Sindhu vs State Of Kerala

Ziyad Rahman A.A, J

The petitioner is the sole accused in C.P.No.21 of 2018 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate-I, Mavelikkara, which arises from Crime No.594 of 2015 of Mavelikkara Police Station. The offence alleged against the petitioner is under Section 306 of IPC.

Crux of the allegation in this case is as follows:- The petitioner made a false representation that she was impregnated by one Arun S.Kumar and by highlighting the said impregnation she had threatened the said Arun with dire consequences if he is not marrying her or compensating her monetarily. As a result of said threat, the said Arun committed suicide by hanging on 25.04.2015 at about 10.30 am inside his room at his house.

Initially the police has registered Crime No.594 of 2015 for unnatural death under Section 174 Cr.P.C. The First Information Statement did not contain any allegation of offence and there was no whisper as to the involvement of the petitioner herein. Later, after completion of the investigation, the police submitted Annexure-A final report, wherein the petitioner was arrayed as an accused and the offence under Section 306 IPC was charged with the above allegations. This Crl.M.C is filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C to quash all further proceedings pursuant to Annexure-A final report on the ground that the contents of Annexure-A charge sheet, even if is accepted for its face value, would not constitute an offence under Section 306 IPC.

Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Public Prosecutor.

The learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that the only allegation against the petitioner is that she made a threat to the deceased to the effect that the deceased had impregnated her and even if it is accepted to be true, the same would not attract offence under Section 306 IPC. The learned counsel relies on the judgments in S.S.Chheena v. Vijay Kumar Mahajan and Another [(2010)12 SCC 190] and Cyriac v. S.I of Polcie [2005 (3) KLT 673].

According to the learned counsel, the contents of Annexure-A charge sheet would not reveal the intention of the accused to form a mens rea so as to attract the offence under Section 306 IPC. The learned counsel strongly relies upon the observations made by the Honourable Supreme Court in S.S.Chheena (supra) wherein it was observed as follows:

"28. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. The intention of the legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by this court is clear that in order to convict a person under S.306 IPC there has to be clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also require an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and that act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he committed suicide."

In Cyriac (supra) a learned Judge of this Court observed in paragraph Nos.17 and 18 as follows:

"17. From the discussion already made by me, I hold as follows: The act or conduct of the accused, however insulting and abusive those may be, will not by themselves suffice to constitute abetment of commission of suicide, unless those are reasonably capable of suggesting that the accused intended by such acts consequence of suicide. Even if the words uttered by the accused or his conduct in public are sufficient to demean or humiliate the deceased and even to drive him to suicide, such acts will not amount to instigation or abetment of commission of suicide, unless it is established that the accused intended by his acts, consequence of a suicide. It is not enough if the acts of the accused cause persuasion in the mind of the deceased to commit suicide.

An indirect influence or an oblique impact which the acts or utterances of the accused caused or created in the mind of the deceased and which drove him to suicide will not be sufficient to constitute offence of abetment of suicide. A fatal impulse or an ill-fated thought of the deceased, however unfortunate and touchy it may be, cannot unfortunately, touch the issue. Those cannot fray the fabric of the provision contained in section 306 IPC. In short, it is not what the deceased `felt', but what the accused 'intended' by his act which is more important in this context. Of course, the deceased's frail psychology which forced him to the suicide also may become relevant, but it is only after establishing the requisite intention of accused."

It is true that, as per the above principles, there must be some positive act on the part of the accused, with mens rea, and such act must have compelled the accused to commit suicide. However, the factual circumstances in the above judgments are completely different, from this case. In S.S.Chheena (supra) the Honourable Supreme Court was considering a case in which a student committed suicide, against whom an allegation of theft of mobile phone was raised. The accused therein, a security officer of the college was entrusted with the task of conducting an inquiry relating to the allegation against the deceased student. Suicide was in the course of such inquiry and it was due to the apprehension of the deceased as to the outcome of inquiry . It is evident from the facts in the above case that, the petitioner accused therein was only carrying out the responsibilities entrusted upon him by conducting such an inquiry. It was in that circumstance, aforesaid observations were made by the Honourable Supreme Court.

In the case of Cyriac (supra), this Court was considering the case of a suicide made by a person; when a creditor of the deceased asked for the repayment of the amount which the deceased borrowed from him. As the deceased could not repay the same, some remarks were made by the petitioner/ accused therein which apparently caused pain in the mind of the deceased and it ultimately lead to his suicide. In both the above cases, the accused were acting with bona fides and the transactions which ultimately resulted in the suicide, were those occurred in normal course of relationship between the parties. To be precise, the actions complained of, were ordinary transactions, which would not have, under normal circumstances, resulted in suicide.

However, factual scenario in this case is completely different. On going through the charge sheet it is evident that CW7 and CW8 who are parents of the deceased have clearly mentioned about the threat put forward by the accused to the deceased immediately before his death. It was specifically stated by the aforesaid witnesses that she made a false allegation of impregnation against the deceased and the deceased was also threatened with dire consequences if he is not marrying her or not paying adequate compensation for the same. The presence of the petitioner along with the deceased was clearly revealed from the statements made by the aforesaid witnesses. It is also discernible that the petitioner was not actually pregnant as well. In such circumstances, it is evident that it was a case of raising a false allegation that she was impregnated by the deceased. Such kind of a threat cannot be treated at par with a statement or action taken, with bonafides. It cannot be treated as a conversation arose in the ordinary course of relationship of the parties also, particularly because it reveals an intention to induce the person concerned to part with some amount, with the aid of a false allegation of impregnation. Further, the nature of circumstances under which the threat as revealed through statements of CW7 and CW8 were made, is yet another relevant aspect to be taken into consideration for deciding the question of involvement of the petitioner, which is also a matter of evidence.

In such circumstances, I do not think that this is a matter which can be considered in a proceeding under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. In other words, the contention of the petitioner with regard to the absence of any intention on the part of the petitioner while making the statements as alleged in the charge sheet, can be considered only on the basis of evidence. In my view, the materials now available before me leads to the conclusion that a prima facie case is made out.

In such circumstances, I do not find any grounds to consider the relief sought for by the petitioner by invoking Section 482 Cr.P.C and accordingly it is dismissed. However, it is made clear that, findings in this order, are prima facie in nature and are intended only for the consideration of the petition under section 482 of Cr.P.C. The petitioner shall be at liberty to raise all his contentions before the trial court, which shall be considered by the trial court in accordance with law, untrammeled by any of the observations made herein.