Smt. Kamala Majumdar vs Chittaranjan Sarkar

A.N. Sen, J.—This is a suit for recovery of possession of premises No. 14B Brindaban Mullick Lane, Calcutta, for a decree of Rs. 1,112-70 being the arrears of rent in respect of the premises, for mesne profits and for other relief�s.

On or about February 28, 1968, the Plaintiff purchased the said premises No. 14B Brindaban Mullick Lane, Calcutta, from one Sanat Kumar Chatterjee, the then owner thereof, for a total consideration of Rs. 27,000. At the time of the purchase of the said property by the Plaintiff the said premises was tenanted and the Defendant was a monthly tenant in respect of the said premises at a rent of Rs. 220 per month payable according to the English calendar. The Defendant had duly atoned to the Plaintiff. The Defendant failed and neglected to pay rents for the months of March, April, May, June and July 1968 and the Defendant became a defaulter in the matter of payment of rent. By and under a combined notice u/s 13(b) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, and u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, dated June 21, 1968, caused to be duly served on the Defendant through the Plaintiff''s Solicitor, the Plaintiff duly determined the tenancy, called upon the Defendant to quit, vacate and deliver up vacant possession of the said premises on the expiry of the last day of the month of July 1968, and by and under the said notice the Plaintiff also gave due notice to the Defendant of her intention to file a suit.

The Plaintiff instituted the suit on or about August 8,1968. In this suit, recovery of possession of the said premises No. 14/B Brindaban Mullick Lane is claimed on two grounds, namely, (i) default and (ii) reasonable requirement-of the Plaintiff for her bona fide use and occupation of the said premises.

A written statement has been filed on behalf of the Defendant. One of the defences taken in the written statement is that this Court has no jurisdiction to try and entertain the suit. It is to be noted that the defence taken in the written statement as to delivery of possession has already been struck out by an order made by this Court on an application u/s 17(3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956.

At the hearing of the suit, Mr. P. K. Das, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Plaintiff, stated that he did not want to proceed on the ground of bona fide requirement and he would proceed only on the basis of default. The case made in the plaint on the basis of reasonable requirement of the Plaintiff for her bona fide use and occupation was given up at the trial.

Mr. Bagchi, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the Defendant, admitted the allegations made in para. 1 of the plaint and admitted that the value of the premises in suit is Rs. 27,000. Mr. Bagchi, learned Advocate for the Defendant, has further admitted that the Defendant was, and is still, a defaulter in the matter of payment of rent within the meaning of Section 13(l)(i) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. Mr. Bagchi also admits that the amount of rent for the months mentioned in para. 9 of the plaint were and are still in arrears. Mr. Bagchi also admits that the notice to quit had been duly served on the Defendant.

Both the parties have also agreed that in the event of the Plaintiff succeeding in the suit, the mesne profits will be on the basis of the rent which was payable by the Defendant in respect of the said premises, i.e. @ Rs. 220 per month.

After having made the aforesaid statements and admissions on behalf of the Defendant, Mr. Bagchi, the learned Advocate for the Defendant, has submitted that he wants to contest the suit only on the ground that this Court has no jurisdiction to try and entertain the suit.

The aforesaid statements and admissions made by the learned Counsel on behalf of the respective parties have been duly recorded and are also hereby recorded in the judgment.

The only issue that has been raised by Mr. Bagchi is- Has this Court jurisdiction to try and entertain the suit ?

In view of the statements and admissions made on behalf of the parties recorded earlier and in view of the fact that the only issue to be determined is the question of jurisdiction of this Court, no oral evidence was considered necessary to be led by the parties and no oral evidence has been led by any of the parties. The Brief of Documents and Correspondence has, however, been exhibited by consent of the parties and is marked as Ex. A.

The only question that falls for determination in this case, therefore, is whether this Court has jurisdiction to try and entertain this suit.

Mr. Bagchi, learned Advocate for the Defendant, has submitted that this Court has no jurisdiction to try and entertain this suit. He has contended that by virtue of the provisions contained in Section 20 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, City Civil Court has jurisdiction to try and entertain this suit and the High Court has no jurisdiction to try and entertain the same. Section 20 of the West Bengal Premises Tenency Act, 1956, reads as follows:

Special provisions regarding jurisdiction of Courts for trial of suits for possession. Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, a suit or proceeding by a landlord against a tenant in which recovery of possession of any premises to which this Act applies is claimed shall lie to the Courts, as set out in Schedule, and no other Court shall be competent to entertain or try such suit (or proceeding).

The Schedule referred to in Section 20, as in force at the material time, is noted hereunder:

The Schedule (See Section 20)(1) Where the premises are situate on land, wholly within the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court�

(i) Where the value of the suit or the value of premises of which recovery of possession is claimed does not exceed ten thousand rupees�to the City Civil Court as defined in the City Civil Court Act, 1953 (W.B. Act 21 of 1953):

(ii) Where the value of the suit exceeds ten thousand rupees�to the High Court at Calcutta:

Provided that any suit, the value of which does not exceed Rs. 10,000, instituted in the City Civil Court on or after the date of the commencement of the City Civil Court Act, 1953, and before the commencement of the City Civil Court and the West Bengal Premises Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1957 (W.B. Act 27 of 1957), shall be deemed to have been validly instituted therein and such Court shall continue to try and dispose of such suit as a Court of competent jurisdiction: Provided further that any suit, appeal or proceeding instituted in the Calcutta High Court or in the Court of the Chief Judge of the Court of Small Causes of Calcutta under the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 (W.B. Act 12 of 1956) and pending on the date of the commencement of the City Civil Court and the West Bengal Premises Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1957, shall be continued as if this amendment had not been made.

