Smt. K.S. Radhamani and Another vs Steel Authority of India Limited, Bhadravathi and Another

Petitioners in these cases have challenged the legality and validity of the impugned orders at Annexures-U and V, dated 8-8-1995 passed by the convener of the Governing Council-second respondent terminating their services from their respective posts which they holding in the Shishuvihars on the ground that the second respondent has decided to close down the Shishuvihars run by them for the reasons mentioned in the termination orders and further their appointment orders have not been approved by the Assistant Educational Officer, Bhadravathi. The correctness of these orders are challenged by the petitioners in these petitions urging various facts and legal contentions.

Certain undisputed relevant necessary facts are stated as hereunder:

For the purpose of considering the respective cases of the parties and answer the same with reference to the rival contentions urged by them on behalf of the parties as per the proceedings of the first respondent dated 31-5-1983 approval was granted by the erstwhile management of the VISL for starting a Shishuvihar at HUDCO Colony which was decided to be administered and managed by the second respondent-Governing Council. As per the decision of the second respondent to appoint one Trained teacher, ayah and attender as per the State Government Rules. The proceedings were recorded that the Education Department would consider and sanctioned the grants at the rate of 50% after completion of five years of establishment of its Educational Department. The proceedings are produced at Annexure-A. The first petitioner was appointed as a Nursery School Head Mistress to the Shishuvihar, HUDCO Colony as per the Karnataka Government Rules, vide memo dated 17-6-1983 issued by the Governing Council as per Annexure-B. Another memo dated 20-6-1983 was issued to her informing that her duty report was accepted and her certificates were also verified and accepted. Similarly, the second petitioner was also appointed as a Nursery School Teacher on 17-6-1983 in the pay scale of Rs. 550-1050 + other admissible allowances as per the rules referred to supra. Her duty report also accepted. Annual increments have been regularly sanctioned to the petitioners under their staff group of the second respondent-Educational Institution. The pay scales and other allowances payable to them as per the rules were revised during the period from 1987 and also during 1993 but the benefit of revision of pay scales was not granted to the petitioners. In that regard representations dated 14-9-1991 and 25-7-1992 has been submitted by the petitioners and others to the Chairman of the Governing Council. Another representation dated 6-8-1992 was also submitted.

The management of the second respondent had taken a decision as per its office order bearing reference No. PL(Estt)/435, dated 31-3-1993 to absorb as many as 25 teachers in the erstwhile VISL Works area after giving them necessary training to work in the various departments. It is stated that the above said 25 teachers have been working in different departments of the erstwhile VISL on 4-8-1993 an office order was issued regulating the pay scales of the teachers. It is the further case of the petitioners that the second respondent has not retrenched any one of the teachers, the second respondent has issued a circular dated 11-3-1995 stating that it has decided to close down the Shishuvihars run by it on the alleged ground that there was thin attendance in the Classes. Besides, circular was followed by another order dated 31-3-1995 issued by the convener of the second respondent-Governing Council for Shishuvihars once again ordering closure of the Shishuvihars directing the Head Mistresses not to admit children for the next academic year. Petitioners have submitted another joint representation dated 30-6-1995 to the erstwhile VISL represented by its Executive Director requesting him for providing any suitable job consisting with their qualification and their present pay scale and emoluments.

