely to be released on bail and that on being released, he is likely to indulge in further prejudicial activities and so to prevent the same an order of detention needs to be passed, is a subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority. Relying on the dictum in Senthamilselvi v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2006) 5 SCC 676, it was submitted that, normally the subjective satisfaction arrived at based on materials is not to be interfered with. Reference was also made to the dictums in Union of India v. Dimple Happy Dhakad, 2019 KHC 6662 and Kamarunnissa v. Union of India, (1991) 1 SCC 128, wherein it has been held that even in the case of a person in custody, a detention order can be validly passed if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody; that he has reason to believe on the basis of reliable materials placed before him that there is a real possibility of his being released on bail and that on being so released he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activity and therefore it is essential to detain him to prevent him from doing so. In this case though the detenu was in judicial custody when the detention order was passed, as per order dated 19/12/2022 in Crl.M.P.No.4931/2022 and Crl.M.P.No.5037/2022, the Sessions Court, Alappuzha has granted him bail. It is to safeguard the interest of the society and to maintain public order, Ext.P7 order has been passed. The said order is strictly in conformity with the relevant provisions of the KAAPA, contend the respondents.

It is well settled that, before a valid order of detention is passed under Section 3 of the KAAPA, the detaining authority must first entertain the requisite twin satisfactions. Firstly, the initial objective satisfaction must be entertained that the detenu is a known goonda or a known rowdy. Then the authority must entertain the latter subjective satisfaction that detention of the detenu is necessary to prevent such detenu from indulging in any anti-social activity. Only when both the satisfactions are validly entertained based on the materials available before him, can the detaining authority pass a valid order of detention under Section 3 of the KAAPA. (Shruthi P. v. State of Kerala, 2009 KHC 1207).

Further, the mere fact that the person is a known goonda, or a known rowdy cannot automatically entail the consequence of passing an order under Section 3. That is only the threshold requirement. Mind has to be applied by the authorities to satisfy themselves first that the detenu is a known goonda or a known rowdy. This is verification of a fact situation. No subjective satisfaction is involved. The satisfaction on that aspect must certainly be objective. Once that fact is verified, then the Authorities must apply their mind and consider whether the powers of preventive detention under Section 3 of the KAAPA deserves to be invoked against that person. (Sruthi v. State of Kerala, 2009(2) KHC 992).

The subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority should not rest on the mere fact of registration of the required number of crimes against the person concerned. The detaining authority must be satisfied that despite the application of the ordinary laws of the land, in order to prevent such person from committing any antisocial activity, his detention is required under the KAAPA. (Sreedevi v. State of Kerala, 2012 KHC 575).

Based on the aforesaid precedents, the question is, has the detaining authority considered the aspect of the judicial custody of the detenu before passing Ext.P7 order. Paragraph 22 of Ext.P7 order which is at page 88 of the paper book reads thus:-

