AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
H.N. Nagamohan Das, J.—In this writ petition the petitioner has prayed for a writ in the nature of certiorari to quash the judgment dated 21.03.2009 in LAC No. 267/2004 passed by the Principal Civil Judge (Senior Division), Bangalore Rural district.
Under the provisions of the National Highways Authority of India Act, 1988 (for short the Act''), the National Highway Authority of India (for short the Authority'') was constituted. The object of the Authority is to develop, maintain and manage the national highways. The Authority had taken up the development of National Highway No. 4 connecting from Chennai to Mumbai. As a part of development of national highway No. 4 the Authority notified lands in survey No. 94/1 measuring 4 guntas, survey No. 84/2 measuring 1? guntas and survey No. 94/3 measuring ?gunt situated Sompura Village, Nelamangala taluk, Bangalore district. An award came to be passed awarding a compensation of Rs. 20,32,931/ in respect of the lands and buildings. In the course of enquiry the first respondent received claims and objections from the petitioner and respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4. The dispute landed before this Court in W.P. No. 44750/2003. This Court disposed the writ petition directing the respondent No. 1 to decide who is entitled for compensation, as provided u/s 3(H)(3) of the Act or in the event if there is any dispute regarding apportionment of compensation to refer the matter to the Civil Court as provided u/s 3(H)(4) of the Act. The first respondent referred the dispute between the parties to the Principal Civil Judge (Senior Division) Bangalore Rural District to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and the same came to be numbered as LAC No. 267/2004. Before the reference Court the contesting parties filed their claim statements. The parties examined four witnesses as P.W.1 to P.W.4 and got marked Ex.P.1 to Ex.P.72. The reference Court after hearing arguments and on appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence passed the impugned judgment rejecting the claim of petitioner and allowing the claim of respondent Nos. 2 to 4. Aggrieved by the impugned judgment passed by the reference Court the petitioner is before this Court.
Learned Counsel for the contesting respondents raised preliminary objection with regard to the maintainability of the writ petition. On the question of maintainability arguments are heard.
It is necessary to extract Section 3(H)(4) of the Act, which is relevant for the purpose of this case. The same is as under:
(4) If any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the amount or any part thereof or to any person to whom the same or any part thereof is payable, the competent authority shall refer the dispute to the decision of the principal civil Court of original jurisdiction within the limits of whose jurisdiction the land is situated.
The Civil Court passed the impugned judgment on the reference made by the first respondent. The question therefore is, whether the judgment of the Civil Court on a reference u/s 3(H)(4) of the Act is a decree within the meaning of Section 2(2) of CPC. Sub-section 2(2) of CPC reads as under:
2(2) "decree" means the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to aid or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. It shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint and the determination of any question within Section 144, but shall not include
(a) any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order, or
(b) any order of dismissal for default.
When a reference is made u/s 3(H)(4) of the Act it partakes the nature of a suit. The Civil Court in the course of adjudicating the legal rights of the parties in the dispute has to adjudicate by applying the ordinary civil jurisdiction and Rules of Civil Procedure. The decree means a formal expression of adjudication by which the Court conclusively and finally determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit. The civil Court in the impugned Judgment finally adjudicated the rights of the parties. Therefore the impugned Judgment is a decrees defined u/s 2(2) of the CPC.
The Act do not provide for an appeal against the Judgment of civil Court passed in a reference u/s 3(H)(4) of the Act. Since the impugned Judgment is a decree the same is appellable u/s 96 of CPC.
The Supreme Court in the case of Shiv Kumar Sharma v. Santosh Kumari 2007 (7) SCJ 353 held as under:
Scope and ambit of jurisdiction of the High Court in determining an issue in an appeal filed in terms of Section 96 of the CPC (which would be in continuation of the original suit) and exercising the power of judicial review under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of Lndia would be different while in the former, the Court subject to the procedural flexibility has laid down under the statute is bound to act within the four corners thereof, in adjudicating a lis in exercise of its power of judicial review, the High Court exercise a wider jurisdiction. No doubt, the Court in an appropriate case, even in a civil suit may mould a relief but its jurisdiction in this behalf would be confined to Order VII, Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure. [See Bay Berry Apartments Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. Shobha and Ors. and U.P. State Brassware Corporation Ltd. and Anr. v. Udai Narain Pandey)
Under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court does not issue a writ of certiorari to quash a decree passed by a civil Court Article 227 of the Constitution of India vests the High Courts with power of superintendence which is to be very sparingly exercised to keep the Tribunals and Courts within the bounds of their authority. Such power, however, is not be exercised to correct a mistake of fact and of law. A writ Court, in ordinary course, cannot intervene in a dispute over property rights between private individuals. Writ proceedings are not the appropriate proceedings to interfere with a decree declaring the title in an immovable property between the parties.
For the reasons stated above, I hold that the writ petition is not maintainable and the only remedy to the petitioner is to file an appeal. Reserving liberty to the petitioner to file an appropriate appeal against the impugned judgement, this writ petition is hereby rejected.