Learned Counsel Mr. Narayan Bhat, submits that the services of the petitioners have been illegally and arbitrarily terminated under the guise of the decision to close down the Shishuvihars and further the Education Department did not approve their appointment. He elaborates his submission contending that as on the date of passing the impugned orders, petitioners have completed for more than 12 years of continuous services. Therefore, it is urged the reasons assigned in the termination orders are not tenable and it is a clear case of mala fide exercise of power and the reasons assigned in the termination orders are only with a view to justify the illegal action of the respondents. It is contended by the learned Counsel on behalf of the petitioners that the salary including other staff members have been paid from the welfare fund of the first respondent. In support of the submission, he has placed reliance upon the provisions of Sections 98, 99 and 105 of the Karnataka Education Act, 1983 (in short called as "KEA Act") which has come into force with effect from 1-6-1995. He has elaborated the submissions contending that the impugned orders of termination amount to retrenchment of the petitioners employees by the second respondent, therefore the same should have been passed subject to compliance with the mandatory provisions of the Act as specified under sub-section (2) of Section 98 of the Act and Rules referred to supra. By reading the orders of termination as contemplated under Section 99, the termination of the services of the petitioners is otherwise than as a measure of punishment, would amounts to retrenchment. Therefore, the petitioners are entitled to be paid compensation i.e., 15 days salary for every completed years of service subject to the maximum 15 months salary. The State Government in exercise of its power under Section 145 of the Act and the rules called as ''Karnataka Educational Institutions (Recognition of Primary and Secondary Rules) Rules, 1999 have been framed, but the same have no application to the facts of this case for the reason that the termination orders were passed anterior to the framing of the said rules. Therefore, in view of Section 146(3) of the KEA Act, under the heading repeal and savings the rules in respect of the matters relating to code of conduct of employees framed have got application to the facts of the present case. In view of Section 146(3) of the Act of 1983 the rules framed under the repealed Act namely. The Karnataka Private Educational Institutions (Disciplinary and Control) Act, 1975 were made applicable to the present case. The State Government in exercise of its power under Sections 3 and 15 of the Act of 1975, it has framed rules called as ''Karnataka Private Educational Institutions (Disciplinary and Control) Rules, 1978 as per Rule 27, the payment of retrenchment compensation is provided at the rate of 15 days salary for every completed year of service subject to the maximum of 14 months salary to the petitioners. Rule 5 of the said rules also provide for the scale of pay of an employee to an educational institution shall not be lower than the scale of pay of an employee of a corresponding post in the Government Educational Institution.

It is further contended that the decision of the Governing Council to close down the Shishuvihars vide its decision dated 31-3-1995 with effect from 10-4-1995 is questionable and the same is arbitrary, unreasonable, unjustifiable and a clear case of unfair action on the part of the second respondent, as it has bluntly violated the aforesaid provisions of the Act and Rules. Therefore, it is submitted that the impugned orders are not in conformity with the provisions of the Act and the law laid down by the Apex Court. Further, as could be seen from the impugned orders of termination passed against the petitioners the retrenchment compensation as contemplated under Rule 27 read with Rule 5 of the Rules of 1978 have not been paid to them by the second respondent, which is mandatory in law. Therefore, the orders of termination passed against, the petitioners are void ab initio, in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case in State Bank of India v Shri N. Sundara Money, AIR 1976 SC 1111. The said judgment has been approved by the Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court in the case in Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Limited, Chandigarh and Others v The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Chandigarh and Others, 1990-II-LLJ-70 (SC), for the proposition that the non-payment of retrenchment compensation as required under the provisions of the Act and the Rules referred to supra rendered the impugned orders are bad in law. The payment of retrenchment compensation by the respondents under the provisions of the Act and Rules referred to supra is as a social security measure to the petitioners for their livelihood till they get an alternative employment. Therefore, the payment of amount to the petitioners towards the retrenchment compensation is mandatory in law. The mandatory Rule 27 of the Rules of 1978 is not complied with by the respondents, therefore the orders passed by them is a nullity in the eye of law. Therefore, the learned Counsel on behalf of the petitioners submits that this Court has to grant the reliefs as prayed for in these petitions.

