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Judgment
36 paragraphs · 803 wordsGovinda Menon, J.—This appeal has to be allowed and the ''ex parte'' decree set aside. What happened was that the third defendant, who
is the appellant before us was said to have been served by substituted service and the learned Judge, therefore, held that that was sufficient service
of notice on him. Thereafter the suit was decreed ''ex parte''. An application by the third defendant to set aside the decree was dismissed by the
successor of the learned Judge following the decisions of this Court in - ''Shariba Beeby v. Abdul Salam'', AIR 1928 Mad 815 (A) to the effect
that if substituted service is effected under Rule 20, Order 5 such service is effectual as if it had been made on the defendant personally and
therefore such service must be deemed to be effective service within the meaning of the expression in Article 164 of the Limitation Act. In that
case, the learned Judge referred to earlier decisions in - ''Doraiswami Ayyar v. Bala-sundaram Ayyar'', AIR 1927 Mad 507 (B) and -- K.B.
Narasimha Chettiar Vs. K.P. Balakrishna Chetty, .
But the trend of decisions subsequent to this is exemplified in - Gyanammal Vs. Abdul Hussain Sahib, and - P.V.M. Muhaidin Kader Meera Sahib
Maraikkayar Vs. P.L.S. Lakshmanan Chettiar and Others, , which are to the con trary effect. In the earlier case, Reilly and Ananthakrishna Aiyar
JJ. have held that sub stituted service cannot always be deemed to be due service within the meaning of Article 164 of the Limitation Act or Rule
13, Order 9 of the Civil P. C. Due service within the meaning of those sections is not service which is technically and formally correct as basis for
proceeding ''ex parte'' but service which has been effective and which has achieved the object of service by bringing the claim against him to the
know ledge of the defendant or respondent. To the same effect is the decision in - P.V.M. Muhaidin Kader Meera Sahib Maraikkayar Vs. P.L.S.
Lakshmanan Chettiar and Others, ''.
We have, therefore, to see whether on the facts of this case, the third defendant had known about the filing of the suit & the existence of the
proceeding against him in Coimbatore Sub-Court. The first notice was taken to him on 19-2-1946 at Bombay where he was employed in the
Government Medical Stores in Byculla. The return of the bailiff was that when notice was taken to the third defendant at 11-15 A.M. he was not
found. On enquiry with the Superintendent of the Government Medical Stores, the bailiff came to know that the third defendant was transferred to
Raichur in the Government Medical Stores. Hence the summons was returned.
Even though this fact must have been brought to the notice of the Court which issued the summons, and thereby to the plaintiff, a further notice
was taken to the third defendant to the same address. How the plaintiff could have taken a notice to the same address when the return was that he
had been transferred from the Government Medical Stores, Byculla passes one''s comprehension. We do not find any endorsement on this
summons. Thereafter the plaintiff filed an application for issuing substituted service and the affidavit in support of that application is really very
vague and contains allegations which on the face of it cannot be said to be true. What he states is:
Though several summonses were issued in this suit to defendants 1 to 3 through Court and by post, the said defendants could not be served in
person. Though the defendants 1 to 3 in the suit are residing in their native village they go outside very often.
It is plain that the third defendant did not live permanently in his native village, but was employed in Government Medical Stores in various parts of
the country.
On this affidavit the Subordinate Judge ordered substituted service and by publication in one issue of the ""Hindu"" of 16-10-1946. A further
affidavit dated 17-9-1946 by the plaintiff is to the effect, that the third defendant was not a cashier in the Medical Stores at Bombay and also that
he never joined the Military service. This also on the face of it is false. In these circumstances we cannot take the substituted service by the
publication in the one issue of the ""Hindu"" as proper service. So the third defendant did not know about the filing of the suit, nor was notice served
on him as contemplated under Article 164 of the Limitation Act. He had therefore sufficient cause for not appearing when the suit was taken up for
hearing. The ''ex parte'' order is set aside and the suit will be remanded to the lower Court to be tried on the merits. The appellant will have his
costs from the plaintiff-respondent.
