Smt. Indira and Others vs Raj Kumar

Ajay Tewari, J.—This petition has been filed against concurrent judgments of the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority allowing the

petition filed by the respondent for evicting the petitioners from the shop in dispute on the ground of personal necessity for the use of his son as an

office for practice as Chartered Accountant. As per the case set up by the respondent, his son had become Chartered Accountant and started his

office in one room of the ground floor of his residential house and, therefore, required the shop in dispute for setting up the office of his son. Both

the Courts below having allowed the eviction petition, the matter, as stated above, is before this Court.

Counsel for the petitioners has argued that in terms of Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1973 (herein

after referred to as ""the Act""), it was mandatory for the respondent to have pleaded that his son was not occupying any other building within the

same urban area and had not vacated it without sufficient cause. As per the counsel, there was no averment in the eviction petition in this regard

because the son of the respondent was occupying a room on the ground floor which was more than sufficient for his office, more-so since in the

area there were many other Chartered Accountants.

Learned counsel for the respondent has argued that the respondent had mentioned in his pleadings the fact that his son had started his office in

one room of the ground floor of the house. He has further argued that in these circumstances it cannot be held to be unreasonable that the

respondent wanted the shop in dispute for that purpose and, therefore, the argument raised by counsel for the petitioner that a specific averment

had to be made is neither here nor there. In this connection, it would be apposite to reproduce the relevant portion of Section 13 of the Act, which

reads as under :-

Eviction of tenants.-(1) xx xx xx

(3) A landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession

(a) in the case of a residential building, if,-

(i) xx xx xx xx

(ii) he requires it for use as an office or consulting room by his son who intends to start practice as a lawyer, qualified architect or chartered

accountant or as a ""registered practitioner"" within the meaning of that expression used in the Punjab Medical Registration Act, 1916, the Punjab

Ayurvedic and Unani Practitioners Act, 1963, or the Punjab Homeopathic Practitioners Act, 1965, or for the residence of his son who is married:

Provided that such son is not occupying in the urban area concerned any other building for use as office, consulting room or residence, as the case

may be, and has not vacated it without sufficient cause after the commencement of the 1949 Act.

As per the learned counsel, it is in terms of the above proviso that a specific averment has to be made.

The question which arises is as to what meaning has to be given to the words `any other building''. As an illustration, if the son of a person is

staying with him and gets married and such person then moves a petition for eviction of a tenant of another premises for the use of his son, it cannot

be said that the son is in occupation of `any other building'' as stipulated in the above mentioned proviso. If that were so, such a landlord would

have no right to evict a tenant because his son has got married and is staying with him in the house. Looked at from that angle, the phrase `any

other building'' can only be made applicable to an independent premises and not, as in the present case, one room in the house. It would be most

unfair if the son of a landlord would not be able to start his practice till the shop is vacated because if he starts his practice in a room of the house,

he would be dis-entitled from seeking the eviction on the ground of personal necessity. Resultantly, I find no fault in the judgments of the Courts

below and consequently dismiss this petition with no order as to costs. However, since the petitioners are using the premises in dispute for

commercial enterprise, I allow them to vacate the premises within three months from today.