At the outset, it is contended by the learned Counsel Mr. M. Ravi Prakash, on behalf of the respondents that these writ petitions are not maintainable for the reason that they have got an effective statutory alternative remedy of filing appeals under the provision of Section 94 of the KEA Act of 1983 not availed the effective alternative remedy as provided under the Act by approaching this Court would be depriving a valuable right conferred upon the second respondent to justify its orders after adducing evidence to substantiate the case before the Education Appellate Tribunal constituted under the provisions of the KEA Act. In support of this submission he has placed reliance upon the judgment of Supreme Court in The Workmen of M/s. Firestone Tyre and Rubber Company of India Private Limited v The Management and Others, AIR 1973 SC 1227. This valuable right to the respondents has been deprived by the petitioners. Therefore, it is contended by the learned Counsel on behalf of the respondents that the petitioners are not entitled for the reliefs in this petition. It is also stated that the petitioners salary were being paid from the welfare fund of the first respondent and therefore the absorption of other teachers in the respective jobs in respect of other schools cannot be equated with the running of the schools by the respondents as those schools were recognised by the State Government. The respondents have traversed all the petition averments and the allegations made therein in their Counter statement. All the statement of facts as urged in the counter statement are not stated in this order, as the same is not necessary for the purpose of considering and answering the rival contentions raised in this petition. The learned Counsel for the respondents has also further stated that no direction can be issued by this Court to the first respondent to absorb these persons in the alternative jobs of the first respondent for the reason that the first respondent had 12,000 employees, the same has been substantially reduced to 6,000 and further denied the claim of the petitioners that the first respondent is required to provide schools and other amenities including Education of the children of its employees. It is further stated that running of the schools and the Shishuvihars by the second respondent is not the function of the first respondent. The second respondent is a Governing Council, which is neither a body nor a party of the first respondent. It is only an association of persons established for the proper management of the Shishuvihars run by the second respondent. However, it is admitted that Shishuvihars run by the Governing Council has approached the Education Department for grant of additional 50% grant-in-aid for running the same and they were getting the grants, learned Counsel on behalf of the respondents submits that the closure of the Shishuvihars run by the 2nd respondent is justified by the Governing Council. Further it is stated that this Court in exercise of its power under Section 226 of the Constitution of India cannot examine the legality and validity of its decision of closure and quash the same for the valid reason of non- availability of the required strength of the students to the Shishuvihars, and therefore, it has decided to close down the Shishuvihars run by it. The decision was taken consequent upon such decision in exercise of the power under the provisions of Section 98 of the Act, the services of the petitioners have been terminated and the same shall not construed as retrenchment in terms of the definition of retrenchment, as contended by them. Therefore, the submission made on behalf of the petitioners, that non-compliance of the mandatory requirements under Rule 27 of the Rules of 1978 in not paying the retrenchment compensation and not issuing one academic year notice to the petitioners before terminating the services of the petitioners for the reasons mentioned in the impugned orders do not render the same void ab initio in law. Therefore, the learned Counsel on behalf of the respondents has prayed for the dismissal of these writ petitions.

A detailed statement of counter is filed by the respondent 2 justifying the termination orders passed against the petitioners contending that the reasons under which the termination orders are passed as justified, as the same are legal and valid in law for the reason that the mamagement has got every right under the provisions of the KEA Act to close down its Educational Institution as it was not advisable for them to run its Shishuvihars as there was no requisite strength of students. Therefore, it is stated that was inevitable for the second respondent to close down the Shishuvihars and a decision to this effect has been taken to close down the Shishuvihars with effect from 10-4-1995, which cannot be termed as either illegal or arbitrary and further the learned Counsel Mr. Ravi Prakash would elaborates his submissions contending that the appointment of the petitioners to their respective posts in the Shishuvihars was subject to the approval of their appointment was required to be accorded by the Education Department under the Rules, which were in force at that relevant point of time. Approval was not accorded by the Education Department despite the fact that they have rendered 12 years of service in their respective posts of the institution. Therefore, it is contended that the services of the petitioners could not be benefitted in the employment of the second respondent institution, hence the services of the petitioners were rightly terminated.

Having regard to the rival contentions urged on behalf of the parties this Court is required to answer the preliminary objections raised regarding the maintainability of the writ petition. Having regard to the specific stand taken by the second respondent that it is neither an authority nor state in terms of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the second respondent is not a society registered under the provisions of the Karnataka Societies Registration Act and there are no statutory duties conferred upon the first respondent to discharge its public duties to run the educational institutions and Shishuvihars to impart education to the children of the employees of the first respondent. This submission is required to be examined by this Court with reference to the law laid down by the Apex Court in K. Krishnamacharyulu and Others v Sri Venkateswara Hindu College of Engineering and Another, AIR 1998 SC 295. Similar legal contentions urged in the said case. The Apex Court with reference to Article 226 interpreting Article 39(d) of the Constitution of India regarding payment of equal pay for equal value of work as per the executive instructions issued by the Government. The Apex Court has laid down the law at paragraph 4 as hereunder:

"4. It is not in dispute that executive instructions issued by the Government have given them the right to claim the pay scales so as to be on par with the Government employees. The question is when there is no statutory rules issued in that behalf, and the institution, at the relevant time, being not in receipt of any grant-in-aid; whether the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not maintainable? In view of the long line of decisions of this Court holding that when there is an interest created by the Government in an Institution to impart education, which is a fundamental right of the citizens, the teachers who teach the education gets an element of public interest in the performance of their duties. As a consequence, the element of public interest requires to regulate the conditions of service of those employees on par with Government Employees. In consequence, are they also not entitled to the parity of the pay scales as per the executive instructions of the Government? It is not also in dispute that all the persons who filed the writ petition along with the appellant had later withdrawn from the writ petition and thereafter the respondent-management paid the salaries on par with the Government employees. Since the appellants are insisting upon enforcement of their right through the judicial pressure, they need and seek the protection of law. We are of the view that the State has obligation to provide facilities and opportunities to the people to avail of the right to education. The Private institutions cater to the needs of the educational opportunities. The teacher duly appointed to a post in the private institution also is entitled to seek enforcement of the orders issued by the Government, the question is as to which forum one should approach. The High Court has held that the remedy is available under the Industrial Disputes Act. When an element of public interest is created and the institution is catering to that element, the teacher, the arm of the institution is also entitled to avail of the remedy provided under Article 226; the jurisdiction part is very wide. It would be different position, if the remedy is a private law remedy. So, they cannot be denied the same benefit which is available to others. Accordingly, we hold that, the writ petition is maintainable. They are entitled to equal pay so as to be on par with Government employees under Article 39(d) of the Constitution".

In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the above said judgment and having regard to the undisputed fact that the first respondent being an authority as defined under Article 12 of the Constitution of India as the same is being managed and administered and controlled by the Government of India as it is a public limited Company under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 to impart education to the children of its employees who are residing in the HUDCO colony is the public duties entrusted to it. Therefore, it has started its Educational Institution and Shishuvihars by spending amount from the welfare fund which is being paid by the Management and it is also an undisputed fact that the second respondent was getting 50% of the aid from the State Government for the purpose of running its Educational Institutions and the Shishuvihars. The Supreme Court in the case in Jawahar Lal Wadhwa and Another v Haripada Chakroberty, AIR 1989 SC 606, the opening of the schools, educational institutions and Shishuvihars is in discharge of the public duties as held by the Supreme Court in the case referred to supra. The law laid down in the said case has been approved by the Apex Court in another case in Unni Krishnan J.P. v State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1993 SC 2178, wherein the Apex Court has laid down the law stating that discharge of public duties in running the schools either by Government or by Private Educational Institutions subject to the regulation of certain relevant statutes and the rules which are framed under State Legislature which are applicable to the institutions. Therefore, such institutions are amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the Unni Krishnan''s case referred to above the Educational Institutions which are being run under the control of the first respondent cannot contend that it is not an authority as defined under Article 12 of the Constitution and therefore it is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. For the reasons stated supra and the law laid down by the Apex Court as referred above the respondents are amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and therefore the preliminary objection raised by the respondents that these writ petitions are not maintainable is wholly untenable in law. Therefore, I have to reject the preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of these petitions and to hold that the writ petitions filed by the petitioners are maintainable and this Court has to examine the correctness of the impugned orders passed by the second respondent.