(2) Where the premises are situate on land, wholly or partly, outside the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court�The Court other than the Calcutta High Court, which would have jurisdiction to try the suit if this Act were not passed.

Mr. Bagchi has argued, relying on these provisions that the value of the suit in question on the basis of the rental of the premises does not exceed Rs. 10,000 and, therefore, City Civil Court is the Court which has jurisdiction to try and entertain this suit and the High Court has no jurisdiction. Mr. Bagchi has referred to Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act (VII of 1887). The said Section 8 reads as follows:

Court-fee value and jurisdictional value to be the same in certain suits. Where in suits other than those referred to in the Court Fees Act, 1870, Section 7, paragraphs (v), (vi) and (ix), and paragraph (x), Clause (d), court fees are payable ad valorem under the Court Fees Act, 1870, the value as determinable for the computation of court-fees and the value for purposes of jurisdiction shall be the same.

Mr. Bagchi has also drawn my attention to Section 7 of the Court Fees Act, 1870. The relevant provisions of the said Section 7, which is under chap. Ill under the heading ''Computation of Fees'', may be set out�

The amount of fee payable under this Act in the suits next hereinafter mentioned shall be computed as follows:

(i) ....

(ii) ....

(iii) ....

(iv) ....

(v) In suits for the possession of land, buildings or gardens not being suits referred to in clause A]

(a) according to the value of the subject-matter, and such value shall be deemed to be fifteen times the net profits which have arisen from the land, building or garden during the year next before the date of presenting the plaint, or if the Court sees reason to think that such profits have been wrongly estimated, fifteen times such amount as the Court may assess as such profits or according to the market value of the land, building or garden, whichever is lower ;

(b) if, in the opinion of the Court, such profits are not readily ascertainable or assessable, or where there are no such profits, according to the market value of the land, building or garden:

Explanation�In this paragraph ''building'' includes a house, out-house, stable, privy, urinal, shed, hut, wall and any other such structure, whether of masonry, bricks, wood, mud, metal, or any other material whatsoever:

(a) In a suit for recovery of possession of immoveable property from (a) a trespasser, where no declaration of title to the property is either prayed for or necessary for disposal of the suit, according to the amount at which the relief sought is�valued in the plaint subject to the provisions of Section 8C ;

(b) a licensee upon revocation or termination of his licence, (i) where a licence fee is payable by the licensee in respect of the immovable property to which the suit refers, according to the amount of the licence fee of the immovable property payable for the year next before the date of presenting the plaint, or (ii) where no such licence fee is payable by the licensee, according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint subject to the provisions of Section 8C:

(vi) ....

(vii) ....

(viii) ....

(ix) ....

(x) ....

(xi) In the following suits between landlord and tenant;

(a) for the delivery by a tenant of the counterpart of a lease.

(b) to enhance the rent of a tenant having a right of occupancy.

(c) for the delivery by a landlord of a lease, (cc) for the recovery, of immovable property from a tenant including a tenant holding over after the determination of a tenancy.

(d) to a contest a notice of ejectment,

(e) to recover the occupancy of (immovable property) from which a tenant has been illegally ejected by the landlord, and

(f) for abatement of rent according to the amount of the rent of the (immovable property) to which the suit refers, payable for the year next before the date of presenting the plaint.

Mr. Bagchi has referred to the case of Swarnalata Bagchi and Ors. v. Kanta Bala Das (1966) 70 C.W.N. 615 and he has also relied on the case of Navinchandra Bukhandas Shah v. Msst. Mariam Bai and Ors. Unreported decision of R.M. Datta J. in Suit No. 1305 of 1965. Mr. Bagchi has also cited the case of Ramric Lal Saha Vs. Sachindra Narayan Roy and Others, .

