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Judgment
Iyyapu Panduranga Rao, J.—Second petitioner is the brother of the first petitioner and third petitioner is the father of petitioners 1 and 2. One J. Ramakrishna is the husband of the first petitioner. There are some family disputes between the first petitioner and her husband, as a result of which the husband of the first petitioner kept his son at Visakhapatnam in her parental house. The first petitioner who is working at A.P. Bhavan, Delhi went to Visakhapatnam and took away her child to New Delhi. In connection with the same, the first respondent filed a Criminal complaint against the petitioners 1 and 2 under Sections 447, 506, 511 r/w. Section 209 IPC on the file of V Addl. Metropolitan Magistrate, Visakhapatnam in C.C. No. 163/89 but the same proceedings were quashed as per the orders of this court dt. October 3, 1989. While so the first petitioner''s husband Ramakrishna filed O.P. No. 25/88 on the file of the I Addl. Judge, Visakhapatnam for the custody of the child and the said case is pending.
The case of the Ist respondent is that the first petitioner addressed a letter to the Deputy Divisional Engineer (Telephones) Visakhapatnam imputing immoral conduct to the first respondent and it was further averred that petitioners 1 to 3 came to the office of the Telecom District Engineer, Visakhapatnam on March, 25, 1989 and scolded the first respondent with scandalous words. Allleging that the averments made in the said letter hurt her character and reputation in the office and further alleging that petitioners 1 to 3 came to the office of the Telecom District Engineer, Visakhapatnam on March, 25, 1989 scolded her with scandalous words, the first respondent filed C.C. 693/89 on the file of the 9th Addl. Metropolitan Magistrate, Visakhapatnam u/s 500 I.P.C. Alleging that the allegation made in the complaint in C.C. No. 693/89 on the file of the 9th Metropolitan Magistrate, Visakhapatnam do not make out an offence u/s 500 I.P.C. the petitioner filed the present criminal petition u/s 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the C.C. 693/89 on the file of the 9th Addl. Metropolitan Magistrate, Visakhapatnam.
Mr. Bali Reddy, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in the averments in the complaint petition in C.C. No. 693/89 it was averred that the petitioners 1 to 3 went to the office of the Telecom District Engineer, Visakhapatnam on March 25, 1989 and scolded the first respondent with scandalous words, the actual words used are not mentioned in the complaint petition in C.C. No. 693/89 and consequently in so far as the said incident is concerned, namely, the incident dt. March 25, 1989 is concerned C.C. 693/89 be quashed. Sri Bali Reddy, the learned counsel for the petitioners further submits that the averments made in the letter written by the petitioners to the Divisional Engineer, Telecom, Visakhapatnam will come within the four corners of exceptions 8 and 9 to Section 499 I.P.C. and consequently the proceedings in C.C. No. 693/89 on the file of the 9th Metropolitan Magistrate, Visakhapatnam be quashed.
Before proceeding further, it is to be seen that the Supreme Court of India repeatedly held that the object of the provisions of Section 202 Cr.P.C. is to enable the Magistrate to form an opinion as to whether process should be issued or not. Proceeding further the Supreme Court of India has observed as follows:
"At that stage what the Magistrate has to see is whether there is evidence in support of the allegations made in the complaint and not whether the evidence is sufficient to warrant a conviction. It has been further pointed out that the function of the Magistrate holding the preliminary inquiry is only to be satisfied that a prima facie case is made out against the accused on the materials placed before him by the complainant. Where a prima facie case has been made out, even though much can be said on both sides, the committing Magistrate is bound to commit the accused for trial and the accused does not come into the picture at all till the process is issued."
(vide para 11 of 1971 S.C. page 1389 (Balraj Khanna v. Moti Ram).
Bearing the above observations in mind it is to be seen whether it is a fit case where the proceedings in C.C. No. 693 of 1989 on the file of the 9th Metropolitan Magistrate, Visakhapatnam be quashed.
The first contention of Sri Bali Reddy, the learned counsel for the petitioners is that there is allegation that on March, 25, 1989 all the petitioners went to the office of the Telecom District Engineer, Visakhapatnam and ''scolded the first respondent with scandalous words'', the actual words used are not mentioned and in addition the said statement is attributed to all the three petitioners jointly, in view of these circumstances the said averments even if it is proved, cannot be treated as defamatory. To establish his contention Sri Bali Reddy, the learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon Sarat Chandra Das and Another Vs. The State, wherein it is observed as follows at para 4:
"In a trial for defamation it is essential that the words alleged to be defamatory in character should be precisely set out and the accused should be individually given notice of what he is charged with. It is the words so set out that will constitute the foundation for defamation. It is essential that not only the words in question should be proved but also that the charge should set out the precise words complained of."