"എത ർകക  പ ത യയ മണഞ  ര    .സ. കപക  396/2022-) നമർ ഞകസ ൽ ന ലവ ൽ ജ ഡ ഷ¬ൽ കസഡ യ ൽ  ർപ ച# വര#നതണ . ട  ഞകസ ൽ ട യൻ ജമ¬  ലഭ ച#  #റത റങ യൽ ട യൻ് ററസന ധ¬  പ ഞ/ശത# വ ണ#  ഗ#ണ ആപകമണങൾക# , ഗ6രവതരമയ ആപകമ പ വർതനങൾക#  ഞനത7ത8  നൽക#റമന# , ട യൻ സമത ക ഞനടത ന ഞവണ  ട യൻ് ററസ ഘ ഗങളയ  അപകമ കളയ യ#വകറള മ#ൻന ർത  വ ണ#  വൻഞതത ൽ മയക#മര#ന വ ൽപന നടത#റമന#  രജ¬ത ൻ് ററ ഭവ  വഗ നങളയ> വര# തലമ#റ ഇതര  ലഹര  വസ#കൾക#B അട മറപട  ഗ6രവതരമയ ക#റക7ത¬ങള ൽ ഏർറപട#ന സഹചര¬മ#ണക#റമന#  എന ക  ഉതമ ഞGധ¬ വന ട#ളതണ . ട  ഞകസ ൽ ജമ¬  ലഭ ക#നത ന മ#മയ  ട യറന ട  ന യമ പ കരമ#ള കര#തൽ തടങല ൽ  ർപ ചത  പ ഞ/ശറത റ ത#ജന സമധന ജ വ തത ന അത¬ന  സഹയകരമറണന#  എന ക  ഞGധ¬റപട ട#ളതണ . ആലപ#ഴ സ6ത    .സ. കപക .1460/2017 മണഞ ര    .സ. കപക .538/2019 എറന ഞകസ#കള ൽ എത ർ കക യ#റട കക യ#റടജമ¬  റദ# റചയ#നത നയ  Gഹ#.ഞകടത  മ#ന  റകസമർപ ച അഞ കയ ൽ ഞകടത  നട ട പകമങൾ   ർത യക#നത ന ടയ ല#ള സ8ഭവ ക നട ട പകമങൾക ടയ ല#ള കലതമസത ന#ള ൽ ട യൻ വ ണ# സമന ക#റ ക7ത¬ങള ൽ പ ത യകൻ സദ¬ത യ#ളത നല#  ട യൻ ജ ഡ ഷ-ൽകസഡ സ കഴ ഞ# വര#നമണഞ ര   .സ .കപക 396/2022 പ കരമ#ള ഞകസ ൽ ജമ¬  ലഭ ക#നത ന# മ#മയ  ട യറന KAAPA ന യമ പ കരമ#ള കര#തൽ തടങല ൽ  ർപ ചൽ പ ഞ/ശറത പകമസമധന  ലനത ന  അത¬നഞ ക തമറണന  ഞGധ¬റപടത ൻ് ററ അട സനത ലണ  ന ലവ ൽ ജ ഡ ഷ¬ൽ കസഡ യ ൽ കഴ ഞ#വര#ന എത ർ കക റകത റര വ ണ#  KAAPA ന യമ  വക#പ 3 (1 ) r/w 13(2)(i) (ii) പ കര  ഈഉതരവ  #ററപട#വ ക#ന#.”

This shows that the detaining authority was well aware that the detenu was in judicial custody. But, according to the detaining authority there was every possibility of the detenu obtaining bail and hence to prevent the detenu on being released from committing further prejudicial activities, he issued Ext.P7 order. Though Section 22(c) of the NDPS Act is also seen referred in crime 396/2022, Manancherry police station, the allegation makes it clear that it was not a case involving commercial quantity of the drug, but only intermediate quantity. The rigour contained in Section 37 (1) (b) of the NDPS Act is applicable only to offences involving commercial quantity. Therefore, the detaining authority was justified in concluding that there was possibility of the detenu obtaining bail in the near future and hence the necessity of Ext.P7 order.

Moreover, the procedural requirements are the only safeguards available to a detenu since the Court is not expected to go behind the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. (Rekha v. State of Tamil Nādu through Secretary to Govt., 2011 (2) SCC (Cri) 596). Therefore, the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority is not open to judicial review. Hence the second challenge raised is also liable to be rejected.

An argument was also advanced that Crime No.396/2022 is a false case registered against the detenu. In the said crime the allegation is that the detenu was in possession of commercial quantity of MDMA. However, the Sessions Court, Alappuzha in Crl.M.P.No.5037/2022 has disbelieved the prosecution case and granted bail to the detenu. Therefore, the prosecution case that the detenu was in possession of commercial quantity of MDMA has turned out to be false. It is on the basis of such a false crime, Ext.P7 order has been passed mechanically by the detaining authority, which is yet another infirmity, contends the detenu.