Mr. P. K. Das learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Plaintiff has submitted that this Court has jurisdiction to try and entertain this suit. He has contended that the Suits Valuation Act and the Court Fees Act had no application to the High Court at the material time. It is his contention that as the Suits Valuation Act and the Court Fees Act did not apply to a suit in the High Court at the relevant time, the value of this suit instituted in this High Court cannot be determined with reference to the provisions contained in the Suits Valuation Act and the Court Fees Act. Mr. Das has argued that the value of the suit in the High Court must be considered to be the value of the premises in suit, and as the value of the premises in suit very much exceeds Rs. 10,000, the value of the suit in the High Court must necessarily be considered to exceed Rs. 10,000 and by virtue of the provisions contained in the Sch. (l)(ii) the High Court has jurisdiction to try and entertain the suit. In support of his contention that the value of the suit in the High Court for the purpose of jurisdiction is the value of the premises in suit, Mr. Das has referred to the decision in the case of Nanhoon Singh v. Tofanee Singh (1873) 12 B.I.R. 113. Mr. Das relies very strongly on the judgment of Bijayesh Mukherji J. in the case of Girdharlal Govindji v. Pravin Chandra Ochhavlal (1965) 69 C.W.N 469. Mr. Das has argued that this question is really concluded by the said decision of Bijayesh Mukherji J., and he has in fact submitted that he adopts the reasoning of the learned Judge as part of his argument. Mr. Das has commented that this decision of Bijayesh Mukherji J. has been affirmed in appeal and he has drawn my attention to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Pravin Chandra Ochhavlal v. Girdharlal Govindji (1968) 72 C.W.N. 404. Mr. Das has further submitted that this Court should lean in favour of jurisdiction of this Court and should hold that this Court has jurisdiction unless the jurisdiction of this Court is expressly taken away. Mr. Das contends that in case of premises value whereof exceeds Rs. 10,000, but the valuation of the suit for possession of such premises on the basis of the Suits Valuation Act and the Court Fees Act is less than Rs. 10,000, both the City Civil Court and the High Court will have concurrent jurisdiction.

It will be convenient at this stage to notice the cases cited from the Bar. In the case of Swarnalata Bagchi and Ors. v. Kanta Bala Dass (Supra) the question had arisen on the jurisdiction of the City Civil Court to entertain an ejectment suit under the Amending Act (W.B. XXVII of 1957). It had been contended that the City Civil Court had no jurisdiction as neither the value of the suit nor of the premises in suit was below Rs. 10,000. A Division Bench of this Court held that on the admitted rental of the premises in suit the value of the suit was less than Rs. 10,000 and, accordingly, the City Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. P. N. Mookerjee J., who delivered the judgment of the Bench, observed:

On the question of the City Civil Court''s jurisdiction, the first argument of Mr. Dev is that, in the instant case, neither the value of the suit nor of the disputed premises can be said to be below Rs. 10,000 and, accordingly, the City Civil Court will have no jurisdiction to entertain the suit under the Amending Act (W.B. Act XXVII of 1957), the City Civil Court and the West Bengal Premises Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1957. '' It is enough to say, for our present purpose, that the present suit being a suit for ejectment and, on the admitted rental, the annual value being less than Rs. 10,000, the value of the suit would be below Rs. 10,000 and, accordingly, the City Civil Court had ample jurisdiction to entertain the present suit. We further hold, that, on the express wording of the above statute, Mr. Dev second or extreme argument on the point that to give the City Civil Court jurisdiction neither the value of the premises should exceed Rs. 10,000 cannot be accepted. (Pages 616-17)

The unreported decision in the case of Navinchandra Bukhandas Shah v. Msst. Mariam Bai and Ors. (Supra) related to a suit for possession of premises No. 58 Metcalfe Street which had been let out at a rent of Rs. 200 per month. It does not appear that the learned Judge had delivered any judgment and, in any event, no judgment of the learned Judge could be produced. Mr. Bagchi, learned Counsel for the Defendant who had also appeared on behalf of the Defendant in the case before R.M. Datta J., had, however, caused the minutes and the decree to be produced. From the minutes it appears that the case had been opened on behalf of the Plaintiff before the learned Judge and issues had thereafter been framed and one of the issues raised was with regard to the question of jurisdiction of the Court. It further appears from the minutes that the learned Judge dismissed the suit on the ground of jurisdiction.

In the case of Ramrick Lal Saha v. Sachindra and Amyan Roy and Ors. (Supra) the Court was concerned with an application for the grant of a certificate under Article 133 of the Constitution for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, and one of the questions that arose for consideration was the value of the property in dispute. The subject-matter of the suit in question out of which the appeal had arisen was the tenancy of the applicant who intended to prefer an appeal to the Supreme Court. The Court held that in a suit by a landlord for eviction of tenant, the subject-matter of the suit was the tenancy of the tenant and no question respecting the value of the premises let out to the tenant was involved in such a suit.

In the case of Nanltoon Singh v. Tofanee Singh (Supra) a Division Bench of this Court held that for the purpose of determining the question of jurisdiction, the valuation of a suit should be computed according to the market value of the subject-matter of the suit and not by special rules applicable to valuation laid down in the Court Fees Act, 1870 (VII of 1870). This case is not of any particular importance after the passing of the Suits Valuation Act (VII of 1887).