In Balraj Khanna v. Moti Ram AIR 1954 Mad 482 also similar allegations, namely, that the impugned statement was a joint statement and that the actual words used were not set out in the complaint and that unless the statement alleged to have been made by each of the accused must be set out, the individual accused cannot have notice as to what is specifically alleged against him, were made. Repelling the said contentions the Supreme Court observed as follows:
"After a consideration of the various decisions referred to above, we are of the opinion that the proposition laid down in English decisions dealing with libel that the actual words alleged to be used must be stated in the indictment cannot be applied on all fours when dealing with the cases of defamation by spoken words u/s 499 IPC. It will be highly desirable no doubt if the actual words stated to have been used by an accused and which are all to be defamatory are reproduced by the complainant. The actual words used or the statements made may be reproduced verbatim by the complainant if the words are few and the statement is very brief. But in cases where the words spoken are too many or the statements made are too long, in our opinion, it will be the height of technicality to insist that the actual words and the entire statements should be reproduced verbatim. The object of having, if possible, the actual words or the statements before the Court is to enable it to consider whether those words or the statements are defamatory in nature. That purpose or object will be served if the complainant is able to reproduce in his complaint or evidence in a substantial measure the words of imputation alleged to have been uttered. If the statements or the words placed before the court by the complainant are held to be not defamatory, it will mean that the complainant will have to lose. Therefore, it is to his interest to get a proper adjudication from the Court that as far as possible the words spoken or the statements actually made and which he alleges to be defamatory are before the Court. But a complaint cannot be thrown out on the mere ground that the actual words spoken or the statements made have not been stated in the complaint. From the point of view of accused also it is necessary that the matters alleged to be defamatory in the complaint must be so stated as to enable them to know the nature of the allegations that they have to meet."
In view of the above observations of the Supreme Court though it is highly desirable that the actual words used be reproduced verbatim, but the complaint cannot be thrown out on the mere ground that the actual words spoken and the statements made have not been stated in the complaint and in any event I find that it is not desirable to throw away the complaint on that score, at this stage. It is to be noted that in this decision the Supreme Court has not only considered the judgment of the Orissa High Court referred to above but also considered another subsequent decision of the said Court reported in Dhruba Charan Khandal Vs. Dinabandhu Patri, .
In the Supreme Court judgment referred to above, it was contended that the alleged statement therein comes within the four corners of the exceptions embodied in Section 499 I.P.C. and consequently the Supreme Court considered as to whether the question of applicability of the exceptions appended to Section 499 I.P.C. be permitted to be raised in the quash proceedings. Adverting to the said aspect the Supreme Court was pleased to observe as follows:
"In our opinion, the question of application of the exceptions to Section 499 IPC does not arise at this stage. Rejection of the complaint by the Magistrate on the second ground mentioned above cannot be sustained. It is needless to state that the question of application of the exceptions to Section 499 I.P.C. as well as all other defences that may be available to the appellants will have to be gone into during the trial of the complaint, (vide para 30)"
The above decision of the Supreme Court is an authority to show that the applicability of exceptions to Section 499 I.P.C. as well as the other defences that are available to the petitioners, will have to be gone into during the trial of the complaint and no decision of the Supreme Court taking a contrary view is brought to my notice.
The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners places reliance on T.R. Devarajan v. Del Credere Bank of India 1988 APLJ (Cri.) 81 and G. Narayana Reddy v. P. Sithapathi 1992 APLJ (Cri.) 81. Of course, in these two decisions Justice Jayachandra Reddy, as he then was and Justice Jagannadha Raju respectively have taken a contrary view. But in view of the categorical statement of the law on the subject by the Supreme Court and since no judgment of the Supreme Court to the contra is brought to my notice, relying upon the Supreme Court Judgment referred to above, I find that the petitioners are not entitled to press into service the exceptions appended to Section 499 I.P.C. and as a matter of fact any other defences that may be available to them at this stage.
In view of these circumstances, finding no merits, the Criminal Petition is dismissed. No costs.
Sri Bali Reddy, the learned counsel for the petitioners submit that the petitioners are residents of Delhi, that it will be difficult for them to appear before the court at Visakhapatnam for all the hearings and in any event their personal appearance be dispensed with. In view of the circumstances of this case, I find that in the event of the petitioners making a submission in this behalf before the learned 9th Metropolitan Magistrate, Visakhapatnam, the same shall favourably be considered as the parties are related and as there is no difficulty regarding identification in the matter.