Sita Rani Gupta vs State of Haryana

G.R. Majithia, J.—This judgment disposes of Civil Writ Petitions No. 2130 of 1982, 3370 of 1980 and 1968 of 1981 and 666 of 1981 since common questions is of law and facts are involved therein.

Reference to the relevant facts for resolving disputed questions of facts has been made from the pleadings of C.W.P. No. 2130 of 1982.

The petitioner was allotted residential plot No. 1229, Sector 7, Faridabad under the provisions of the Punjab Urban Estates (Development and Regulation) Act, 1964 (for short, the Act). She deposited the entire sale consideration. She did not construct the house on that plot within the extended time notice was issued to her to show cause why the plot be not resumed. She filed reply to the notice. After going through the reply, respondent No. 3 permitted her to construct the house upto April 30, 1977. Act was repealed and Haryana Urban Development Authority Act, 1977 (for short, 1977 Act) came into force. Respondent No. 3, vide order dated June 15, 1978, resumed the plot and forfeited the sale price. This order was passed without any notice to the petitioner. The petitioner preferred an appeal against the resumption order before respondent No. 4. In the petition, it is also stated that plots No. 1148 to 1163, 1196, 1197, 1209, 1210, 1215, 1216, 1217, 1222, 1226, 1227, 1228, 1232, 1233, 1235, 1264, 1265 are lying vacant in this Sector and houses have not been constructed thereon. The appeal was rejected.

3A. Written statement has been filed on behalf of respondents No. 1 to 4. Preliminary objection has been taken that the building was not constructed within a period of three years as enjoined by rule 14 of the Punjab Urban Estates (Sale of Sites) Rules, 1966 (for short, the Rules). Condition No. 11 of the allotment letter also enjoins that the construction of the building has to be completed within the time allowed. It is also asserted that the writ petition is not maintainable, since the dispute purely arises out of the contractual obligation. It is, however, not denied that notice under the 1977 Act for resumption of the plot was not issued to the petitioner. The allegation in the petition that large number of residential plots are lying vacant in the same Sector on which construction has not been raised and those have not been resumed is not controverted.

Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that since the petitioner had paid full sale consideration, the plot could not be resumed for not raising construction thereon within the period allowed under the Rules. He further submitted that resumption in a sense amounts to divestiture of title of the owner and, therefore, it should be resorted to in the rarest of the rare cases. This harsh step should not be taken in order to regulate the planned development of the city. There appears to be substance in this submission of the learned Counsel. The Rules provide that the allottee should construct the building within the period allowed. Failure to do so does amount to violation of the Rules. The allottee deserves to be penalised for his inaction. The respondents have recently devised a policy prescribing the payment of fees for extension of time for raising the construction. The purpose of the policy is that the allottees must be kept alert that he is to raise the construction as enjoined by the Rules, and in case he fails to do so, he is to pay penalty and fee for grant of extension of time for raising construction. The new policy appears to have been framed to avoid the harsh action which was being invoked before framing the new policy of ordering resumption. The order of resumption is, thus, not justified.

Resumption of the plot was ordered under Section 8 of the Capital of Punjab (Development and Regulation) Act, 1952. The action was challenged by way of a writ petition in this Court and the matter was referred to a Full Bench, which finally disposed of the case and the judgment is reported as Shri Ram Puri v. The Chief Commissioner, Chandigarh, 1982 PLR 388. It was held thus :

"There is no manner of doubt that resumption in the sense of divestiture of title would be the ultimate civil sanction in the armoury of the authorities to effectuate the twin purpose of a regulated and planned development as also the expeditious creation of the capital city in the State. It bears repetition that the power of resumption is the ultimate civil sanction and must, therefore, be a weapon of last resort. Inevitably it should be used with great caution and circumspection."

This judgment was followed by my learned brother M.R. Agnihotri, J. in Brij Bhushan v. The Union Territory Administration, Chandigarh and others, 1987 PLJ 213 : 1987 RRR 286.

The new policy which prescribes fee/penalty for grant of extension of time for constructing the building on the residential plot had not been produced at the time of hearing. Reference to the same, was made in Civil Writ Petition No 4617 of 1986 Prem Parkash Ranguballa v. Chief Administrator, HUDA etc. wherein it was held thus :

"The learned counsel appearing for the respondents states that subject to the condition that the petitioner agrees to follow the new policy for making payment of the prescribed extension fee, they are prepared to withdraw the impugned resumption order and the penalty imposed by them and to deliver the possession of the land to the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner states that he agrees to the aforesaid offer made by the learned counsel for the respondents."

The order of resumption, thus, cannot be sustained. The appellate order passed by respondent No. 4 upholding the resumption order has also to be set aside.

For the reasons above, these writ petitions are allowed and the orders of resumption and the orders passed by the appellate authority rejecting the appeals of the petitioners against the resumption orders are quashed. The petitioners will construct the house within one year from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. If he/she is unable to construct the house within the time allowed, he/she will move for extension of time under the policy decision referred to in C.W.P. No. 4617 of 1986. The competent officer will grant the extension if the plot holder complies with the conditions for grant of extension of time. There will be no order as to costs.