In the case of Girdharlal Govindji v. Pravin Chandra Ochhavlal (Supra) the allegation in the plaint was that the Defendant was in occupation under leave and licence from the Plaintiff or in the alternative as a tenant in respect thereof. The jurisdiction of this Court to try and entertain the suit had been challenged and the very first issue that was raised was�''Has this Court jurisdiction to try the suit ?'' The learned Judge in his judgment dealt with this question of jurisdiction from both the aspects, namely, (i) suit being one for possession from a licensee and (ii) suit being one for possession from a tenant. The learned Judge came to the conclusion that in either view of the matter the High Court had jurisdiction to try and entertain the suit. Considering the suit to be one against the tenant the learned Judge observed (pp. 473-75):

Regarded as a suit resting on determination of Ochhavlal''s tenancy, the conclusion come to in favour of this Court''s jurisdiction is not shaken by one jot or one title, nothing to say of the general principle that the Court having jurisdiction to try a bigger matter can try along with it a smaller matter which by itself would have conferred on it no jurisdiction. Governed as such a tenancy will be by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 12 of 1956, the Second Schedule to the Act (City Civil Court Act), as amended by the City Civil Court and the West Bengal Premises Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 27 of 1957, and itself amending the solitary schedule to the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, rules the matter. Insofar as it is material here, the aforesaid schedule bears:

(i) Where the value of the suit or the value of the premises of which recovery of possession is claimed -does not exceed ten thousand rupees- to the City Civil Court....;

(ii) Where the value of the suit exceeds ten thousand rupees - to the High Court at Calcutta ;

Read with Section 20 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, it codifies the law on jurisdiction of the City Civil Court and this Court for trial of suits of this nature.

Thus, the value of the premises recovery of possession of which is claimed (here the disputed room at ''44'') is the value for the purpose of jurisdiction. Since its value exceeds Rs. 10,000 �I have stated why�the City Civil Court cannot have jurisdiction to try it. In Clause (ii) quoted above, only the expression�the value of the suit�appears; not the other expression �the value of the premises of which recovery of possession is claimed�which is in Clause (i) in addition to the value of the suit. But that seems to be of the least materiality. For one thing, the moment it is found (as is found here) that the value of the premises of which recovery of possession is claimed exceeds Rs. 10,000 the City Civil Court ceases to have jurisdiction: vide Clause (i) above. For another, the value of subject of the suit exceeding Rs. 10,000 (as here), the value of the suit exceeds Rs. 10,000 too, thereby bringing it within the jurisdiction of this Court: vide Clause (ii) above. There is thus no escape from the conclusion that this Court has, and the City Civil Court has not, jurisdiction to try the instant suit.

In vain does Mr. Tibrewal refer to the rent of the disputed room at ''44'' being Rs. 45 a month (as his case is) and twelve times such rent coming to Rs. 540. Equally vain is the reference to the total rent of Girdharlal''s four-roomed flat at Rs. 140 a month (Q. No. 14 to him) and the proportionate rent for the disputed room coming to even less than Rs. 45 a month. In submitting so, Mr. Tibrewal has obviously at the back of his mind Section 7(xi)(cc) of the Court Fees Act which provides that in a suit between landlord and tenant, for recovery of immovable property from a tenant including a tenant holding over after the determination of a tenancy, the amount of fee payable under the Court Fees Act shall be computed according to the amount of the rent of immovable property to which the suit refers, payable for the year next before the date of presenting the plaint. But this fiscal statute is not for the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original jurisdiction in which the present suit has been tried and is about to be decided. (See Section 4 of the Court Fees Act). This is one consideration. There are still two others. One, Section 7(xi)(cc) prescribes the notional valuation for the levy of court-fees; whereas the valuation I have to go by for the purpose of jurisdiction is the market or actual value of the premises (here the room in controversy at ''44'') of which Girdharlal claims recovery of possession ; vide the Schedule to the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. And that value exceeds Rs. 10,000 no matter that the rent for a year preceding the institution of the suit comes to Rs. 540 or less. Two, u/s 8 of the Suits Valuation Act, the notional value of a suit u/s 7(xi)(cc) of the Court Fees Act ''as determinable for the computation of court-fees and the value for purposes of jurisdiction shall be the same''. In other words, twelve times the monthly rent preceding the institution of the suit shall be the value for the purpose of court-fees and jurisdiction both. Such a consideration, however, can hardly avail Mr. Tibrewal. On a matter as this, dovetailed as the Suits Valuation Act, is with the Court Fees Act, the suit in hand cannot be touched by either. What it is touched by is the Schedule to the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act to which one has to come full circle back. The burden of this Schedule has been noticed and may be reiterated. The value of the room in controversy at ''44'' exceeds Rs. 10,000. Therefore, under Clause (i) reproduced in paragraph 14 ante, the City Civil Court lacks jurisdiction to try this suit. The value of the said room (which is the subject-matter of this litigation) exceeding Rs. 10,000 the value of the suit necessarily, exceeds Rs. 10,000 as well. Therefore, under Clause (ii) reproduced in paragraph 14 ante, this Court has jurisdiction to try it. No notional value shows its head here.

True it is, as Mr. Tibrewal submits, Girdharlal''s right in the room in controversy at ''44'' is no more than a tenant''s right. So what ? Even to such a one it is open to say: ''here is Ochavlal who is in wrongful possession of the disputed room and might have with ordinary diligence received therefrom Rs. 2 a day''. That is what he says when he claims mesne profits of Rs. 2 a day. Even a modest sum as that raises the value of the room to more than Rs. 10,000.

