Smt. Jai Rani Bhatnagar vs State of U.P. and Others

Sudhir Agarwal, J.—Heard learned Counsel for the Petitioner and perused the record.

The Petitioner retired from the post of Assistant Teacher from Bal Mandir, Nagar Palika Parishad, Shikohabad, District Firozabad in the year 1996. It appears that there was a Writ Petition No. 24703 of 1995 filed by the Petitioner pending before this Court wherein she had claimed right to continue till she attained the age of 60 years and till end of academic session. The aforesaid writ petition was disposed of on 10th September, 1997 observing that the main relief sought in the writ petition has rendered infructuous and this Court issued the following directions:

It is hereby directed that the Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 shall release the pension of the Petitioner as well as all pensionary and retiral benefits treating him to has been retired w.e.f. 30.6.96 within 3 months from the date of production of a certified copy of this judgment. The writ petition stands finally disposed of.

It is said pursuant thereto Petitioner was directed to complete requisite document for payment of retiral benefits whereafter gratuity and pension was paid to the Petitioner on 25th September, 2001. The Petitioner claim that she made several representations for payment of interest on the delayed amount as also for payment of certain other dues of earlier period of 1986, 1988, 1994 etc. and when the said payment was not paid, hence this writ petition.

It is not disputed that payment of the retiral benefits were made to the Petitioner in 2001. This writ petition has been filed in 2006. Nothing has been shown by Petitioner as to why Petitioner did not take effective steps if she was not paid retiral benefits within three months, as directed by this Court vide judgment dated 10th September, 1997.

There is also nothing on record to show that for delay in payment of retiral dues to the Petitioner, the Petitioner was not at fault and the entire responsibility lie upon the Respondents. There is no whisper at all in the entire writ petition that the said delay caused was not on account of fault of the Petitioners, but the delay is on the part of Respondents.

Delay and laches constitute substantial reason for disentitling relief in equitable jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In New Delhi Municipal Council Vs. Pan Singh and Others, , the Apex Court observed that after a long time the writ petition should not have been entertained even if the Petitioners are similarly situated and discretionary jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those who approached the Court after a long time. It was held that delay and laches were relevant factors for exercise of equitable jurisdiction. In Lipton India Ltd. and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, and M.R. Gupta Vs. Union of India and others, it was held that though there was no period of limitation provided for filing a petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India, ordinarily a writ petition should be filed within reasonable time. In The Oriol Industries Ltd. Vs. The Bombay Mercantile Bank Ltd., , it was said that representation would not be adequate explanation to take care of delay. Same view was reiterated in State of Orissa Vs. Pyarimohan Samantaray and Others, and State of Orissa and Others Vs. Shri Arun Kumar Patnaik and Others, and the said view has also been followed recently in Shiv Dass Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, and New Delhi Municipal Council (supra). The aforesaid authorities of the Apex Court has also been followed by this Court in Chunvad Pandey v. State of U.P. and Ors. 2008 (4) ESC 2423 . This has been followed in Virender Chaudhary Vs. Bharat Petroleum Corporation and Others, . In S.S. Balu and Another Vs. State of Kerala and Others, the Apex Court held that it is well settled principle of law that delay defeats equity. It is now a trite law that where the writ Petitioners approaches the High Court after a long delay, reliefs prayed for may be denied to them on account of delay and laches irrespective of the fact that they are similarly situated to other candidates who have got the benefit. In Yunus (Baboobhai) A Hamid Padvekar Vs. State of Maharashtra through its Secretary and Others, the Court referred to the observations of Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Company v. Prosper Armstrong Hurde etc. (1874) 5 PC 239 and held as under:

Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. . . Two circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy.

In the circumstances, I find no reason or occasion to accept plea of payment of interest, particularly when the writ petition has been filed in 2006 i.e. after payment of retiral benefits in 2001. While entertaining writ petition under Article 226 of Constitution for enforcement of rights of the litigant, delay and laches plays an important role. So far as the grievance with respect to other dues are concerned, it appears that the same pertains to the period of 1986, 1988, 1993 and do not constitute part of the retiral benefits. If salary or other dues at the relevant time was not paid to the Petitioner, there is nothing on record to show that any steps were taken by the Petitioner for enforcement of her right at the relevant time. Thus, that grievance also cannot be looked into at this stage i.e. after more than 14 years from the date of retirement of the Petitioner.

I, therefore, find no good ground for giving any relief to the Petitioner, as sought in the writ petition. Dismissed.