Smt. Krishna Devi vs The State of Himachal Pradesh and Another

R.S. Pathak, C.J.—The Petitioner, Smt. Krishna Devi, was interviewed with a number of other candidates for appointment as Instructress, Cutting and Tailoring, in the Industrial Training Institute, Solan, and on January 2, 1970, the Principal of the Institute, informed her that she was offered the post on certain terms and conditions. She accepted the appointment. At the time no rules had been framed providing for appointment to that post and the terms and conditions attaching to it. Subesquently, the Himachal Pradesh Industries Department (Craftsmen Training Scheme) Class III Non-ministerial Service (Recruitment, Promotion and Certain Conditions of Service) Rules, 1969 were promulgated. They set out the qualifications requisite foi appointment, including the minimum age limit and the academic qualifications prescribed. Rule 17, however, declared that all appointments made before the commencement of those rules would not be affected by the circumstance that the appointment was not made in accordance with the rules. The Petitioner took charge of the post on January 5, 1970 and continued to serve there. After the rules came into force, it was decided to make appointments in accordance with the rules and applications were invited in respect also of the post occupied by the Petitioner. Among others, the fifth Respondent, Miss Balbir Sharma, applied. The Petitioner also applied. The Departmental Recruitment Committee interviewed the candidates and decided that the fifth Respondent should be appointed. Accordingly a notice was issued on September 29, 1970 by the Principal, Industrial Training Institute, Solan, terminating the services of the Petitioner and directing that she be paid a sum equivalent to the amount of pay and allowances for a period of one month in lieu of notice. She was asked to hand over charge to Miss Balbir Sharma who, it appears, was appointed in her stead. The Petitioner challenges the order terminating her services and the order appointing the fifth Respondent to the post of Cutting and Tailoring Instructress, Industrial Training Institute, Solan.

The first contention on behalf of the Petitioner is that her services were not terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract governing her employment, because while the contract provided that her services could be terminated upon one month''s notice instead of such notice she was given one month''s pay in lieu of notice. The submission is that as an essential contractual condition had not been satisfied the employment of the Petitioner under the contract continued without break. The contention, it seems to me, is without substance. According to the terms and conditions of the contract, the post was offered on an ad hoc basis and was intended to last for a limited period. Condition No. 5 of the contract prescribed that the Petitioner''s services were liable to terminate upon one month''s notice on either side without assigning any reason. It is true that instead of giving one month''s notice the Petitioner was given one month''s pay and allowances in lieu of notice. In other words, the emoluments which she would have earned had she stayed on for another month were paid to her without requiring her to work for that further period. In my opinion, by the payment of those emoluments there was no such breach of the contract as could afford any grievance to the Petitioner. If one month''s notice had been given, the Petitioner would have been liable to work for one month more and then been entitled to the emoluments payable for that month. Her only right was the right to receive the emoluments. Her working for one month was by way of an obligation imposed on her. The state of our jurisprudence and the condition of our law has not yet reached the stage where right to work has been recognised. What is recognised is that for work done one is entitled to remuneration in accordance with the contract of service or statutory rules in that behalf. If, as in the present case, the Petitioner received the remuneration which she would have earned for working for one more month, and it was received without having to work for that month, the Petitioner can hardly be aggrieved by that circumstance. In this regard, reference may be made to Punjab State v. Shri Mohan Singh Mahli 1970 S.L.R. 194.

The terms and conditions of the contract do not lead to & the inference that payment of one month''s pay and allowances in lieu of notice made the termination order void and that, therefore, the Petitioner must be treated as continuing in ser '' vice. If anything, it was a mere irregularity.

The next contention is that the termination of the Petitioner''s employment was mala fide inasmuch as it had already been decided to appoint the fifth Respondent and for that purpose to terminate the Petitioner''s employment. Reference is made to a letter of the then Minister for Industries, Himachal Pradesh, recommending the case of the fifth Respondent to the Departmental Recruitment Committee. It is not possible to accept the allegation that the Government had decided to remove the Petitioner in order to accommodate the fifth Respondent. The decision to fill up the post in accordance with the rules was taken long before the fifth Respondent had anything to do with the matter. It was only after applications were invited that the fifth Respondent came forward and met the Minister with an application for employment. I have seen the original record, and the letter of the Minister states that the fifth Respondent''s application was being forwarded and that as she was well qualified she should be given employment in some post. There was no request or order in that letter that the fifth Respondent should be accommodated in the post of Cutting and Tailoring Instructress, Industrial Training Institute, Solan. A number of candidates for that appointment were interviewed by the Departmental Recruitment Committee, and the fifth Respondent was only one of them. In the opinion of the Committee she was the best candidate. The Members of the Committee have filed their affidavits on the record and so has the Minister. According to the affidavits the selection of the fifth Respondent was made on its merits and was not prompted by any extraneous influence. There is no reason why the affidavits should not be believed. In my opinion, the material on the record is insufficient to prove the charge of mala fides levelled by the Petitioner. In any event, it is necessary to note that the Petitioner was from the very beginning regarded as holding an ad hoc appointment, and when the decision was taken to make an appointment under the rules to that post it was by necessary implication a decision also to terminate her services. Therefore, the advent of the fifth Respondent made little difference so far as the Petitioner was concerned.

But before parting with this matter, I am compelled to observe that letters of recommendation issued by superior authorities and officers to recruitment committees do little to advance the interests of fair play and justice. They often tend to place an honest and impartial administrative tribunal under suspicion, and unnecessarily put it on the defensive against allegations of undue and improper influence.

Learned Counsel for the Respondents raised the plea that relief should not be granted to the Petitioner because by the writ petition she was seeking the enforcement of a contract between the parties, and for that a suit was the proper remedy. As the contentions raised on behalf of the Petitioner fail on their merit, it is not necessary for me to go into that objection.

The petition fails and is dismissed, but in the circumstances there is no order as to costs.