The last contention of Mr. Tibrewal on valuation is that the view I am taking will practically denude the City Civil Court of a vast deal of litigation of this type. It will. But the Act by its fifth section fixes the maximum limit of the pecuniary jurisdiction of that Court to Rs. 10,000 in suits and proceedings of a civil nature. And it is a notorious fact (of which I take judicial notice) that even a cottah of land in ''ancient'' Calcutta with an area of nine square miles, the limits of that Court''s territorial jurisdiction, sells at Rs. 40,000 and more. So, what Mr. Tibrewal makes a point of is inherent in the Act itself. And it is not for me to rise above the law the Act lays down. It is for the law-maker to amend the law, if it thinks fit in its wisdom.

What goes before exhausts my reasons for having found the first issue in favour of Girdharlal.

An appeal had been preferred against the decision of Bijayesh Mukherji J. The appeal was dismissed and the decision of the learned Judge was upheld (Supra). On the question of jurisdiction the Court of Appeal, however, proceeded entirely on the basis of leave and licence and had not considered the question on the basis of any tenancy. The Appellate Court, in concluding, observed� "The appeal is dismissed. The judgment and decree are affirmed."

The decision of the Division Bench (1) was concerned with the question of jurisdiction of the City Civil Court in an ejectment suit u/s 20 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act read with the Schedule thereto as amended by the City Civil Court and the West Bengal Premises Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1957 (W.B. XXVII of 1957). The said decision was really concerned with Clause (l)(i) of the Schedule as amended and was not concerned with Clause (l)(ii) thereof which deals with the jurisdiction of the High Court. This decision is, however, an authority for the proposition that the City Civil Court does have jurisdiction even if the value of the premises in suit exceeds Rs. 10,000, provided the value of the suit does not exceed Rs. 10,000. The decision of Bijayesh Mukherji J. (Supra) does not appear to have been cited and considered.

The decision in the case of Navinchandra Bukhandas Shah v. Msst. Mariam Bai and Ors. (Supra) in the absence of any judgment, is not really of any assistance.

The decision of the Division Bench in the case of Ramrick Lal Shah v. Sachindra Naxayan Roy and Ors. (Supra) was on an application under Article 133 of the Constitution for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court and is not of any material assistance in construing the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act and in considering the question of jurisdiction of the High Court in an ejectment suit under the provisions of the said Act. This decision, however, lays down that for the purpose of valuation under Article 133 of the Constitution, the value of a tenancy right is not the value of the premises in respect of which the tenancy right is claimed.

The case of Nanhoon Singh v. Tofanee Singh (Supra) loses its importance after the passing of the Suits Valuation Act (VII of 1887). This case, however, recognizes the general principle that the value of the premises in suit should be the value of the suit for the purpose of jurisdiction in the absence of any law or mode of ascertaining the value of the suit for determining the question of jurisdiction.

The decision in the case of Girdharlal Govindji v. Pravin Chandra Ochhavlal (Supra) is one exactly on the point involved in the present case. It is undoubtedly true that the case before him had proceeded on the basis of both leave and licence and tenancy. The learned Judge in his judgment has considered the question of jurisdiction from both the points of view and has held that in either case the High Court has jurisdiction. The learned Judge in his judgment has clearly held that even in case of tenancy the High Court had jurisdiction and I have earlier quoted at length the findings of the learned Judge. The decision of Bijayesh Mukherji J. was, as already noted, affirmed on appeal, though the Court of Appeal had considered the question of jurisdiction on the basis of leave and licence and had not proceeded to consider the said question of jurisdiction from the viewpoint of tenancy and had not expressed any opinion from that point of view. The decision of Bijayesh Mukherji J. on the question of jurisdiction, judged from the point of view of leave and licence, cannot, in my opinion, be questioned and I am in entire agreement with his view. In any event the said decision on the question of jurisdiction on the basis of leave and licence, affirmed by the Court of Appeal, is binding. With very great respect to the learned Judge, I, however, find it rather difficult to agree with the view expressed by Bijayesh Mukherji J. on the question of jurisdiction on the basis of tenancy. It is to be noted that the learned Judge himself appreciated that the view that he had taken would render Clause (l)(i) of the Schedule to Section 20 nugatory. As already noted, the learned Judge observed:

The last contention of Mr. Tribrewal on valuation is that the view I am taking will practically denude the City Civil Court of a vast deal of litigation of this type. But the Act by its fifth section fixes the maximum limit of the pecuniary jurisdiction of that Court to Rs. 10,000 in suits and proceedings of a civil nature. And it is a notorious fact (of which I take judicial notice) that even a cottah of land in ''ancient'' Calcutta with an area of 9 square miles, the limits of that Court''s territorial jurisdiction, sells at Rs. 40,000 and more. So, what Mr. Tribrewal makes a point is inherent in the Act itself. And, it is not for me to rise above the law the Act lays down. It is for the law maker to amend the law if it thinks fit in its wisdom. (Page 475) These observations of the learned Judge must be held to have been impliedly disapproved by the decision of the Division Bench in the case of Swarnalata Bagchi and Ors. v. Kanta Bala Das (Supra) where the Division Bench expressly negatived the contention that the City Civil Court could have no jurisdiction to try and entertain an ejectment suit, if the value of the premises in suit exceeded Rs. 10,000. An interpretation which may have the effect of rendering Clause (l)(i) of the Schedule to Section 20 nugatory, should, in my opinion, be avoided if possible. The proper construction to put on any section, in my view, should be such as will render the entire section effective and will result in harmonious working of all the clauses in the section for giving proper effect to the true intention of the Legislature. It may be that at the relevant time the Suits Valuation Act and the Court Fees Act had no application to a suit for possession on the Original Side of the High Court. Prior to the amendment of the Schedule to Section 20 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act by the amending Act of 1957 (W.B. XXVII of 1957), the jurisdiction of the High Court had been fixed on the basis of the monthly rental of the premises in question and the High Court had jurisdiction only in case where the monthly rent of the premises exceeded Rs. 500. When the earlier Schedule to Section 20 providing for jurisdiction on the basis of monthly rent was amended by the amending Act of 1957 (W.B. XXVII of 1957), and the present. Schedule was incorporated, the Legislature must have been aware of the position that the Court Fees Act had. no application to the High Court and the Suits Valuation Act, ''Dovetailed as the said Act is with the Court Fees Act'', (to quote the words of Bijayesh Mukherji J), may not have any application to the High Court. Notwithstanding the position the Legislature had thought it fit to amend the earlier Schedule and to incorporate the present one in its place by the amending Act of 1957. By Section 20 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, the Legislature made special provision as to jurisdiction of Courts in respect of suits for possession of premises covered by the said Act. The said provision as to jurisdiction had been made by the Legislature in its wisdom to curtail the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of the High Court in respect of suits for possession not considered fit to be tried on the Original Side of the High Court. In the initial stage the jurisdiction of the High Court in entertaining any suit for possession of premises to which West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act applies, had been confined to premises, rent payable in respect of which exceeded Rs. 500 per month, and in all other cases the jurisdiction had been vested in the Court of Small Causes. Section 20 makes it quite clear that the Legislature intended to confer exclusive jurisdiction on the respective Courts mentioned in the Schedule to the said Section. The Schedule came to be amended, as already noted, by the City Civil Court and the West Bengal Premises Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1957 (W.B. XXVII of 1957). By the amendment under which the present Schedule came to be incorporated, the fixation of jurisdiction on the basis of monthly rent was given a go-bye and jurisdiction was conferred on the City Civil Court and the High Court on the basis indicated in the Schedule. The said amendment was not introduced with any intention of enlarging the jurisdiction of the High Court as will be clearly indicated by the nature of the amendment effected.