The second preliminary objection raised by the respondents is that the petitioners should have availed an alternative remedy under Section 94 of the Act is also required to be considered. The Apex Court in the case Whirlpool Corporation v Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai, (1998)8 SCC 1, has clearly laid down the law holding an effective alternative remedy is no bar for this Court to exercise the discretionary power conferred upon this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In another case in Billa Linga Reddy v The Revenue Divisional Officer and Others, AIR 1996 AP 3, wherein, the Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that no alternative remedy can be availed when fundamental rights of the aggrieved persons are infringed and further it is held that when it is shown to the Court that the orders passed by the authority are in contravention of the fundamental and statutory rights of the petitioners, this Court can exercise its writ jurisdiction, further this Court in the case in Papiah v Union of India, 1981(1) Kar. L.J. 488 (sic), wherein, this Court has clearly laid down the law stating that where it is shown there is violation of the statutory rights and the fundamental rights of the employees, an alternative remedy for the parties is no bar for this Court to exercise its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and grant the relief. In this case as could be seen from the impugned orders at Annexures-U and V passed by the second respondent having regard to the undisputed facts that these persons have rendered 12 years of continuous service in the Shishuvihar run by the respondents. As per Rule 27 of the rules referred to supra, the second respondent was required to pay a compensation of maximum 14 months salary to the petitioners at the time of passing the impugned order, which has not been paid. Therefore, there is violation of the statutory rights conferred upon the petitioners under the provisions of KEA Act and Rules 1978 to that extent and the orders of termination are also contrary to the judgments of the Apex Court in Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Limited, Chandigarh''s case, supra. Therefore, this Court need not reject the petitions on the ground that they have got an alternative remedy of filing appeals under the provision of Section 94 of the Act before the Educational Appellate Tribunal constituted under the provisions of the Act. Therefore, the writ petitions cannot be dismissed directing the petitioners to go and avail an alternative remedy provided to them under the provisions of the Act, for the reason that this Court on 29-3-1995 issued rule and emergent notice. The Division Bench judgment of this Court in Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, Bangalore v Karnataka State Transport Authority, AIR 1984 Kant. 4, relying upon the judgment of the Apex Court, it has been clearly laid down the law when this Court issued the rule, party shall not be driven to the alternative forum. For this reason also writ petition cannot be dismissed on the ground that they have got an alternative remedy. The Division Bench of this Court has held that the rule that the Court does not entertain the petition under Article 226 when there is an efficacious alternative remedy is not a rule of law. The Apex Court in the cases in Dr. Balakrishna Agarwal v State of Uttar Pradesh, (1995)1 SCC 614, another case in Pradeep Post Print v Sales Tax Officer, (1998)4 SCC 90, it has been held that, if matter is pending before this Court shall not relegate the party to avail the alternative provided under the statute. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the cases referred to supra, the legal contention urged by the respondents Counsel that the petitioners have got an alternative remedy to challenge the impugned orders are misconceived have the submissions made in this regard cannot be accepted. In view of the legal position as laid down by the Apex Court, the question which is required to be considered by this Court in this case is whether the orders of termination impugned in this writ petition are legal and valid and to examine the correctness of these orders. For this purpose this Court is required to examine the provisions of Sections 98, 99 and 105 of the Act of 1983. Section 99 termination of service of an employee of educational institute other than the measure of punishment shall be entitled to compensation at the rate of 15 days salary for every one year of completed service, as could be noticed from the impugned orders, the termination of the services of the petitioners is not as a measure of punishment but for the reasons that the second respondent decided to close down the Shishuvihars and the appointment of the petitioners have not been approved by the Assistant Education Officer, Bhadravathi. Therefore, it is a case of retrenchment as contemplated under Section 98 of the KEA Act. The retrenchment is on the ground that the Shishuvihars are closed down by the second respondent, closing down of the Shishuvihars is not permissible under Section 105 of the Act unless a notice not less than one academic year is issued to the petitioners and other employees indicating the intention to do so has been given by the Governing Council to the officer authorised and competent authority in this behalf. In the instant case, this statutory mandatory requirement has not been complied with and further the payment of retrenchment compensation as provided under Rule 27 of the Rules was also not complied with. The amounts specified in the impugned orders is not referrable to the retrenchment compensation, in any event one academic year notice has not been given under Section 105 to the petitioners is an undisputed fact. Therefore, the decision to close down the Shishuvihars is the cause of action of termination of the services of the petitioners. For all the reasons stated supra the termination of services of the petitioners is not as provided under Section 99 of the Act, therefore, this Court has to hold that the termination orders are not legal and valid in law, hence the same are liable to be quashed. The submission made by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents is that the non-compliance of the statutory requirements of the provisions of the Act and Rules do not vitiates the impugned orders and this Court can give a direction to the respondents to pay the retrenchment compensation to the petitioners as provided under the provisions of the Act and Rules, in the event of this Court coming to the conclusion that the termination orders passed against the petitioners are held to be bad in law. Therefore, the learned Counsel for the respondents has urged that the consequential relief of reinstatement directing the respondents to reinstate the petitioners cannot be given in this case. These contentions are considered by this Court and grant the appropriate relief to the petitioners. Keeping in view the law laid down by the Apex Court referred to supra, having regard to the undisputed facts that one Shishuvihar is already closed, the posts are abolished according to the respondents. Therefore, issuing a direction to the respondents for reinstatement of these petitioners do not arise for consideration of this Court.