It is true that as per order dated 19/12/2022 in Crl.M.P.No.5037/2022 the detenu was granted bail as it was found that he was not in possession of commercial quantity of MDMA. But what is required under the relevant provisions of the KAAPA is only registration of a crime involving offence(s) coming either under Section 2(j) or Section 2(t). Here the last prejudicial activity is violation of the provisions of the NDPS Act, which comes under Section 2(j) of the KAAPA. Even if the detenu was not in possession of commercial quantity of MDMA, he continued to be a drug offender in possession of intermediate quantity of MDMA, thus violating the provisions of the NDPS Act. Moreover, it is not in the domain of the detaining authority to make an inquiry as to whether the allegations raised in the crimes are true or whether the detenu has actually committed the crime or whether there is sufficient evidence to conclude that the detenu is guilty (Anithakumari v. State of Kerala, 2015 (4) KLT 632). Therefore, the second challenge raised, is also liable to be rejected.

Now coming to the last argument regarding the non-application of Section 13(2)(i) of the KAAPA to the facts of the case. Sub Section (1) to Section 13 says that a detention order, may at any time, be revoked or modified by the Government. Clause (i) of Sub Section (2) says that the revocation or expiry of a detention order shall not be a bar for the issuance of another detention order against the same person, if he continues to be a person falling within in the definition of known rowdy or known goonda as given in Section 2(o) or Section 2(p) and if after release, he is found to have again involved in an offence of the nature described in Section 2(o) or Section 2(p) at least in one instance. Therefore, the twin conditions to be satisfied for Section 13(2)(i) to be attracted are - (i) the person continues to fall within the definition of a known goonda under Section 2(o) or a known rowdy under Section 2(p) and (ii) if after release he has committed an offence of the nature described in 2(o) or 2(p) at least once.

Admittedly, two detention orders under Section 3(1) had been passed earlier against the detenu. Ext.P1 order dated 04/09/2015 is the first detention order for a period of six months. The detenu served the same also. Subsequently two crimes were registered based on which Ext.P2 detention order dated 25/10/2019 was passed. The respondents could not arrest him for a long period. Hence R1, as per Ext.P3 order dated 10/12/2021 revoked the order on the ground of delay. After the issuance of Ext.P3 revocation order, the fourth respondent (R4) suo motu registered crime 396/2022, Mannancheri police station alleging commission of offences punishable under the NDPS Act and 27 of the Arms Act.

Five crimes have been reckoned for passing Ext.P7 order. They are – (i) Crime No.1460/2017, Alappuzha South Police Station, for the offences punishable under Section 143, 147, 148, 149, 201, 323, 324, 307 IPC ; (ii) Crime No. 538/2019, Mannancheri Police Station, for the offences punishable under Sections 341, 323, 324, 308 and 34 IPC; (iii) Crime No. 374/2021, Kadavanthra Police Station, for the offences punishable under Sections 365, 370, 452, 120(b), 201 and 34 IPC; (iv) Crime No. 1172/2021, Panangad Police Station, for the offences punishable under Sections 341, 294(b), 323, 324, 506, 427, 143, 147 and 149 IPC and (v) Crime 396/2022, Mannancheri Police Station, for the offences punishable under Section 20(b)(ii)(B) of NDPS Act and Section 27 of the Arms Act. The first and the second crimes were taken into consideration for passing Ext.P2, that is, the second order of detention, which was thereafter revoked as per Ext.P3 order. An argument was also advanced that the said two crimes could not have been made the basis of Ext.P7 order. This argument also does not seem to be correct. The cases relied on in an earlier order of detention, which has expired by lapse of the period of detention; or which has not been confirmed under Section 10(4); or which has been set aside by a constitutional Court in judicial review, cannot be relied upon again for the purpose of entertaining the latter subjective satisfaction in a later order of detention. However, the cases which formed the subject - matter of an earlier order of detention can validly be considered for arriving at the objective satisfaction that a person is a known rowdy or known goonda. (Stalin C.V. v. State of Kerala, 2011(1) KHC 852). Therefore, the said two crimes can also be taken into account for arriving at the objective satisfaction as to whether the detenu falls within the definition of a known-goonda or a known rowdy.