The said Schedule was amended by the City Civil Court and the West Bengal Premises Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1957 (W.B. XXVII of 1957), essentially for taking away the jurisdiction of the Court of Small Causes and conferring jurisdiction on the City Civil Court. Under the old Schedule, Clause (l)(i) thereof provided for jurisdiction of the High Court in respect of suits for possession of premises situate within the ordinary original jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court, when the rent payable for one month for the premises exceeded Rs. 500 and under Clause (l)(ii) thereof, in all other cases, such jurisdiction had been vested in the Court of Small Causes, Calcutta. Clauses (l)(i) of the amended Schedule makes provision for jurisdiction of the City Civil Court and not of the High Court, as was the case under the earlier Schedule, and Clause (l)(ii) of the amended Schedule makes provision for jurisdiction of the High Court. This change in the amended Schedule providing for the jurisdiction of the High Court in Clause (l)(ii) instead of Clause (l)(i) is, to my mind, deliberate and significant. Under the old Schedule, the underlying idea was to provide for jurisdiction of the High Court as mentioned in Clause (l)(i) thereof and to confer jurisdiction on the Court of Small Causes in all other cases in terms of Clause (l)(ii) of the old Schedule. The present Schedule, on the other hand, provides first for jurisdiction of the City Civil Court and after having made provision for the jurisdiction of the City Civil Court, provides for jurisdiction of the High Court in other cases. Clause (l)(i) of the present Schedule provides that the City Civil Court will have jurisdiction if the value of the suit or the value of the premises does not exceed Rs. 10,000. It is to be noted that the jurisdiction of the City Civil Court is determined on the basis of the valuation of the suit or on the basis of the valuation of the premises, and if either of the valuation is less than Rs. 10,000 the jurisdiction is vested in the City Civil Court. As the Court Fees Act and the Suits Valuation Act have application in respect of suits filed in the City Civil Court, determination of the value of the suit and the court-fees payable is easily possible on the basis of" the provisions of the said Acts and it can be ascertained whether the value of the suit exceeds or does not exceed Rs. 10,000. If the value of the suit on such determination does not exceed Rs. 10,000, the City Civil Court will have jurisdiction, and if the value of the suit exceeds Rs. 10,000, the City Civil Court will have no jurisdiction, and in such case the High Court will have jurisdiction in terms of the provision contained in Clause (l)(ii) of the Schedule. It is very important to note that although in Clause (l)(i) of the amended Schedule where the Legislature makes specific provision for the jurisdiction of the City Civil Court, the Legislature proceeds on the basis of the value of the suit or the value of the premises, the Legislature in dealing with this question of the jurisdiction of the High Court in Clause (l)(ii) of the amended Schedule, has chosen to proceed only on the basis of the value of the suit with knowledge of the fact that the Court Fees Act and the Suits Valuation Act might not have any application at the relevant time to the High Court, and not on the basis of the value of the premises. While considering the jurisdiction of the High Court in Clause (l)(ii) of the amended Schedule the Legislature, in my opinion, must have deliberately omitted to include ''valuation of the premises'' which the Legislature had thought fit to include in Clause (l)(i) of the Schedule. This part, namely, the value of the premises, has been omitted from Clause (l)(ii) of the Schedule for the very good reason that if the Legislature had provided in Clause (l)(ii) of the Schedule that the High Court would have jurisdiction where the value of the suit or the value of the premises would exceed Rs. 10,000, Clause (l)(i) of the Schedule would be rendered completely nugatory and there would be conflict between the provisions in the two clauses, namely, Clause (l)(i) and Clause (l)(ii) of the Schedule. If the provision was that the suit would lie in the High Court if the value of the premises exceeded Rs. 10,000, the City Civil Court would also be in a position to entertain it, if the value of the suit on the rental basis would be less than Rs. 10,000 and there would be clear conflict between the provisions of the two clauses. Section 20 itself makes it quite clear that the Legislature intended not to confer any concurrent jurisdiction and to confer exclusive jurisdiction on the Courts mentioned in the Schedule to the said Section. As the Legislature had not intended, and it cannot possibly intend, that there should be any conflict between the provision of the two clauses or that Clause (l)(i) should be rendered nugatory, the Legislature in its wisdom had deliberately omitted ''the value of the premises'' part from Clause (l)(ii), although they have incorporated this provision in Clause (l)(i) of the amended Schedule. It may be that the Suits Valuation Act and the Court Fees Act did not have any application to the High Court at the material time and on the basis of the provisions thereof, the value of this suit in the High Court cannot be determined. The Suits Valuation Act and the Court Fees Act, however, applied at all times and still apply to the City Civil Court and it is easily possible to determine the value of a suit in the City Civil Court on the basis of the provisions contained therein. If the value of the suit on such determination is less than Rs. 10,000 the suit will have to be filed in the City Civil Court, and if the value exceeds Rs. 10,000 the High Court will have the jurisdiction. Clause (l)(ii) of the Schedule relating to the jurisdiction of the High Court is a part of the entire Schedule which should be read as a whole for proper construction thereof and should not be construed independently of the provisions contained in Clause (l)(i) of the Schedule. Section 20 of the Schedule makes specific and express provision with regard to jurisdiction and the true intent of the Legislature has to be gathered on a proper construction thereof. The Legislature, in my opinion, intended to confer jurisdiction on the City Civil Court in respect of suits the value of which was less than Rs. 10,000 and in respect of premises the value of which is also less than Rs. 10,000 irrespective of the question of the value of the suit in such cases. In the case of the High Court, the Legislature intended, in my opinion, to confer jurisdiction only in respect of the suits the value of which exceeds Rs. 10,000 irrespective of the question of the value of the premises, excepting this, that if the value of the suit exceeds Rs. 10,000 and the value of the premises happens to be less than Rs. 10,000, a possibility not likely to occur at all, the City Civil Court and not the High Court will have jurisdiction because of the express provision contained in Clause (l)(i) of the Schedule. The value of a suit for ejectment of a tenant can easily be determined in any case in relation to the City Civil Court and the value of a suit, so determined, will be the guiding factor in determining the jurisdiction of the appropriate Court. If the value so determined is less than Rs. 10,000, the High Court will have no jurisdiction. This construction, in my opinion, will result in harmonious and proper working of Section 20 and the Schedule thereto with all its clauses and will not render any provision nugatory. To my mind, this construction gives effect to the true intent of the Legislature ; to make the intention of the Legislature clear and manifest, the Legislature in the amended Schedule has dealt with jurisdiction of the High Court in Clause (l)(ii) after having provided for the jurisdiction of the City Civil Court in Clause (l)(i) thereof, and while dealing with the question of the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Legislature had advisedly not included the value of the premises in Clause (l)(ii) in determining the said question. In view of the express provision specifically introduced on the question of jurisdiction in Section 20 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act read with the Schedule to the said Section, the question of the Court leaning in favour of the jurisdiction of any particular Court does not and cannot arise. Only that Court which has been clothed with the necessary jurisdiction by virtue of the provisions contained in the said special statute will have jurisdiction to try and entertain the suit. Section 20 and the Schedule thereto do not, in my view, make provision for any concurrent jurisdiction of the Courts referred to in the Schedule and the said Section clearly provides for exclusive jurisdiction of the proper Court in appropriate cases.

For reasons indicated above, I find it difficult to agree with the view expressed by Biyayesh Mukherji J. in the case of Girdharlal Govindji v. Pravin Chandra Ochhavlal on this aspect of the question.

