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Judgment
M. N. Chandurkar, J.—The petitioner in this case had filed a petition against the tenant, respondent No. 3, on the ground that the tenant had secured alternative accommodation and that the landlord was, therefore, entitled to permission under clause 13 (3) (v) of the C. P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949, hereafter referred to as the Rent Control Order. It may be stated that by an order passed in Special Civil Application No. 1137 of 1966, I have disposed of the petition by the present petitioner against the same tenant, that is, the respondent No 3, in which the petitioner had challenged the orders of the Rent Control authorities rejecting his application under clause 13 (3) (vi) of the Rent Control Order. In the application which was filed by the landlord it was alleged that the tenant had purchased a house bearing Corporation No. 97 in Circle No. 24 which was occupied by one Shri Keki R. Bala in Clarke Town, Nagpur, and that, therefore, the tenant had secured alternative accommodation . This application was also contested by the respondent No. 3, who admitted that he had purchased the said house, but, according to him, the house which was purchased by him was in possession of a tenant who was a Government servant, and therefore, he cannot be said to have secured an alternative accommodation. The Rent Controller by an order passed on 18-10-1964 took the view, which in my opinion was erroneous, that the application under clause 13 (3) (v) of the Rent Control Order was barred by the provisions of clause 13 (9) of the Rent Control Order, because, according to him, the application Bought the same relief which was denied in the application under clause 13(3)(vi) of the Rent Control Order.
This order was appealed against by the landlord and the appellate authority rightly set aside the finding of the Rent Controller that the application was hit by clause 13 (9) of the Rent Control Order. The appellate authority further took the view that before permission is granted under clause 13 (3) (v) to a landlord two conditions must be satisfied, namely, that the tenant has secured alternative accommodation and that he does not reasonably need the house. The appellate Court found that since the house purchased by the tenant was occupied by an allottee and the tenant was residing in that house the requirements of clause 13 (3) (v) were not satisfied. He, therefore, rejected the appeal. The petitioner has now filed this petition challenging the order of the Deputy Collector.
The contention of the learned counsel is that the words "and does not reasonably need the house" in clause 13 (3) (v) of the Rent Control Order only govern the preceding words "has left the area for a continuous period of four months" and that the earlier words, namely, "that the tenant has secured alter native accommodation" must be read disjunctively and in a case where the claim is made on the ground that the tenant has secured an alternative accommodation it is not necessary to find whether the tenant does not reasonably need the house. I am unable to accept this contention. In my view, the words "and does not need reasonably the house" have to be read with both the parts of the clause preceding them. In a case where permission to terminate tenancy is sought on the ground that the tenant has purchased a house it will further have to be shown that the tenant does not reasonably need the house which he has taken on rent. Unless it is shown that a tenant does not reason ably need the landlord''s premises because he has secured alternative accommodation permission to terminate the tenancy of the tenant under clause 13 (3) (v) of the Rent Control Order cannot be granted to the landlord. Construing the clause in any other way and restricting the applicability of the words "and does not reasonably need the house" only to a case where the tenant leaves the area for a continuous period of 4 months is likely to result in serious hardship and injustice in some cases. Accepting the contention of the petitioner would mean that even in a case where house purchased by the tenant is not available for occupation or where the alternative accommodation secured by a tenant is extremely meagre and insufficient having regard to the number of members of the tenant''s family permission under clause 13 (3) (v) could be asked against him. Such does not appear to be the object of clause 13 (3) (v),
The words used in clause 13 (3) (v) are "secured alternative accommodation". There are several meanings of the word "secure". Webster''s dictionary gives the following meanings:
"Secure-
(1) To make safe or secure, to put into a state of safety or security against danger, to to guard effectually, to protect;
(2) To make fast or secure, to fasten as a door;....
(3) To obtain, to gain possession of."
The Chamber''s dictionary amongst the several meanings of the word "secure" refers the word as meaning "to get hold of, to make sure, to make secure possession of.." Having regard to the context viz. the words "additional accommodation" in which the word "secure" is used, in my view, the meaning given in the Webster''s dictionary ''to obtain'' or ''to gain possession of is the sense in which the word is used in clause 13 (3) (v) of the Rent Control Order. It must also be noticed that the accommodation which is contemplated by clause 13 (3) (v) is alternative to the one already in possession of the tenant. Therefore the extent of the accommodation said to have been secured as compared with the present accommodation is also a relevant consideration which must be taken into account while determining the question whether the landlord is entitled to permission under clause 13(3)(v) of the Rent Control Order. It is thus clear that merely because a tenant purchases property which is in the possession of another tenant who cannot be ousted easily in view of the Rent Control Legislation and possession of which cannot be obtained by the landlord so as to occupy those premises, the tenant cannot be said to have secured alternative accommodation within the meaning of clause 13 (3) (v) of the Rent Control Order. It is admitted before me that the litigation between tenant-respondent No. 3 and his tenant has now been pending for more than 3 years and that the premises are still in the occupation of the tenant, though a suit is pending. In such a case it is impossible to hold that the respondent No. 3 has secured an alternative accommodation so as to entitle the landlord to a permission under clause 13 (3) (v) of the Rent Control Order. The order passed by the Deputy Collector is, therefore, just and proper.
The petition is, therefore, rejected with costs.