It was pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner that Ext.P7 order says that the detenu has been declared to be a 'known rowdy' under 2 (p) (iii) read with Section 2 (t)(i)(ii) and so Ext.P7 order is being passed under Section 3(1) read with Section 13(2)(i) and (ii). The last prejudicial activity is an offence coming under Section 2(j). In such circumstances Ext.P7 order declaring him as a known rowdy could never have been passed. In reply to the said allegation, R1 in paragraph 9, 10 and 11 of the counter contends-

“9. There are a minimum of 3 cases registered under IPC that will come under its Chapters XVI, XVII and XXII and are largely affecting the life and properties of people of the locality. The punishment prescribed for the offences charged against the detenu is for a period of more than one year. None of the cases falls under the proviso of Class (i) to (vi) of Section 2(p) of the Act. The detenu comes under the category i.e., Section 2(p)(iii) of the Act, because the cases involved by the detenu are criminal cases wherein the detenu was found, on investigation, by a competent police officer or other authority on complaints initiated by any persons other than police officers in more than three separate instances not forming part of the same transactions, to have committed offences mentioned in Clause (t) of Section 2 of the Act. So the detenu is a Known Rowdy under section 2 (p) (iii) r/w 2(t)(i) & (ii) of the Act.

Apart from this, the detenu involved in an offence registered under the NDPS Act which will attract Section 2(j) and 2(o) of the Act. ........................

Explanations to Section 2(o) of the Act will make it clear that an instance of an offence which satisfies conditions specified in the definition of known rowdy can also be taken into consideration as an instance along with other cases for deciding whether detenu is a known goonda or not. It is already found that the detenu is a known rowdy based on 4 crime cases registered under IPC. The said instances can also be taken into account to define the detenu to be a known goonda. Crime No. 396/2022 of Mannancherry Police is the case against the detenu for the offences under the NDPS Act. The allegation in this case is that the detenu and co- accused were found in possession of Methylene Dioxy Metha Amphetamine (MDMA) in a Innova car bearing No. KL-04-AR-0014 and seizure mahazar was prepared in the presence of independent civil witnesses. Therefore he will come under the category of a drug offender as defined u/s 2(i). Even if the complaint was initiated by police officer, this case can be reckoned since the seizure mahazar was made in the presence of independent civil witnesses. The definition of 'goonda' shows that to become a 'goonda' the person concerned must be a person who indulges in any anti-social activity or promotes or abets any illegal activity which is harmful for the maintenance of the public order directly or indirectly. The definition of 'goonda' also includes several categories like bootlegger, counterfeiter etc., and it includes a 'rowdy as well. On a close reading of the definitions of 'anti-social activity, 'goonda', 'known goonda 'rowdy' and 'known rowdy, it is clear that a person who satisfies the definition of 'rowdy' also becomes a 'goonda' provided he indulges in any anti-social activity or promotes or abets any illegal activity which is harmful for the maintenance of public order directly or indirectly. If a 'rowdy' as defined in S.2(t) indulges in any such activity, he becomes a 'goonda' If such a 'goonda' involved in two such instances, he becomes a 'known goonda' Hence, the detenu can also be considered as a 'known goonda'. The detenu was a person who indulged in committing robbery and also inflicted injury to the victims by using dangerous weapons. Here the detenu comes under the definition of both "Known Goonda" and "Known Rowdy" The Detaining Authority rightly classified the detenu as a Known Rowdy. Hence the first requirement for preventive detention u/s 3(1) of the Act was satisfied."

Therefore the contention of the respondents is that the detenu falls within the definitions of both 'Known goonda' as well as 'Known rowdy'.