In the instant case, on the admitted rental value of Rs. 220 per month of the premises in suit, the value of the suit will be very much less than Rs. 10,000 and by virtue of the provisions contained in Clause (l)(i) of the Schedule, the City Civil Court will, in my opinion, have jurisdiction to try this suit, and in view thereof this Court will not have any jurisdiction to try and entertain this suit, even though the value of the premises in suit is Rs. 23,000, much in excess of Rs. 10.000.

On the basis of the decision of Bijayesh Mukherji J. (Supra) this Court, however, will have jurisdiction to try and entertain the suit as the value of the premises in suit is Rs. 27,000, very much in excess of Rs. 10,000. I have already expressed my own view on this matter. I have to bear in mind that the decision of Bijayesh Mukherji J. on this question has been accepted and followed in very many other cases and is considered to be the law on the question. I am also mindful of the fact that the appeal preferred from this decision of Bijayesh Mukherji J. has been dismissed (Supra) and that any dissentient judgment is likely to create confusion and uncertainty in the legal position.

In the case of Suresh Chandra Khasnabish v. Bank of Calcutta Ltd. (1950) 54 C.W.N. 832 (835) a Division Bench of this Court laid down that where there was a decision of a single Judge upon a question of law (not given per incurium) it was not right for any other single Judge of that Court to depart from it whatever his views may be. Banerjee J., who delivered the judgment of the Court of Appeal, presided over by Harries C.J., who concurred with the judgment, observed:

I would desire, therefore, to lay down as law as Jenkins C.J. laid down many years ago, that if there is a decision of a single Judge of this Court upon a question of law (not given per incurium), it is not right for any other single Judge whatever his own views may be to depart from it. The Judge may express his own views about the matter but his decision should be in accordance with the previous decision.

The Supreme Court in the case of Mahadeolal Kanodia Vs. The Administrator-general of West Bengal, observed:

Before we part with this appeal, however, it is our duty to refer one incidental matter. We have noticed with sortie regret that when the earlier decision of two Judges of the same High Court in Deorajin Debi and Another Vs. Satyadhyan Ghosal and Others, , was cited before the learned Judges who heard the present appeal they took on themselves to say that the previous decision was wrong, instead of following the usual procedure in case of difference of opinion with an earlier decision, of referring the question to a larger Bench. Judicial decorum no less than legal propriety forms the basis of judicial procedure. ''If one thing is more necessary in law than any other thing, it is the quality of certainty. That quality would totally disappear if Judges of co-ordinate jurisdiction in a High Court start overruling one another''s decision. If one Division Bench of a High Court is unable to distinguish a previous decision of another Division Bench and, holding the view that the earlier decision is wrong, itself gives effect to that view the result would be utter confusion. The position would be equally bad where a Judge sitting singly in the High Court is of opinion that the previous decision of another single Judge on a question of law is wrong and gives effect to that view instead of referring the matter to a larger Bench. In such a case lawyers would not know how to advise their clients and all Courts subordinate to High Court will find themselves in an embarrassing position of having to choose between dissentient judgments of their own High Court.

Similar view was expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of Shri Bhagwan and Another Vs. Ram Chand and Another, .

The decision of Bijayesh Mukherji J. (Supra) is not one given per in curium. The said decision, as I have already noted, has been upheld on appeal (Supra). The said decision of Bijayesh Mukherji J. decides the question of law relating to jurisdiction of this Court u/s 20 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1957, as amended by the amending Act of 1957 (XXVII of 1957). Notwithstanding my own view on the question of jurisdiction on interpretation of the said Section 20, which I have expressed earlier, and in spite of the fact that my own view is not in accord with the decision of Bijayesh Mukherji J. it is, however, my duty to follow the decision of Bijayesh Mukherji J. As after the introduction of the Court Fees Act to the Original Side of the High Court, the question of valuation of "suit, where the Court Fees Act and the Suits Valuation Act did not apply, loses its importance, I do not propose to refer this case to a larger Bench as, in my opinion, a reference to the larger Bench of this question involved in this suit will not be in the interest of the parties to the suit or of the cause of justice. In fact, at the time of the hearing of the suit, the learned ''counsel appearing on behalf of the parties submitted that I should not refer this case to a larger Bench as any such reference would result in hardship for the parties who are not very well off.

In view of the principles laid down by the Division Bench (Supra) and in view of the observations of the Supreme Court (Supra) and (Supra) referred to earlier, and bearing in mind that the decision of Bijayesh Mukherji J. (Supra) on the question of jurisdiction has been followed in very many cases as laying down the law on the question and any contrary decision by a Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction will create instability and confusion, I consider it to be my duty to follow the said decision of Bijayesh Mukherji J., notwithstanding my own views on the question. Following the decision of Bijayesh Mukherji J. I have, therefore, to hold that this Court has jurisdiction to try and entertain the suit and the issue has to be answered accordingly.

There will, therefore, be a decree for possession in terms of prayer (a), decree for Rs. 1,112-70 for arrears of rent in terms of prayer (b) and for mesne profits at the rate of rent till recovery of possession. The principal sum of Rs. 1,100 for arrears of rent will carry interest @ 6 % from the date of the decree. The Plaintiff is entitled to the costs of the suit.