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Judgment
27 paragraphs · 663 wordsReilly, J.—The Subordinate Judge has found that the defendants 1 to 3 as a firm owed money to Ramaswami Mudaliar and Mahalinga
Mudaliar as a firm. Ramaswami Mudaliar and Mahalinga Mudaliar dissolved their partnership and divided between them the outstanding debt due
to them from the firm of defendants 1 to 3. After that Ramaswami Mudaliar assigned his share of the debt to plaintiff. Plaintiff, alleging that the
whole debt was Rs. 599-12-o, out of which Ramaswami''s share was Rs. 449-12-0, sued to recover the latter amount with interest. He presented
his plaint without impleading Mahalinga on 6th October, 1922. More than a year later, Mahalinga having died, meanwhile, he added Mahalinga''s
representative as defendant 4 on 1st December, 1923. By that date, it is admitted, the claim against the firm of defendants 1 to 3 would have been
barred by limitation. The Subordinate Judge holding that Mahalinga or his representative was a necessary party and that therefore the suit was not
properly instituted until 1st Decejmber, 1923, has found that the suit is barred by limitation. Plaintiff in this petition objects to that finding.
It appears that, when defendant 4 was added as Mahalinga''s representative, he stated that Mahalinga''s share of the debt, viz., Rs. 150, had
been paid to him. It is urged for plaintiff that in those circumstances he was competent tc.sue alone for the balance] of the debt. The answer to this
is that until Mahalinga''s representative was brought on record there was no suggestion that the suit was for the whole unpaid balance. Another
argument urged for plaintiff by Mr. Ananta Aiyar is that, even if this statement that Mahalinga received payment of his share must be disregarded
for the present purpose, under Rule 4 of Order 30, Civil Procedure Code, Ramaswami as surviving partner of his firm, and therefore plaintiff as
Ramaswami''s assignee, could sue alone for the whole debt and, if plaintiff chooses to sue for part of it only, the result is merely that he must be
treated under Rule 2 of Order 2, Civil Procedure Code, as having relinquished the remainder. In regard to this contention, it must be noticed that
Mahalinga did not die until after the period of limitation had expired and that apart from that, plaintiff sued as the assignee of part of the debt, not as
representing the firm of Ramaswami and Mahalinga. Mr. Ananta Aiyar further contends that Ramaswami and Mahalinga were entitled to split up
their claim and each sue separately for his own share. That is against the principle of Section 45 of the Contract Act. And it may be noticed that
even in Annapiirnamma v. Akkayya 24 M L J 333 (F B) in which the majority of the Full Bench decided that one joint promisee can by himself
give a valid discharge of the entire debt, it appears to have been assumed and was stated explicitly by Sankaran Nair, J., that, if a suit is brought to
recover a debt due to joint promisees, all of them must be impleaded and the, suit must be for the entire debt. Moreover, when two joint
promisees have divided as between themselves their claim to recover the debt due to them jointly, it is obvious that, if the first sues for his share
without impleading the second, the debtor cannot be protected from a second suit by the second promisee in which it may be denied that the first
promisee is entitled to so much out of the amount of the debt as he has claimed in his suit. In my opinion it is clear that in the present case
Mahalinga or his representative was a necessary party to the suit. As the representative was not brought on record until after the period of
limitation had expired, the whole suit was barred.
It is unnecessary to discuss the effect of not bringing defendants 2 and 3 on record in time. This petition is dismissed with costs.