After Ext.P2 order was passed and before the revocation of the said order by Ext.P3, the detenu is alleged to have committed two more crimes, i.e., crime no.(iii) and (iv) referred to herein above. The aforesaid four crimes and the last crime, i.e., crime No.396/2022 has been made the basis for passing Ext.P7 order. Except the last prejudicial activity, all the other crimes involve commission of offences under IPC. Section 2(j) reads-

"goonda" means a person who indulges in any anti-social activity or promotes or abets any illegal activity which are harmful for the maintenance of the public order directly or indirectly and includes a bootlegger, a counterfeiter, a depredator of environment, a digital data and copy right pirate, a drug offender, an hawala racketeer, an hired ruffian, rowdy, an immoral traffic offender, a loan shark or a property grabber.”

A 'known goonda', defined in Section 2(o) reads-

"known goonda" means a goonda who had been, for acts done within the previous seven years as calculated from the date of the order imposing any restriction or detention under this Act, -

(i) found guilty, by a competent Court or authority at least once for an offence within the meaning of the term 'goonda' as defined in clause (j) of section 2; or

(ii) found in any investigation or enquiry by a competent police officer, authority or competent Court on complaints initiated by persons other than police officers, in two separate instances not forming part of the same transaction, to have committed any act within the meaning of the term 'goonda' as defined in clause (j) of Section 2.

Provided that an offence in respect of which a report was filed by a Police Officer before a lawful authority consequent to the seizure, in the presence of witnesses, of alcohol, spirit, counterfeit notes, sand, forest produce, articles violating copyright, narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, or currency involved in hawala racketeering may be included for consideration though the report had resulted from an action initiated by a police officer.

Explanation. - An instance of an offence involving a person, which satisfies the conditions specified in the definition of known rowdy referred to in clause (p) of section 2 can also be taken into consideration as an instance, along with other cases, for deciding whether the person is a known goonda or not.”

It is true that the last prejudicial activity or crime has been initiated or registered suo motu by the police. However, the proviso to Section 2(o) says that an offence in respect of which a report has been filed by a police officer before a lawful authority consequent to the seizure in the presence of witnesses, of alcohol, narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances etc. may be included for consideration though the report had resulted from an action initiated by a police officer.

The contention of the respondents contained in the counter affidavit hereinabove referred to is squarely against what has been held by a Division Bench of this Court in Sailaja v. State of Kerala, 2010 (1) KHC 457 . It has been held that to justify an order of detention under S.3 of the KAAPA it is not enough if a person is a goonda or a rowdy. He must be a known goonda as defined under S.2(o) or a known rowdy as defined under S.2(p). Only a goonda or a rowdy who answers the definition of 'known goonda' or ' known rowdy' can be visited with a valid order of detention under S.3. It therefore assumes significance that a person who falls within the sweep of the expression 'goonda' or 'rowdy' alone can be classified as a 'known goonda' or a 'known rowdy' under S.2(o) and S.2(p) of the KAAPA. Only if they fall within the sweep of S.2(o) and S.2(p) can they be ordered to be preventively detained under S.3. Finding by a competent Police Officer on investigation that a person has committed two offences / acts within the meaning of the term 'goonda' in S.2(j) would bring such person within the sweep of the expression 'known goonda' under S.2(o)(ii); but to bring him within the sweep of the expression 'known rowdy' under S.2(p) (iii), there must be not two but three instances of such commission of offences under S.2(t). Where a person is not found guilty or found in investigation to have committed any non 2(t) offences, the mere fact that he has committed 2(t) offences, whatever be the number, cannot bring him within the sweep of the expression 'known goonda' under S.2(o)(ii). This conclusion is inevitable considering the broad scheme of the Act and the deprivation and frustration of the advantage of S.2(p)(iii) and provisos 1 to 6 for a rowdy if he were permitted to be classified as a known goonda under S.2(o) on the ground that he has committed 2(t) offences only. Further, referring to the Explanation to section 2(o), it has been held that, a plain reading of the same clearly shows that an instance of an offence which satisfies the definition of 2(p) 'can also be taken into consideration' as an instance 'along with other cases' for deciding whether the person is a known goonda or not. Plain language suggests that this explanation must be read as a proviso to S.2(o)(ii). This does not permit reckoning of the instance of a 2(t) offence as one under S.2(o)(ii) to attract the definition of known goonda. But such an instance can also be taken into consideration if it satisfies the other requirements of S.2(p). Such an instance can also be taken into consideration along with other cases. The same cannot by itself be taken into consideration. The Explanation only facilitates the reckoning of a 2(t) offence satisfying the requirements of S.2(p) also along with other 'non 2(t) cases' under S.2(o). The explanation ensures that the benefit of the provisos 1 to 6 shall be available to such persons even when one such instance along with other cases is taken into reckoning under S.2(o)(ii). S.2(p) and S.2(o) read along with the explanation can never lead a Court to the conclusion that where no non 2(t) offences are alleged, 2 or more offences under S.2(t) can be taken into consideration under S.2(o)(ii).