Having regard to the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Limited, Chandigarh, the termination of the services of the petitioners are not in compliance with the mandatory requirement of the provisions of the Section 99 read with Section 105 of the Act and Rule 27 of the Rules 1978, therefore, the termination orders are rendered void ab initio in law. Therefore, this Court has to record a finding that the termination orders are in contravention of the statutory provisions of the Act referred to above and the law laid down by the Apex Court in the cases cited supra. Therefore, the orders of termination are invalid, inchoate, inoperative in law and therefore the same are liable to be quashed and therefore, submission made in this regard by the learned Counsel Mr. Narayana Bhat, is well-founded and the same must be accepted and grant the relief as moulded in these petitions.

It is well-established principle of law that though this Court comes to the conclusion on the basis of the undisputed facts and the documents on record produced by the parties and holds that the termination orders are bad in law still in exercise of its discretionary power having regard to certain relevant aspects of the case, the reliefs which are required to be granted has to be modified by this Court, keeping in view the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of O.P. Bhandari v Indian Tourism Development Corporation Limited . No doubt, the petitioners have filed additional affidavit in this case stating that the Shishuvihar is not closed, out of two Shishuvihars one Shishuvihar is being run is not disputed by the petitioners further the ground stated in the termination orders stating that these petitioners appointment has not been approved by the Assistant Education Officer is wholly untenable in law in view of Rule 6 of 1978 rules and the Apex Court in the case of Nayagarh Co-operative Central Bank Limited v Narayan Rath, AIR 1977 SC 112, has clearly laid down the law holding that the Appellant Co-operative Bank had appointed the respondent and he has rendered 13 long years of service in the mean time no action was taken, removal of such incumbent on the ground that the appointment shall not made without the approval of the Registrar of Co-operative Societies Act and Rules. The Apex Court considering the legal contentions urged in that case has held that no approval was required to be obtained as he had acquiesced in the appointment having allowed the incumbent to work thirteen years and it was not open to him to set aside the appointment of incumbent. The law laid down in the aforesaid case by the Apex Court with all fours applicable to the fact situations of this case as the petitioners have rendered 12 years of long service in the second respondent-Educational Institutions and the increments were granted to them and 50% of the grant in Aid was being granted to the second respondent institution by the Karnataka State Government is an undisputed fact. Therefore, the second reason assigned in the impugned orders that the petitioners appointment orders were not approved by the Assistant Education Officer is also not tenable in law, hence for this reason also the impugned orders are liable to be quashed.

For the reasons stated supra, the petitioners must succeed and the impugned orders are liable to be quashed. Whether the petitioners are entitled for reinstatement with consequential benefits of full back wages is a question required to be considered and answered having regard to the undisputed relevant fact of closure of one Shishuvihar. Having regard to the submission made by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents reinstatement in respect of these petitions cannot be granted for the reason that the respondents Shishuvihar is closed down even according to the petitioners. Five years time has been elapsed from the date of passing the impugned orders. No doubt, the termination orders have been passed in contravention of the provisions of the Act referred to supra for that adequate relief of awarding the monetary compensation in the interest of justice will be suffice in this case. In this view of the matter, though the orders of termination have been held to be a bad in law by this Court, the normal rule of reinstatement need not be awarded in this case for the reasons stated supra by me and further the question for non-compliance of statutory provisions of the Act and Rules as referred to supra. What is the monetary compensation required to be awarded whether the full salary required to be given or not is the question examined by this Court having regard to the undisputed facts of the case and taken the relevant fact of the social security of the petitioners in awarding monetary compensation in favour of the petitioners. It would be suffice for this Court, keeping in view the well-established principle of law that normal rule of reinstatement of full back wages has to be awarded in the absence, of any material evidence that was required to be placed before this Court by the respondents to show that these petitioners have been gainfully employed from the date of termination till this day.

For the reasons stated supra, the impugned orders at Annexures-U and V are liable to be quashed. The normal rule of direction to the respondents to reinstate the petitioners is not granted but the consequential monetary benefits by awarding suitable back wages are granted by moulding the relief as held by the Apex Court, having regard to the facts of this case referred to supra. Hence, I pass the following order:

Writ petitions are allowed. The rule made absolute. The impugned orders Annexures-U and V are hereby quashed. Reinstatement of the petitioners is denied but the respondents are hereby directed to pay 80% of the salary from the date of termination till this day, on the basis of the pay scale fixed from time to time under Rule 5 of the Repealed Rules of 1978 and further directed them to pay the terminal benefits of gratuity. The order shall be complied with by the respondents within eight weeks from the date of receipt of the copy of this order.