Sirigiri Venkatarao vs Vaddi Pullamma and Others

Umamaheswaram, J.—This Second Appeal raises an interesting question of law. In order to appreciate the question, it is necessary to. set out a few relevant, facts. Rangayya executed a promissory note dated 22nd July, 1945, in favour of the Plaintiff. He died leaving behind two minor sons, Defendants 1 and 2 and his second wife, the 3rd Defendant. The 2nd Defendant is the son by his second wife, the 3rd Defendant. On 21st July, 1948, the 3rd Defendant for herself and as guardian of Defendants 1 and 2 made a payment of Rs. 4 and endorsed it on the promissory note, The point that arises for consideration is, whether the payment made by her-operates as a valid payment u/s 20 of the Indian Limitation Act as to bind the first Defendant the son of Rangayya by his first wife.

Section 20(1) of the Limitation Act provides that if a payment is made on account of a debt before the expiration of the prescribed period by the person liable to pay the debt, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the payment was made. It is contended on behalf of the Appellant by Sri G. Venkatarama Sastry that the third Defendant who acquired an interest in the Hindu joint family property u/s 3 (2) of the Hindu Women''s Rights to Property Act (18 of 1937J is not a person liable to pay the debt and that the payment made by her does not consequently furnish a fresh starting point.

It is therefore necessary to examine the nature of the right conferred on a Hindu widow under the provisions of the Hindu Women''s Rights to Property Act. Section 3(2) provides that on the death of a Hindu governed by any school of Hindu Law other than the Dayabhag school or by customary law having at the time of his death an interest in r Hindu joint family property, his widow shall, subject to the provisions of Sub-section (3) have in the property the same interest as he himself had. Sub-section (3) enacts that the interest taken by her shall be the limited interest known as a Hindu " Woman''s estate and that she shall also have the "same" right of claiming partition as a the owner.

The interest which she therefore acquires under the Act is a right to a share-in the property subject to the payment of debts.

In Movva Subba Rao and Another Vs. Movva Krishna Prasadam by Padyala Muthaiya and Another, , a Bench of the Madras High Court held that S. 3 (2) of, the-Act does not operate as severance of interest of the deceased co-parcener, that the right which a widow gets under that section is not as heir of her deceased husband and that it is a statutory right based on the recognition of the principle that a widow is the surviving half of her deceased husband. This decision was approved by the Full Bench in Parappa alias Hanumanthappa and Another Vs. Nagamma and Others, . .

At page 255 (of MLJ): (at. 579 of AIR), it was observed that the widow would have during her life time all the powers which her husband had save that her interest was limited to a widow''s interest and that she could alienate her widow''s interest in her husband''s share for necessity or other binding purposes. In Saradambal Vs. S. Subbarama Aiyar, , Venkataramana Rao J., held that a creditor was entitled to attach in execution the interest taken by the widow for the debt of her husband. The relevant observations are at page 865 (of Mad LJ): (at p. 213 of AIR), and are as follows:

If for instance an undivided member dies leaving a son and also his widow, the property would devolve upon both of them and tough, so far as the widow is concerned, her interest is limited no such limitation can be placed upon the interest taken by the son. It cannot be said that the interest of the son is attachable but not that of the widow. The fact that a right of partition is conferred upon the widow goes to show that the property is taken by her subject to all the rights and liabilities which the husband would have had because it is the same interest that is conferred upon her. Therefore giving the language its plain meaning, the property taken by her must be held to be liable for the payment of her husband''s debts and is liable to be attached by the Plaintiff.

From those observations, it is clear that the widow who is entitled to a share in the property is also liable to pay the debts. This decision was followed by the Patna High Court in Siveshwar Prasad Narain Singh and Others Vs. Lata Harnarain Mal Bahal, , and approved by the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Parappa alias Hanumanthappa and Another Vs. Nagamma and Others, . I am therefore clear that the widow, who acquires an interest under the provisions of the Hindu Women''s Rights to Property Act is also a person liable to pay the debts of the deceased Hindu and that a payment made by her furnishes a fresh starting point u/s 20 (1) of the Limitation Act:

The decision in Murikipudi Satyanarayanacharlu v. Madanamchedu Narasamma, 1943 2 Mad LJ 282: ftUR 1943 Mad 708) (E), does not in any way affect this conclusion. What was held by Hor-will J., in that case was that in spite of the death of her husband, the widow and her son continued as members of a Hindu joint family, that the son was entitled to file a suit for recovery of the debt due to the joint family and that the suit was not bad for1 the nonlinear of the widow. Similarly in the The Indian Leaf Tobacco Development Ltd. Vs. K. Kotayya and Others, , I held that (lie undivided interest of the deceased cannot be regarded as "effects of the deceased person" so as to attract the terms of Section 214 of the Succession Act. At page 33, (of Andhra LT): flat p. 136 of AIR) pointed out that

a reading of Clause (2) and (3) of Section 3 of Hindu Women''s Rights to Property Act makes it clear that, until the widow claims partition, the family continues joint and she is entitled only to the interest which her deceased husband had.

I only wish to add in the present case that the interest which she takes is subject to payment of debts and that she is consequently a person liable to pay the debts of her husband. In that view there can be no doubt that the terms of Section 20 of the Limitation Act apply. It is not disputed by Sri Venkatarama Sastry that if she is a person liable to pay the debt the payment is valid and binding upon the first Defendant. I therefore confirm the finding of the lower appellate Court and hold that the decree passed against the Appellant is not liable to be set aside. The Second Appeal consequently fails, and is dismissed with costs. Leave granted.