In the case on hand, crime no.(v) or the last prejudicial activity is an offence falling under Section 2(j). But to be a known goonda under Section 2(o)(ii), the commission of two offences of the nature referred to in Section 2(j) is a must, which criteria is not satisfied in the case on hand. In the light of the dictum in Sailaja (Supra) the contention of the respondents that the detenu falls within the definition of 'known goonda' is not correct.

Now coming to the definition of ‘Rowdy’ as defined under Section 2(t) and 'known rowdy' in Section 2(p), which reads-

“ 'rowdy' means and includes a person who either by himself or as a member of a gang commits or attempts to commit, or abets the commission of any offences under Sections 153A and 153B of Chapter VIII and Chapters XV, XVI, XVII & XXII of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Central Act 45 of 1860), or any offences under the provision of the Arms Act, 1959 (Central Act 54 of 1959), or the

(i) punishable with five or more years of imprisonment of any type,

or, (ii) with less than five years of imprisonment of any type, except those punishable with less than one year of imprisonment, or

(iii) such offence under any other law for the time being in force, coming under item (i) or (ii), as may be notified by the Government, from time to time.”

Section 2(p) reads-

“(p) "known rowdy" means any person, who had been, by reason of acts done within the previous seven years as calculated from the date of the order imposing any restriction or detention under this Act,-

(i) made guilty, by a competent court at least once for an offence of the nature under item (i) of clause (t) of section 2 or any offence notified as such under the said clause; or

(ii) made guilty, by a competent court at least twice for any offence of the nature mentioned under item (ii) of clause (t) of section 2 or any offence notified as such under the said clause; or

(iii) found on investigation or enquiry by a competent police officer or other authority, on complaints initiated by persons other than police officers, in three separate instances not forming part of the same transaction to have committed any offence mentioned in clause (t) of section 2:”

In this case, if the first four crimes are taken, the detenu would fall under the definition of a 'known rowdy' as contemplated under Section 2(p)(iii). Therefore, the first limb of Section 13(2) of the KAAPA that the detenu continues to be a person falling within the definition of Section 2(p), is satisfied. The next criteria to be satisfied to attract Section 13(2)(i) is that the detenu after his release has involved in an offence of the nature described in Section 2(o) or Section 2(p) at least once. The last prejudicial activity constitutes an offence contemplated under Section 2(o). Therefore, if the detenu after his release commits an offence of the nature described in Section 2(o) or Section 2(p), then an order under Section 13(2)(i) can be passed. Section 13 does not say that only if a known rowdy commits an offence under Section 2(o), that clause (i) of sub-section (2) could be invoked. When the detenu herein, a known rowdy, after his release committed the last prejudicial activity, which is an offence coming under Section 2(o), the provisions of Section 13(2)(i) would be attracted. Hence arguments to the contrary are liable to be rejected.

In these circumstances, we find no infirmity in Ext.P7 order of detention passed by the detaining authority.

In the result, the writ petition is dismissed.

Interlocutory applications, if any pending, shall stand closed.