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Judgment
M. Srinivasan, C.J.—The writ petition is directed against the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Kullu in case No. 19 of 1994-95 registered on a complaint made by the 3rd Respondent herein. The land in question was granted to the predecessor-in interest of the Petitioners under H.P. Grant of Nautor Land to Landless Persons and other Eligible Persons Scheme, 1975. Four items of land were given by the Government under the said Scheme. The present dispute relates only to Khasra No. 5296, measuring 0 14 bighas. Admittedly, the Petitioners had transferred that land on exchange and sale to other persons as the land which was granted to the Petitioners was not yielding such income as would be necessary for the needs of the family It was because of such transfer of land by exchange and sale that the complaint was made by the 3rd Respondent. He had also alleged that the transfer took place with the collusion of some of the Revenue Officers. We are not concerned with that part of the allegation. The Deputy Commissioner after enquiry passed an order dated 2-6-1995 holding that the restriction imposed in paragraph 11 of the Scheme has been violated by the Petitioners and the land should be resumed by the Government as per the said paragraph. It is that order which is challenged in this writ petition.
Four contentions are raised by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners. Firstly, Paragraph 11 does not give a right of resumption to the Government as such and the resumption in this case is illegal. We are unable to accept this contention, as the language of Paragraph 11 is very clear. According to the said paragraph, the grantee shall not transfer the land to any person within the period of 20 years from the date of taking possession of the land by him. In this case it is stated that the grant was made in 1984 and at that time the period prescribed in Paragraph 11 was only 15 years. The relevant facts as regards the rule applicable on the date are not very clear. However, there is no dispute that the transfer was made within a period of 8 years from the date of grant. Whether the period of 15 years was applicable to the grant made to the Petitioners'' predecessor or the period of 20 years was applicable, it is irrelevant in this case. In either event the transfer is made within the period prohibited. Hence the State Government has got the right to resume the land.
The second contention is that the restriction imposed in Paragraph 11 will be applicable to the grantee and not to his successors-in interest. There is no merit in this contention. The Petitioners claim the property only as heirs of the grantee. Whatever restriction was applicable to the grantee will naturally apply to the legal heirs also. If the contention is accepted logically, the Petitioners will not be entitled to the land and it has to revert back to the Government. Hence the contention is rejected.
Third argument is that the expression ''transfer'' used in Paragraph 11 will not include transaction of exchange. There is no merit in this contention. It is elementary law of transfer that exchange is also a transfer in the eye of law.
Fourth contention is that the exchange and sales have been effected by the Petitioners only on account of necessity for family needs and not with a view to make any profit. It is argued that the object of the scheme will not be defeated by such transfer and in those cases there shall be no restriction. We are unable to accept this contention. Paragraph 11 is very clear under which any transfer by the grantee is prohibited. Hence this contention is also rejected.
In the result, we do not find any substance in the writ petition. Consequently it is dismissed.
C.M.P. No. 9798 of 1995:
In view of the dismissal of the writ petition, the C. M. P. is also dismissed. The interim stay granted on 19-10-1995 is vacated.